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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Essays
Amartya Sen famously postulates that income is only a means to an end (Sen, 2001). Thus, if
one seeks to measure welfare in a society, one ought to focus on the quality of life instead of
income alone. Sen’s capability approach provides a framework to capture the quality of life. He
states that humans have a variety of “functionings” that they value (Sen, 1980; Nussbaum and
Sen, 1993). Functionings include “beings” and “doings” such as being well-nourished, well-
educated or living in a safe environment. These functionings span a person’s capability set,
which ideally captures the maximum quality of life. While capabilities are difficult to measure,
realizations within each functioning, achievements, are often quite tangible and measurable
given today’s data availability. For instance, an achievement in being well-nourished is a certain
number of calories consumed.
Some argue that with economic growth everyone’s capabilties set expands, and higher
achievements are a logical consequence of income growth. Thus, growth alone might solve
all matters (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2013). Since the 1980s India’s gross domestic product
(GDP) has grown at an annual rate of over five per cent and some years have even touched
double-digits. For various reasons and reforms, the “Hindu Rate of Growth” of the 1960s and
1970s transformed into high-rate growth (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004; Nayyar, 2006; Pana-
gariya, 2008; Drèze and Sen, 2013). India’s growth story is widely celebrated. This celebration
is reflected in the change in narrative adopted by economists such as Bhagwati and Panagariya
(2013) who no longer speak of a growth’s “trickle-down” effect but of “pull-up” growth, which
would lead to employment for the masses of the poor. One would expect the high growth rates
and its corresponding ‘pull-up’ effect to reflect in lower poverty rates.
During the 1980s, more than 40 per cent of India’s population was living on less than one
US dollar a day (Chen and Ravallion, 2010). By 2005, this figure had decreased to around 25
per cent (Chen and Ravallion, 2010). Using its national poverty line, the Government of India
(2014b) estimates a similar stark decline in the poverty headcount ratio, with consumption
poverty reducing by more than half between 1993-94 (45 per cent) and 2011-12 (22 per cent).
Given this success story in achieving high economic growth and reducing consumption
poverty, the enthusiasts of the growth story would also expect such high growth rates to trans-
form the quality of life, even without redistribution of resources (Bhagwati and Panagariya,
2013). However, a closer look at achievements in various functionings of health and educa-
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tion reveals that India has been under-performing in many social indicators (Drèze and Sen,
2012; Drèze and Sen, 2013). For example, the authors find that the mean years of schooling has
only increased to 4.4 years in 2010, from a meager three years in 1990. They also establish that
amongst India’s South Asian neighbors, who are mostly worse off in terms of GDP per capita,
only Nepal accounts for a lower rate in mean years of schooling in 2010. Likewise, in terms
of child mortality (under five years of age), India is second last among South Asian countries.
While Sri Lanka, for instance, has a child mortality rate of 17 per cent in 2010, India’s rate is 63
per cent. India also accounts for the largest number of underweight children world-wide. Al-
most every second child under three years was underweight in 1998-99 and 2005-06 (Deaton
and Drèze, 2009). A measure that captures India’s poor performance using household level
data is the multidimensional poverty index (MPI). Counting joint deprivations in ten indica-
tors within the dimensions of health, education, and living standards, almost 50 per cent of
India’s rural population was deprived in at least one third of the indicators, in 2005-06. Thus,
while income growth certainly matters, for higher tax collection for example (Drèze and Sen,
2013), evidence shows that it does not immediately and necessarily translate into improved
welfare or quality of life.
In this dissertation, I highlight the state of India’s welfare during the last decade. I focus
on the most fundamental end, consumption, and consider income a means to this end. Con-
sumption as an indicator of welfare is measured in two ways - increase in consumption as a
response to welfare programs, and smoothing of consumption patterns in the context of fluc-
tuating household income. Given the high undernourishment as a result of food consumption
deprivation, I also examine the composition of food consumption of rural Indian households
to determine the incidence, intensity and type of nutritional inadequacies. In the following
paragraphs, I briefly discuss the themes and chapters of this dissertation.
Recognizing the abject poverty and severe living conditions of it’s population (especially in
rural areas), since independence, the Government of India (GoI) has been implementing social
welfare programs, such as food rationing, support prices for farmers, drought relief, and em-
ployment schemes amongst other public initiatives (see Drèze and Sen, 1989, for a discussion
on the history and usefulness of public action). During the period of high growth rates, too,
the GoI implemented several social security reforms, most of them following a rights-based
approach (see Drèze and Khera, 2015, for an extensive overview). One such major program is
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), enacted in 2005. Its primary aim
was to “improve the livelihood of the poor” (Government of India, 2013b), by providing 100
days of work to any rural household that demanded it. The coverage of the NREGA is exten-
sive, with more than 40 million households receiving employment in some years (e.g. 2009-10).
The program costs the Indian exchequer on average four per cent of its annual expenditure. In
the early years, much employment was generated in some of the poorest districts of the states
of Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, and Madhya Pradesh, employing many tribal communities and
female workers (Drèze and Oldiges, 2011).
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Despite such achievements, several questioned the purpose of the Act (e.g. Economist,
2008), while others discussed its effectiveness to reduce poverty (Murgai and Ravallion, 2005).
Though the NREGA has received resistance and criticism (consult Drèze, 2011, for a discus-
sion), research on the NREGA has largely found positive effects for the rural population.
Labor market studies, for instance, find that the NREGA has increased rural wage rates by
up to five per cent (Azam, 2012; Berg et al., 2012; Imbert and Papp, 2015), while female wage
rates registered some increase (Zimmermann, 2014). Given the large female workforce em-
ployed under the NREGA, studies on the impact of female employment on child education
find that the NREGA has an indirect but beneficial effect on school enrollment and learning
outcomes of children (Afridi et al., 2012; Das and Singh, 2013). While it is generally found
that the NREGA empowers women (Narayanan, 2008), research also finds that manifold and
useful assets are built under the NREGA, even in the state of Maharashtra, where the NREGA
was known to be less active (Ranaware et al., 2015). Deininger and Liu (2013) and Ravi and En-
gler (2009) find welfare enhancing effects and declining poverty rates due to NREGA works in
South India. In general, however, research on welfare effects of the NREGA has been limited
to certain regions.
Architects of the NREGA envisioned it as a social safety net for the poor, to rely on during
times of great distress, and it has proven to be one. For instance, during the drought-year 2009-
10, NREGA employment peaked. Rural households are generally considered to be highly vul-
nerable to diverse shocks such as droughts and the subsequent destruction of crop, livestock,
and land. Further, poor households are often not well insured against health shocks, death in
the family, unemployment and other risks. Due to the reliance on agriculture and casual labor,
income of rural households is considered to be highly volatile. However, research on rural In-
dian households with data on the 1970s and 1980s from the Indian Crop Research Institute
of the Semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT) shows that household consumption does not follow as
volatile a path as income. Instead, it is shown to co-move with average village consumption
and is much less affected by idiosyncratic shocks as one might expect (Townsend, 1994; Ja-
coby and Skoufias, 1998). Further research on the ICRISAT villages for the same time period
shows that households are able to smooth consumption by smoothing labor income (Kochar,
1995, 1999; Morduch, 1995). In India, microfinance institutions have grown immensely, and
access to microfinance is considered a promising tool for the poor to smooth consumption
(Morduch, 1998, 1999a). Some of the latest research, however, questions whether the poor are
indeed able to smooth consumption as hypothesized by so many, reiterating concerns by Jalan
and Ravallion (1999). A recent study on rural households of Central India, using consumption
and income data for 2009, 2010, and 2011, shows that the poorest households are much less
insured against rainfall shocks than wealthier households (Gaurav, 2015). Therefore, there is
reason to believe that the poorest are not immune to idiosyncratic shocks, despite economic
growth and its “pull-up” factors. In addition, given the emergence of microfinance institutions
and a general increase in the access to banking, the question arises whether and how the rural
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poor are able to utilize the latest development to mitigate income risks.
In terms of the composition of food consumption realized by rural households, and given
the huge rates in child undernourishment, it is natural to ask what diets rural Indian house-
holds follow. Being well-nourished is certainly the most basic functioning in the capability
space of health. However, unlike other countries which experienced economic growth and
a subsequent transition to more diverse diets (Drewnowski and Popkin, 1997; Tilman and
Clark, 2015; Smith et al., 2016), evidence for India does reveal some, albeit weak evidence, for
a transition away from cereals-based diets (Kumar et al., 2007). Deaton and Drèze (2009) show
for the last decades, that there has been a decline both in per capita calorie consumption as well
as in proteins and other nutrients. While nutritional diversity is an end in itself for many and
carries an intrinsic value, there is an established link between diverse diets and nutritional out-
comes (Arimond and Ruel, 2004a). Several determinants of the quality of life depend to a large
extent on adequate and diverse nutrition. Diverse childhood nutrition is shown to impact cog-
nitive development, physical stature, strength, earlier school enrollment, and ultimately adult
productivity (Alderman et al., 2005). For India in 2005-06, Menon et al. (2015) demonstrate
that dietary diversity of young children is strongly correlated with height-for-weight z-scores
(HAZ), weight-for-age (WAZ) z-scores and underweight. Even though their findings do not
allow causal interpretations, inadequate nutrition is very likely one of several reasons for the
extremely high rates of child undernourishment. Thus, it is warranted to provide for a clear
picture of dietary diversity in India using appropriate measures.
In this dissertation, I discuss the three topics related to consumption as a measure of
welfare in three separate chapters.
Safety Net for India’s Poor or Waste of Public Funds? Poverty and Welfare in the Wake
of the World’s Largest Job Guarantee Program
In the first essay, titled “Safety Net for India’s Poor or Waste of Public Funds? Poverty and
Welfare in the Wake of the World’s Largest Job Guarantee Program,” co-authored with Stefan
Klonner, I study the effect of the NREGA on rural households’ welfare. In line with the Act’s
official objective of “ensuring social protection for the most vulnerable people living in rural
India,” one particular focus of our analysis is the NREGA’s potential for improving the situ-
ation of the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups of the rural population. We study
households belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (SC/ST), which account for
about 30% of India’s rural population according to the 2011 Census.
We make use of the phase-wise roll-out of the Act. The NREGA was implemented first in
200 districts in the fiscal year 2006-07 (Phase 1), in another 130 districts in 2007-08 (Phase 2),
and the remaining 295 districts in 2008-09. We construct a district-level panel with NSS con-
sumption and program coverage data for the years 2005-06 and 2007-08 to estimate effects of
the presence of NREGA on rural households’ consumption expenditures and consumption-
based poverty measures. To deal with potential endogeneity in the assignment of program
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placement, we conduct an instrumental variable estimation similar to Zimmermann (2012).
Toward this, we use an official district poverty ranking by India’s National Planning Com-
mission from 2003, which has served as the basis for program allocation to districts in Phase
2 in 2007-08. Following Zimmermann (2012), we predict actual program status of a district
in 2007-08 by whether it is among the 130 poorest eligible districts according to the 2003
Planning Commission ranking, and regress the outcomes of interest on program status thus
instrumented.
Our results are as follows. For the sample of all rural households residing in NREGA
Phase II and Phase III districts, we find a statistically significant effect on neither the average
level of consumption nor consumption-based poverty measures. For the subsample of SC/ST
households, in contrast, we find large effects on both average consumption and poverty
for the agricultural slack season in spring while there are no statistically significant effects
for the fall season. According to our point estimates, which are imprecisely measured, the
Act has increased SC/ST consumption during the spring season by as much as 20 percent
and reduced poverty by 40 percent. Our findings are compatible with a scenario where the
Act has reduced seasonal consumption fluctuations for SC/ST households in India’s poorer
districts in a sustained fashion by increasing spring consumption to levels close to those
during the fall season. Based on rough cost-benefit analysis of the NREGA, we conclude
that households have used the bulk of the wages earned from the program for immediate
consumption and that the program’s wage expenditures have been highly cost-effective in
increasing consumption of SC/ST households. According to our findings, the Act appears
to have successfully delivered on the two goals, reaching out to the most vulnerable and
improving livelihood security.
Income Shocks, Consumption Smoothing and Financial Market Transactions: Evidence
from Indian Villages
While the first chapter addresses the employment program’s welfare effects at a national level,
in the second chapter’s essay, titled “Income Shocks, Consumption Smoothing and Financial
Market Transactions: Evidence from Indian Villages”, I investigate how NREGA wage pay-
ments are used by households in four South Indian villages for smoothing consumption and
risk sharing in the presence of volatile income. large body of literature that includes the sem-
inal work by Townsend (1994) on three villages visited by the International Crop Research
Institute (ICRISAT). Research in the ICRISAT villages has produced diverging results on the
extent of mutual insurance in village economies. Townsend (1994) largely cannot reject the hy-
pothesis of full insurance, and finds that consumption co-moves with average village income.
Jalan and Ravallion (1999) and most recently Gaurav (2015) are prominent studies, rejecting
the hypothesis of full insurance for the poorest households. While there are many studies
since the 1990s on Low Income Countries (LICs), examining the effect of changes in income
on changes in consumption, the data quality of self reported income has been a constant con-
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cern (Deaton, 1990; Townsend, 1994). Involving potentially a huge measurement error in in-
come and given its endogeneity with respect to income, many have found ways to instrument
changes in income, and most convincingly so via rainfall shocks (Paxson, 1992; Jacoby and
Skoufias, 1998; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Gaurav, 2015).
In this work, I adopt a unique never before used approach to explore a much explored
research question - how does consumption react to changes in income. Further, I explore
what mechanisms are used by poor households to smooth consumption especially in light of
the recent expansion of microfinance and banking sector. For this purpose, I have visited the
ICRISAT villages in Andhra Pradesh that Townsend visited three decades before me, for ex-
ample Aurepalle in the district of Mahbubnagar. I conducted this field study in collaboration
with Sudha Narayanan. I set out to study the functioning of the NREGA, and the usefulness
of NREGA wages for consumption and financial transactions. From the interviews with
NREGA beneficiaries, it was learned that NREGA wages were often used for immediate
consumption, as well as for the repayment of loans. With this information as a starting, I
combine data collected during the two months of field work with local administrative data
on NREGA activities and ICRISAT’s household-level data. I show that households face
considerable uncertainty regarding the timing of NREGA wage payments. Based on this, I
conceptualize the wage payments as positive income shocks. In high-frequency panel data
analyses, I find that these income shocks do not affect monthly consumption in three of the
four villages. In the poorest of the four villages, however, consumption responds statistically
significantly to changes in wage income. I calculate propensities to consume of .6, implying
that 60 per cent of additional wage income is immediately consumed for consumption
purposes. Also, for the same village, I find that NREGA wage payments induce repayments
to microfinance loans. I conclude that consumption among the households in three of the four
villages is well-insured against moderate income shocks. For the poorest, however, I reject the
hypothesis of full risk sharing. I argue that access to innovative formal financial institutions
plays an important role in how households deal with income fluctuations. In addition, I
identify female wage payments, allowing me to shed light on intra-household allocations of
income. The latter have been studied much (e.g. Bourguignon et al., 1993; Browning et al.,
1994), but especially in LICs it has been been methodologically difficult to identify gender-
wise payments empirically (Hopkins et al., 1994). According to my findings, female wage
incomes are the key driver for the high propensities to consume and to pay back microfinance
loans. I conclude that the poor utilize a broad ranging portfolio of insurance options to
smooth consumption and that women empowerment can go a long way in achieving that goal.
Measuring Malnutrition and Dietary Diversity: Theory and Evidence from India
In the third and final essay, titled “Measuring Malnutrition and Dietary Diversity: Theory
and Evidence from India,” I develop a framework, the Nutritional Deprivation Index (NDI),
to measure the most basic functioning in the capability space of health: being well-nourished.
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I design the N DI to accurately identify both the incidence and intensity of nutritional de-
privation. Using 2011-12 Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) data on food consumption, I
exemplify various properties of the framework empirically.
Arguing that traditional counting measures, such as the Dietary Diversity Index DDI, in-
hibit great limitations, the N DI serves as a powerful and insightful alternative. It overcomes
three weaknesses of the widely used DDI . These are: one, a neglect of measuring the in-
tensity of food inadequacy; two, a lack of indicator-specific cut-offs, and three, the absence
of person-specific thresholds. Conceptualizing the N DI framework, I adapt and extend the
Alkire-Foster counting methodology, a framework widely used in multidimensional poverty
measurement (Alkire and Foster, 2011; Alkire et al., 2015). I develop two versions of the N DI
framework, one applicable for individual-level data, the other for ordinary household-level
data. Overcoming the inherent weaknesses of the DDI , the N DI framework yields both the
incidence and intensity of food inadequacy. In contrast to the DDI , the N DI allows for id-
iosyncratic and food group-specific thresholds and is thus more effective in identifying the
nutritionally deprived (incidence). At the same time, the N DI reveals the extent (intensity) of
food inadequacy as well as the kind of food deprivation the inadequately nourished face.
Applied to the Indian NSS data, the N DI predicts that more than 30 per cent of India’s
rural population is nutritionally deprived in at least five of eight food groups with an average
intensity of six. Utilizing several advantageous properties of the adjusted AF methodology,
such as dimensional breakdown and subgroup decomposability (Foster et al., 1984; Alkire
et al., 2015), the N DI highlights that the inadequately nourished mostly under-consume leafy
vegetables, fruits, and pulses. The average intensity of nutritional deprivation of the inade-
quately nourished is close to 70 per cent. Decomposing the NDI by states and socioeconomic
subgroups reveals that historically disadvantaged regions and subgroups inhibit the greatest
nutritional deprivations. These include many poor Northern states, stretching from Rajasthan
to Orissa, as well as Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes. I conclude that the N DI may
prove as a useful tool for public policies to target the most inadequately nourished.
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Chapter 2
Safety Net for India’s Poor or Waste of
Public Funds? Poverty and Welfare in the
Wake of the World’s Largest Job
Guarantee Program
Stefan Klonner
Heidelberg University
Christian Oldiges
Heidelberg University
Abstract We examine the effects of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act on
consumption and poverty in rural India. Exploiting the district-wise rollout of the program,
we employ a regression discontinuity design to estimate program effects. We find large,
season-specific effects among a traditionally deprived sub-group of the rural population. A
cost-benefit analysis elicits that consumption increases are of the same order of magnitude
as the wage outlays of the program. Given that consumption among the households that
benefited most had previously exhibited severe systematic seasonal fluctuations we conclude
that the employment program has primarily improved consumption smoothing across
agricultural seasons.
Published under the same title as AWI Discussion Paper Series No. 564, Heidelberg University
2.1 Introduction
Poverty around the globe is concentrated in rural areas. For 2002, Chen and Ravallion (2007)
have estimated that more than two thirds of the 1.14 billion living on less than a dollar per
day resided in rural areas while, at the same time, the rural population share figured at less
than one third. Rural development and poverty alleviation programs have been and continue
to be popular, in particular in low and middle-income countries. Well-known programs have
involved cash-transfers, pensions, free or subsidized food provision including school feeding
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programs, subsidized credit and directed lending, asset creation, and various kinds of agricul-
tural subsidies and extension work (Basu, 1991). In addition to bringing down poverty figures,
the declared purpose of most of these programs is to help poor rural households to cope with
various forms of risk (Lal et al., 2010).
A fundamental problem of all such programs is targeting, that is reaching out to the most
needy (Besley and Coate, 1992). When benefits come at no cost for the recipients and adminis-
trative capacities for ensuring proper targeting are limited, the benefits from welfare programs
have often been found to be captured by wealthy and politically well-connected households
(Basu, 1991; Gaiha, 2000). An additional key challenge of programs which aim at the miti-
gation of risks faced by poor households is that they have to be flexible and able to deliver
immediate benefits when a household experiences an income shock (World Bank, 2013).
It is primarily on these grounds that public works programs have been popular with gov-
ernments around the globe (Subbarao, 2003). According to the World Development Report
2014, in sub-Saharan Africa alone, around 150 public works programs are currently active,
and Subbarao (2003) enumerates several large-scale public works programs in Asia and Latin
America from the 1980s and 1990s. The effort involved in the physical labor has the potential
to ensure proper targeting (Besley and Coate, 1992; Basu, 1991) and households can decide on
a day-to-day basis whether to supply their labor and receive benefits. In addition, public works
programs have the potential to build growth-enhancing local public goods (World Bank, 2013).
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program appears to have been the relatively most costly
recent public employment program in low and middle income countries, consuming two per-
cent of the country’s GDP in 2007 (Lal et al., 2010). India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) has been the largest public works program ever in
terms of absolute outreach and cost, providing employment to fifteen percent of India’s work-
force. In 2012, it accrued a cost of close to $10 billion, about one percent of the country’s
GDP. Introduced in 2006, the NREGA guarantees one hundred person days of employment
to every rural household whose adult members are willing to perform unskilled manual labor
at a statutory minimum wage.
Several recent papers have evaluated the Act’s labor market effects on a national scale
econometrically. Studies using National Sample Survey data on employment (Azam, 2012;
Imbert and Papp, 2013; Zimmermann, 2012), as well as Berg et al. (2012), who use agricultural
wage data from the Indian Ministry of Agriculture, find that the Act has resulted in increases
in agricultural wages. Moreover, female workers and marginalized groups belonging to sched-
uled castes and scheduled tribes, formerly untouchables within the Hindu caste system, appear
to be among the main beneficiaries of the Act.
While rural wages and rural consumption are likely positively correlated, particularly
among India’s rural poor (Lanjouw and Murgai, 2009; Berg et al., 2012), increases in agri-
cultural wages are merely a second order, general equilibrium effect of a public employment
program. In our view, the net welfare effects of this large employment program have received
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too little attention in comparison. In this paper, we set out to assess whether the NREGA
has increased rural households’ consumption, to what extent the Act has helped rural house-
holds to smooth consumption, and whether the program has been well-targeted as far as the
distribution of welfare effects over the rural population is concerned.
We combine data from two waves of India’s nationally representative National Sample Sur-
vey on household consumption with information on the district-wise roll-out of the NREGA.
We make use of the phase-wise roll-out of the Act. The NREGA was implemented first in 200
districts in the fiscal year 2006-07 (Phase I), in another 130 districts in 2007-08 (Phase II), and
in India’s remaining 263 districts in 2008-09 (Phase III).1 We construct a district pseudo panel
with consumption and program coverage data for the agricultural years 2006-07 and 2007-08 to
estimate program effects on rural households’ consumption expenditures and consumption-
based poverty measures. To deal with potential endogeneity in program placement, we em-
ploy a modification of Zimmermann’s (2012) regression discontinuity approach. We use an
official district backwardness index published by India’s National Planning Commission in
2003, which has served as the basis for allocating districts to different phases of the program’s
roll-out. In this process, the declared intention of policy makers has been to give more back-
ward districts earlier access to the program. Following Zimmermann (2012), we predict a dis-
trict’s actual program status in 2007-08 by whether it is among the 130 most backward districts
according to the Planning Commission’s index, and regress the outcomes of interest on pro-
gram status thus predicted. To be precise, we estimate local average treatment effects of the
Act, where "local" pertains to the fact that our estimated effects are for districts that are the
least backward among the 130 districts predicted to obtain the program in Phase II, or equiv-
alently the most backward among the 263 districts predicted to obtain the program in Phase
III.
To assess whether the Act has been well targeted, we study households belonging to sched-
uled castes and scheduled tribes (SC/STs), which account for 29.8 percent of India’s rural pop-
ulation according to the Census 2011 (Government of India, 2011), in detail. In our sample,
among scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, poverty is close to three times the figure for the
non-SC/ST population. Further, we assess to what extent NREGA employment has helped
households to smooth consumption across agricultural seasons. Given that, at least in back-
ward districts, consumption used to plummet during the agricultural slack season in spring, a
particular focus of our analysis is on the Act’s effect on seasonal consumption fluctuations.
Our results are as follows. For the sample of all rural households residing in NREGA
Phase II and Phase III districts, we find a statistically significant effect on neither the average
level of consumption nor consumption-based poverty measures. For the sub-sample of SC/ST
households, in contrast, we find large effects on both average consumption and poverty for
the agricultural slack season in spring while there are no statistically significant effects for the
1These numbers are based on the 2001 Census definition of districts(Government of India, 2001). By now,
the Act is active in all 640 Census 2011 districts (Government of India, 2011).
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fall season. According to our point estimates, which are imprecisely measured, the Act has
increased SC/ST consumption during the spring season by as much as 30 percent and halved
poverty.
In addition to the econometric estimations, we also carry out a detailed descriptive analysis
of seasonal consumption patterns with National Sample Survey data from 2003 to 2012. We
document that, prior to 2007-08, SC/ST households in NREGA Phase II districts experienced
far greater systematic consumption fluctuations between fall and spring seasons than in the
generally better-off NREGA Phase III districts. From 2007-08 onward, in contrast, we find
substantially smaller differences in seasonal consumption and poverty patterns across these
two groups of districts. Combining these descriptive with the econometric results, our find-
ings are suggestive of a scenario where the Act has reduced seasonal consumption fluctuations
for SC/ST households in India’s more backward districts in a sustained fashion by increasing
spring consumption to levels close to those during the fall season.
We also conduct a rough cost-benefit analysis of the NREGA by combining our estimates
with program expenditure data. According to NREGA expenditure figures, more than 80 per-
cent of the program’s wage expenditures in Phase II districts during the agricultural year 2007-
08 occurred during the agricultural slack season, that is the spring of 2008, when NREGA
wages paid to SC/ST employees amounted to about Rs. 60 per rural SC/ST individual. Per
rural SC/ST individual, our most conservative point estimates predict an increase in monthly
average individual consumption due to the NREGA of around Rs. 70. We conclude that the
program’s wage expenditures have been cost-effective in increasing slack-season consumption
of SC/ST households, even if our point estimates of the program’s effect on consumption are
overstated.
This paper contributes to a rapidly growing literature on welfare effects of rural anti-
poverty and development programs. To name only a few examples, Djebbari and Smith (2008),
among many others, study welfare effects of the Mexican PROGRESA conditional cash trans-
fer program. Duflo (2003) studies the effect of old-age pensions on child nutrition in South
Africa. Kochar (2005) and Tarozzi (2005) estimate nutritional effects of India’s public food
distribution system. Rural credit expansion and poverty in India and Bangladesh is the subject
of Burgess et al. (2005) and Pitt and Khandker (1998). Moyo et al. (2007) analyze the effect
of agricultural extension on poverty in Uganda. Regarding public works programs prior to
the NREGA, most existing econometric studies focus on targeting rather than welfare and
poverty (Jayne et al., 2002). An exception is Datt and Ravallion (1994), who find a moderate
poverty-reducing effect of the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, a predecessor to
the NREGA active in only one of India’s states. Regarding the NREGA, most existing em-
pirical research by economists is on labor market rather than welfare effects (see the citations
above). Exceptions are Afridi et al. (2012), who find a positive effect on child schooling in data
from six districts in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Scandizzo et al. (2009) find that the NREGA
smooths household income in two villages in the state of Maharashtra. Under the assumption
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that the manual labor required to receive NREGA benefits is a burden for program partic-
ipants, Lagrange and Ravallion (2012) propose to correct welfare and poverty effects by the
disutility from working on NREGA sites and illustrate this conceptual approach with cross-
sectional National Sample Survey data from the state of Bihar.
In terms of the study object, welfare effects of the NREGA, the following three papers are
closest to ours. Ravi and Engler (2009) use a small panel data set of 320 households residing
in the state of Andhra Pradesh and find that consumption expenditures increase by about ten
percent in response to the Act. Their program effect estimates are based on propensity score
matching and, in our view, rely on rather strong identifying assumptions. Deininger and Liu
(2013) use a panel of 4,000 households residing in the same state. With three waves of data from
2004, 2006 and 2008, they perform double and triple differences estimations and propensity
score matching. Similar to our empirical results, they find that the program was well targeted
and had large effects on food consumption and asset accumulation, particularly among SC/STs
and casual laborers, whose magnitudes exceed the value of direct transfers. Our analysis dif-
fers from these studies in four regards. First, in terms of scope, we consider all major Indian
states. Second, our empirical identification strategy does not rely on parallel trend assump-
tions, which we find not to hold in various placebo estimations. Third, we consider effects
not only on consumption averages, but also on consumption-based poverty. Fourth, and most
importantly, we unfold the seasonal pattern of program effects and show how the NREGA
has not only reduced poverty levels but contributed to consumption smoothing. Bose (2013)
uses two waves of Indian National Sample Survey data to estimate the effect of the first phase
of the NREGA on consumption and poverty. Employing a differences-in-differences estima-
tion technique with Phase I as treatment and Phase III as control group, which requires strong
identifying assumptions, her estimated program effects are similar to ours.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2.2, we discuss the NREGA in some
detail and present the data used in our analyses. We introduce our empirical approach and
identification strategy in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 contains the empirical results, Section 5 var-
ious robustness checks and extensions. A cost-benefit analysis is the subject of Section 6. The
final section concludes.
2.2 Background and Data
2.2.1 The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
The NREGA, enacted in 2005 by the United Progressive Alliance government, was envisioned
as a safety net for rural households. Under the Act every rural household is entitled to 100
days of work at the statutory minimum wage, which is set by the respective state government.
The NREGA guarantees employment within 14 days to any rural resident who is willing to
work, irrespective of income level, gender, caste, or religion. The Act includes a provision for
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an unemployment allowance in case of failure to provide work within this time frame. The
NREGA as a policy instrument is remarkable in two ways; first because of its rights-based
approach and, second, its provisions for transparency and accountability (Khera, 2011). As
to the first, the NREGA marks a move away from doling out benefits to recognizing certain
basic entitlements, including the notion of a right to work and to a minimum income. The
NREGA also draws strongly on the spirit of the Right to Information Act, enacted in 2006,
by defining provisions for enabling transparent and easily accessible administrative records, as
well as processes for public scrutiny and accountability of officials toward beneficiaries. As a
result, since its implementation in 2006, it has been closely monitored by civil society, which
in turn has helped to expose several instances of corruption (Vanaik and Siddhartha, 2008a,b).
The NREGA is not the first public works program in post-independence India. The
National Food for Work Programme (NFFWP) implemented between 2004 and 2006,
is viewed as the predecessor of the NREGA. The Maharashtra Employment Guaran-
tee Scheme, enacted in 1977 and active until the inception of the NREGA, has received
some interest by researchers in the past (Basu, 1981; Drèze, 1990; Ravallion et al., 1993).
Figure 2.1: Phase-wise Roll-out of the NREGA Across Districts
The NREGA started in 200 districts, which we will refer to as Phase I districts, in the fis-
cal year spanning from April 2006 to March 2007. In April 2007, another 130 districts started
implementing the Act (Phase II), and in April 2008 all remaining 263 districts were covered
(Phase III). The spatial pattern of districts’ allocation to the three phases is mapped in Figure
2.1. We identify Phase II and Phase III districts as published on the official website of the Min-
istry of Rural Development (Government of India, 2013c). From the same source we collected
year, district, and month-wise program intensity data. In our subsequent analysis, where we
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approach the NREGA roll-out as a natural experiment, we focus on the fiscal year 2007-08 and
regard Phase II districts as treatment group and Phase III districts as control group. We disre-
gard Phase I of the NREGA for two reasons. First, in the 200 Phase I districts, the NFFWP
had been operating up to the initiation of the NREGA making it difficult to separate effects
of the NREGA from those of the NFFWP. Second, unlike for Phase II and III districts, we are
not aware of a convincing empirical strategy addressing the problem of selection of districts
into this Phase.2
Planning Commission Backwardness Index
In the subsequent analyses we employ a district-wise backwardness index published by India’s
National Planning Commission (Government of India, 2003). For 447 districts in India’s ma-
jor states, this index is calculated from three sub-indices, percentage of SC/ST population,
agricultural output per worker, and the agricultural wage rate. The final composite index fig-
ures between 0.078 (most backward) to 2.159 (least backward). This index has served as the
basis for allocating districts to each of the three phases of the NREGA (Zimmermann, 2012).
In our empirical analysis we use this index for dealing with selection problems in district-wise
program status assignment. Unfortunately, the index is available for only 92 and 163 of the
NREGA’s 130 Phase II and 263 Phase III districts, respectively. All districts listed by the Plan-
ning Commission belong to the seventeen major Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Assam,
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Ma-
harasthra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. As our
identification strategy can only accommodate districts for which the Planning Commission’s
backwardness index is available, our subsequent analysis is restricted to those 255 Phase II and
III districts for which the backwardness index is available.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents key program statistics for our sample of 92 Phase II districts during the
fiscal year 2007-08.3 According to Table 2.1, seventy percent of the program’s expenditures of
about Rs. 30 billion were spent on wages. Given a population of 25.5 million households, this
amounts to Rs. 840 per rural household residing in these districts. Employment in NREGA
works and thus NREGA expenditures follow a marked seasonal pattern. They peak during the
dry spring season when labor demand in rural areas plummets. To illustrate, Figure 2.2 depicts
NREGA wage expenditures per rural inhabitant (not per NREGA worker) in our sample
districts by month. Accordingly, wage expenditures per rural inhabitant stood at less than
Rs. 10 per month during the first six months of Phase II for which program expenditure data
is available (May to October 2007). This figure more than tripled to about Rs. 30 per month
2See, however, Bose (2013) for a comparative analysis of Phase I and III districts in the fiscal year 2006-07.
3For a discussion of the quality of official NREGA program data see Drèze and Oldiges (2011).
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Table 2.1: NREGA Facts for Phase II Sample Districts
NREGA Expenditure in Phase II Sample Districts
Total Expenditure (in million INR) 29,926.17
Expenditure on Wages (in million INR) 21,437.76
Share of Exp. on Wages in Total Exp. (in %) 71.64
Population in Phase II Sample Districts
Rural Population (in million) 149.41
Rural Households (in million) 25.50
Rural SC/ST Population (in million) 38.74
Rural SC/ST Households (in million) 7.11
NREGA Employment in Phase II Sample Districts
Households Employed under the NREGA (in million) 8.99
Per Cent of Rural Households Employed under the NREGA 35.27
SC/ST Households Employed under the NREGA (in million) 4.26
Per Cent of Rural SC/ST Households Employed under the NREGA 59.94
NREGA Person-Days in Phase II Sample Districts
Total Person-Days (in million) 287.14
Person-Days per Rural Population 1.92
Person-Days per Rural Household 11.26
SC/ST Person-Days (in million) 136.05
SC/ST Person-Days per SC/ST Population 3.51
SC/ST Person-Days per SC/ST Household 19.14
Number of Districts 92
NREGA figures pertain to the fiscal year 2007-08. They are in current prices, and are calculated
from district-wise statistics as published online by the Ministry of Rural Development.
Population totals are calculated from district-wise Census 2001 figures.
We use household size figures from our respective NSS samples as given in Table 2.2 and 2.3
to calculate household population totals.
We use SC/ST shares in Person-Days as a multiplier to calculate SC/ST-wise employment figures.
during the agricultural off-season, the first half-year of 2008. During the same period, monthly
wage expenditures amounted to Rs. 55 per capita among SC/ST households. The same figure
also demonstrates that this cyclical expenditure pattern continues into the fiscal year 2008-09.
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Figure 2.2: NREGA Wage Costs
2.2.2 Household Welfare
In our main empirical analysis, we use the 63rd and 64th round of the Indian National Sample
Survey’s (NSS) consumption expenditure module. These two rounds cover the agricultural
years July 2006 to June 2007 and July 2007 to June 2008. Our reason for this choice of rounds
is as follows. For a differences-in-differences estimation of the program effect of NREGA’s
Phase II with one baseline and one endline wave of data, we are bound to use the 64th round
as endline since this is the only agricultural year in which the Act was active in all Phase II
districts but in none of the Phase III districts.4 The natural choice for the baseline is the 63rd
round canvassed in 2006-07. In comparison to prior rounds, such as the large 61st or the slightly
smaller 62nd round, using a baseline as close to the endline as possible minimizes the effect of
confounding factors, which we expect to be numerous given India’s rapid rate of transforma-
tion during the 2000s. There is an additional reason in favor of the 63rd, and against the 61st
round, which serves as baseline in Azam (2012) and Zimmermann (2012). The summer mon-
soon rainfall (June to September) of 2004 was more than fifteen percent below the long-term
average for India as a whole resulting in a kharif (fall) crop failure (Government of India, 2012),
while the monsoon rainfalls during the three following years were exceptionally similar with
deviations from the long-term average of -1.3, -0.4 and +5.7 percent in 2005, 2006 and 2007,
respectively (Government of India, 2014a). Hence, as far as weather conditions are concerned,
the three agricultural years covered by the 62nd, 63rd and 64th round are similar in terms
4This statement is not exactly true as the program commenced in the Phase III districts with the beginning of
the fiscal year 2008-09, that is in April 2008. However, this occurred at a low intensity with average monthly wage
expenditures per capita of less than Rs. 10 in April and May of 2008, which compares to an average of Rs. 34 in
our Phase II sample districts. While the former figure increased to Rs. 23 during the month of June, the resulting
total wage expenditures per capita during the first half-year of 2008 in our Phase III sample districts amount to no
more than Rs. 42, which compares to Rs. 204 in our Phase II sample districts. Moreover, since we expect some lag
between wage disbursement and households’ consumption, and since the interviews conducted by the NSS rely
on a thirty day recall period, we regard the start of NREGA in the Phase III districts in April 2008 as a minor
threat to our empirical approach, which treats Phase II districts as treatment and Phase III districts as control
group. Nonetheless, we will revisit this issue in the robustness checks section.
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of weather conditions, which is mirrored by growth rates of the agricultural gross domestic
product of 5.1, 4.2 and 5.8 percent, while there was zero growth in 2004-05 (Government of
India, 2012). We will revisit the issue of alternative baselines when we address the robustness
of our empirical results.
In all our analyses, a household is the unit of observation; we do not aggregate welfare out-
comes at the district-level. Throughout, we use the sampling weights provided with the NSS
data, which are meant to ensure that consumption aggregates calculated from the household-
level data are representative for the rural population at the individual (not the household) level.
While India’s National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) points out that consumption es-
timates are representative at the district level for neither the 63rd nor the 64th round because
of a sample size which is small by NSS standards (Chaudhuri and Gupta, 2009), we shall point
out here that random sampling within each district is sufficient for consistent estimation of
program effects within our empirical approach. The smaller numbers of observations in these
two "thin" rounds (on average 14,000 households rather than 32,500 in the "thick" 61st round)
will merely reduce the estimation precision.
Our key outcome variable of interest, Monthly per Capita Consumption Expenditure
(MPCE), takes into account a mixed recall period applied by the NSSO, thirty days for high-
frequency items and 365 days for certain lumpy expenditure items. In line with common
practice (Deaton, 2008), all prices are deflated to constant 2004-05 prices using the monthly
Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers (CPI-AL).5 At 0.5 percent per month, rural
inflation was similar to the overall rate of inflation in India during the time period we con-
sider, July 2006 to June 2008. We calculate two poverty measures based on MPCE figures and
state-wise poverty lines suggested by the Tendulkar Commission (Government of India, 2009),
the headcount ratio (HCR), P0, and the poverty gap ratio (PGR), P1 (Foster et al., 1984). The
2004-05 Tendulkar poverty line for rural India, which equals Rs. 446.68 (about 30 US Dol-
lars, purchasing power parity concept) is higher than the previously common Indian national
poverty line, equal to Rs. 356.30 (or $23) (Government of India, 2007). Hence the Tendulkar
poverty measure captures roughly "one dollar a day" poverty. We also experimented with
poverty measures based on the traditional national poverty line but faced a problem of too
little estimation precision because less than fifteen percent of the rural population in our sam-
ple districts is poor by that definition. For the Tendulkar poverty line, this figure stands at 32
percent in our sample.
Summary statistics for the sample of all rural households and the sub-sample of SC/ST
households for the 63rd and 64th NSS round are set out in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
Each table gives sample means by year, phase, and season. For considerations of space, we
have opted not to report standard deviations or standard errors. In accordance with the general
trend since the 1990s, there is a decline in poverty in both samples. Both in Phase II and Phase
III districts and across both groups of households, poverty according to the headcount ratio
5India’s Labour Bureau provides these figures online (Government of India, 2013a).
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and the poverty gap ratio has declined between 2006-07 and 2007-08. At the same time, as
expected, poverty in Phase II districts is higher than in Phase III districts in each of these two
NSS rounds.
There are marked seasonal variations in the distribution of consumption, in particular its
lower part, by NREGA phase. For the sample of all rural households, there is an increase in
poverty as measured by the headcount ratio from fall to spring in Phase II districts in both
rounds while the opposite is true in the less backward Phase III districts. Such a pattern is in
line with smoother consumption across seasons in more forward districts. Given the general
secular decline in rural poverty in India, a smooth consumption path across seasons implies a
slight decrease in poverty from fall to spring in each agricultural year and hence NSS round.
It is only the less backward Phase III districts that achieve such a pattern, however, while
consumption in Phase II districts mirrors the annual agricultural cycle, where the bulk of
agricultural activity, employment and yield occurs during the monsoon-fed kharif (fall) season.
2.3 Empirical Approach: Regression Discontinuity Design
In this section, we lay out our estimation strategy. While the papers by Azam (2012), Berg
et al. (2012), Imbert and Papp (2013) as well as Bose (2013) all rely on the phase-wise roll-out
of the program and use differences-in-differences estimation techniques to identify labor mar-
ket effects of the NREGA, Zimmermann (2012) casts doubts on the identifying assumptions
behind such an approach. The intention of the phase-wise roll-out of the program has been
to bring the program to India’s poorest districts first. The critical identifying assumption of
a differences-in-differences analysis which uses Phase II districts as the treatment and Phase
III districts as control group is that time trends are parallel between the baseline and endline,
2004-05 and 2007-08 in Azam (2012), for example, across Phase II and Phase III districts, that is
between two groups of districts with markedly different baseline characteristics. While Azam
(2012) finds no evidence against such a parallel time trend assumption in employment data
spanning the time period 1999 to 2005, we find strong evidence against this assumption in
NSS consumption data from the 2005-06 and 2006-07 NSS rounds (see below). In our view,
this is not surprising. Given that monthly per capita consumption expenditures were more
than twenty percent higher in Phase III relative to Phase II districts in 2006-07, our baseline
year, Phase II and Phase III districts likely also exhibit markedly different structural features,
such as access to financial and other markets and non-farm employment opportunities for ru-
ral households. That such structural features are predictors of subsequent growth and poverty
reduction rates has been shown for Indian states by Datt and Ravallion (2002) and is, in our
view, likely for districts, too.
To provide intuition for our empirical identification strategy, consider the union set of
Phase II and III districts and suppose that, within this set, Phase II status was assigned to only
the 130 most backward districts according to the Planning Commission’s 2003 district back-
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for All Rural Households
2006-07 2007-08
All Year Fall Spring All Year Fall Spring
Phase II and Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 643.71 651.36 636.46 670.09 672.96 667.20
Log. MPCE 631.80 632.94 630.71 637.47 636.76 638.18
HCR 35.60 35.89 35.33 29.31 30.29 28.32
PGR 7.66 7.45 7.86 5.38 5.87 4.89
HH-size 6.10 6.07 6.13 5.93 6.03 5.82
Crank 3.04 3.73 2.38 3.33 3.32 3.34
SC/ST? (in %) 29.34 27.89 30.71 26.37 25.60 27.15
Laborers (in %) 38.62 39.62 37.68 36.10 35.31 36.89
Number of HHs 14860 7446 7414 12901 6456 6445
Districts 255 255 255 255 255 255
Phase II Sample Districts
MPCE 558.44 585.65 535.42 587.13 590.04 584.27
Log. MPCE 619.50 622.88 616.64 627.09 627.38 626.80
HCR 42.85 41.69 43.84 34.98 34.22 35.72
PGR 9.90 9.20 10.49 6.54 6.59 6.49
HH-size 6.20 6.06 6.32 5.86 5.89 5.83
Crank −2.27 −1.43 −2.98 −1.91 −2.00 −1.82
SC/ST? (in %) 34.99 31.50 37.94 29.80 27.90 31.65
Laborers (in %) 40.69 42.81 38.90 37.17 37.26 37.09
Number of HHs 5703 2856 2847 5450 2728 2722
Districts 92 92 92 92 92 92
Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 711.14 698.20 724.54 728.64 730.19 727.06
Log. MPCE 641.52 640.11 642.98 644.80 643.24 646.40
HCR 29.87 31.75 27.92 25.31 27.58 22.97
PGR 5.89 6.20 5.56 4.56 5.36 3.74
HH-size 6.02 6.07 5.96 5.98 6.13 5.82
Crank 7.23 7.41 7.04 7.03 6.99 7.07
SC/ST? (in %) 24.87 25.32 24.41 23.95 24.01 23.89
Laborers (in %) 36.99 37.36 36.61 35.34 33.97 36.74
Number of HHs 9157 4590 4567 7451 3728 3723
Districts 163 163 163 163 163 163
a Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Notes: Calculated from NSS rounds 63 and 64.
"Log. MPCE" is the natural logarithm of monthly per capita consumption expenditures, multiplied by 100.
Individual weights provided by the NSSO are used so that all figures are representative for the rural population
of individuals.
"Fall" and "Spring" include observations from July to December and from January to June, respectively.
The sample is restricted to Phase II and Phase III districts for which the Planning Commission Backwardness
Index is available.
All measures in 2004-05 constant prices using monthly CPI-ALs, and state-wise Tendulkar poverty lines for 2004-05.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Rural Households Belonging to Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes
2006-07 2007-08
All Year Fall Spring All Year Fall Spring
Phase II and Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 496.93 511.59 484.32 547.39 542.60 551.94
Log. MPCE 610.19 614.25 606.69 621.52 619.85 623.10
HCR 52.72 49.03 55.90 42.56 43.80 41.39
PGR 13.50 12.06 14.74 8.61 9.73 7.55
HH-size 6.20 5.84 6.51 5.60 5.70 5.51
Crank 1.97 2.85 1.22 2.53 2.70 2.37
Laborers (in %) 57.13 61.17 53.65 58.64 56.36 60.81
Number of HHs 3579 1785 1794 2724 1352 1372
Districts 253 239 245 252 240 238
Phase II Sample Districts
MPCE 446.23 494.02 412.67 517.34 511.50 522.40
Log. MPCE 599.00 609.55 591.58 615.88 614.50 617.07
HCR 61.44 50.25 69.31 46.35 46.50 46.21
PGR 17.25 13.60 19.80 9.57 10.32 8.92
HH-size 6.59 5.86 7.10 5.45 5.53 5.38
Crank −3.34 −3.35 −3.33 −2.44 −2.48 −2.40
Laborers (in %) 53.15 55.03 51.83 56.31 52.78 59.36
Number of HHs 1661 829 832 1341 643 698
Districts 92 86 90 92 91 89
Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 553.33 527.17 581.40 573.77 567.54 580.19
Log. MPCE 622.64 618.42 627.17 626.47 624.14 628.87
HCR 43.02 47.94 37.74 39.24 41.63 36.78
PGR 9.33 10.69 7.87 7.77 9.25 6.25
HH-size 5.77 5.82 5.71 5.73 5.83 5.63
Crank 7.87 8.34 7.37 6.89 6.86 6.92
Laborers (in %) 61.56 66.62 56.12 60.69 59.23 62.21
Number of HHs 1918 956 962 1383 709 674
Districts 161 153 155 160 149 149
Notes: See Table 2.2.
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wardness index. Under the identifying assumption that expected consumption growth in a
district is continuous in the Planning Commission’s (PC) backwardness index, a local average
treatment effect of the NREGA could be estimated using a sharp regression discontinuity de-
sign (RDD) by regressing consumption growth of a district between 2006-07 and 2007-08 on
a flexible polynomial in the PC backwardness index and a dummy for belonging to the 130
most backward districts. Notice that, in this case, such a dummy equivalently captures Phase
II status. That dummy’s regression coefficient would yield a consistent estimate of the pro-
gram’s expected effect for a district whose PC backwardness index is at the Phase II - Phase III
cutoff value.
The way the NREGA’s Phase II was implemented deviates from such a clean scenario in
two ways. First, the assignment of Phase II status to districts was implemented at the state
rather than at the national level. This means that, in a first step, each state s was prompted to
nominate a given number of districts, ms say, for Phase II with the guideline that the state’s
poorest districts as measured by the PC backwardness index are to be given priority. Second,
because of constraints in administrative capacity or other reasons such as political favoritism
(Gupta, 2006), no state government nominated precisely the ms poorest districts - as measured
by the PC index - within its boundaries. Instead, some districts that should have been nom-
inated following the PC index rule did not obtain Phase II status while some less backward
districts in the same state did.
The first complication can be addressed by implementing a regression discontinuity de-
sign for each state. The required identifying assumption is that, within each state, a district’s
expected consumption growth rate conditional on the district’s PC index is continuous in
the latter. The second complication can be resolved by employing a fuzzy RDD at the state
level. Toward this, a district’s consumption growth rate is regressed on predicted Phase II sta-
tus, where the prediction is based on the district’s PC backwardness index and the state-wise
PC index rule, rather than actual Phase II status. The additional two identifying assumptions
needed for this procedure are, first, that a district’s probability to be in Phase II is continu-
ous in its PC index and, second, that there is a discontinuous jump in this probability at the
state-specific threshold value of the PC backwardness index.
We implement this latter procedure in two steps. Consider a district as the unit of obser-
vation. In the first step, for each district of state s , we predict the probability of being notified
in Phase II based on whether the district is among the ms most backward districts of that state
according to the PC index. In the second, consumption growth in each district is regressed on
the predicted Phase II probability from the first step and a flexible polynomial in the back-
wardness index.
For practical purposes, Zimmermann (2012) suggests to use each district’s within-state PC
backwardness rank rather than the index itself and to force the polynomial of all states to be
identical. More precisely, for each state, we rank the union set of all Phase II and III districts in
descending order of the Planning Commission’s index. Denoting the PC backwardness index
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for district d in state s by xs d , we consider a district’s rank among the Phase II and III districts
of the same state, ranks d . To be precise, we define
ranks d =
ns∑
i=1
1{xs i ≥ xs d},
where ns is the number of Phase II and III districts in state s and
1{·} denotes the indicator
function. Recall that xs d is smaller, the more backward the district. Then, the way ranks d is
defined, the least (most) backward district of state s is assigned the first (ns ’th) rank. Taking
ms as given for each state, we define the centered rank of a district within its state by c ranks d ,
where
c ranks d = ranks d −ms .
Notice that, within each state, the centered rank of the least backward district that would
obtain Phase II status if, within that state, selection of Phase II districts was based solely on
the PC index, equals zero. Accordingly, the dummy variable 1{c ranks d ≤ 0} tells whether
district d of state s should be a Phase II district if, in each state, districts were allocated to
phases following the PC backwardness index strictly.
Using local linear regression as recommended by Lee and Lemieux (2010), our first stage
estimating equation is
P has e2s d = cs +α
1{c ranks d ≤ 0}+η1 c ranks d
+η2 c ranks d ∗ 1 {c ranks d ≤ 0}+ us d ,
(2.1)
where P has e2s d equals one if district d in state s has Phase II status and us d is a
stochastic error term. Notice that we allow for state-specific intercept terms and a dif-
ferent slope of the regression function to the left and the right of the cutoff value. Fig-
ure 2.3 plots the relative frequency of Phase II status averaged over all seventeen states
in our sample over the variable c rank together with a piece-wise linear regression func-
tion in the forcing variable, which includes a jump at zero. We have trimmed the sam-
ple to include only districts whose c rank is no greater than ten in absolute value. There
clearly is a downward jump in the data where the centered rank equals zero. This is mir-
rored by our first stage estimation results, which are set out in the first column of Ta-
ble 2.4. Accordingly, conditional on a district’s within-state centered rank, its probability
to be in Phase II increases by 67.3 percent if it is among the state’s ms poorest districts.
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Figure 2.3: Probability of NREGA Phase II Status by Centered Rank
While the first estimation stage is for a cross-section of districts, our second stage is for a
repeated cross-section of households forming a district pseudo panel,
ys d i t =µs d + γs t +β ÛP has e2s d ∗D0708t +δ1 c ranks d ∗D0708t
+δ2 c ranks d ∗ 1 {c ranks d ≤ 0} ∗D0708t + εs d i t ,
(2.2)
where y denotes an outcome of interest, i and t are subscripts for households and time periods,
respectively, and εs d i t is a stochastic error term. There are two time periods, one for each
of the NSS rounds canvassed in 2006-07 and 2007-08. The dummy variable D0708t equals
one if an observation is from the latter NSS round. For estimating (2.2), we use the survey
weights provided by the NSSO. This second stage can be viewed as a modified differences-
in-differences estimating equation for a district pseudo panel. The first modification is the
addition of a control variable, the centered within-state rank, which is assumed to be related
to the outcome variable in a piece-wise linear fashion, the second one the use of a predicted
value for a district’s Phase II status rather than the district’s actual program status.
Our estimation strategy as laid out in (2.1) and (2.2) gives each district an equal weight in
the first stage while each district’s implicit weight in the second stage estimation equals its pop-
ulation share. An alternative, more standard, approach to the estimation of the program effect
would be to estimate (2.2) with P has e2s d substituted for
ÚP has e2s d by instrumental variables,
where P has e2s d is treated as endogenous regressor and
1{c ranks d ≤ 0} ∗D0708t is used as
identifying instrument (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In such a specification, each district is
given the same weight, its population share, in both estimation stages. The resulting point
estimate of β is a Wald estimator, the extent of the discontinuity in the outcome variable of
interest divided by the extent of the discontinuity in the probability of being notified in Phase
II. An essential feature of our subsequent empirical analysis is that we will consider alternative
subsets of households. In the instrumental variables approach, the first stage estimation results
and hence the denominator of the Wald estimator of the program effect depend on the district
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weights implied by the respective subset of households that is being considered. As the vector
of implied district weights varies greatly across the sub-samples which we will consider, the
instrumental variables approach yields substantially different program effect estimates in two
alternative sub-samples, even if the discontinuity in the outcome variable of interest is exactly
the same in both sub-samples. System (2.1) and (2.2), on the other hand, avoids this artefact
because the program effect estimates for different sub-samples are essentially Wald estimators
with an identical denominator.6 We will revisit this issue in Section 2.5.4.
We close this section with a discussion of the computation of standard errors for our two-
stage approach. As shown by Murphy and Topel (1985), ordinary least squares standard errors
are biased when a "generated regressor" is used, as in our second stage. Another complica-
tion regarding the calculation of standard errors is that, for each of the two NSS rounds, we
want to allow for a non-zero correlation among the error terms of households residing in
the same district. Since we were not able to find explicit formulas for standard errors when
there is a generated regressor as well as the need for clustering, we calculate clustered stan-
dard errors as if there was no generated regressor in (2.2) and correct those standard errors as
suggested by Murphy and Topel (1985; equation 17) for non-clustered standard errors by the
factor
q
1+ bβ2M SE1/M SE2, where bβ is the estimate of β from an ordinary least squared es-
timation of (2.2) and M SEk denotes the mean squared error from estimation of the k’th stage
estimating equation. We realize that such an approach is somewhat ad hoc. On the other hand,
it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether the resulting standard errors are consis-
tent. Therefore, in Section 2.5.4, we also estimate a standard two stage least squares version of
system (2.1) and (2.2), where consistent clustered standard errors are available, without obtain-
ing any qualitatively different results - that is with respect to sign and statistical significance -
from the ones reported in the next section.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Main Results
Our outcomes of interest are individual consumption and consumption-based poverty mea-
sures. Table 2.5 contains the coefficient estimates of β in (2.2) for alternative dependent vari-
ables and different (sub-)samples of households. We also report the number of districts for
which there are observations in both the 63rd and the 64th NSS round as our estimates of the
program’s effect are based on only such districts. For all regressions whose results are repro-
duced in this table, the predicted values of Phase II status for each district are obtained from the
estimation of (2.1) whose results are set out in the first column of Table 2.4. In all regressions,
6While the point estimate of β in our approach does not exactly equal the ratio between the second-stage
and the first-stage discontinuity, none of the point estimates in Table 2.5 differs from that ratio by more than 1.5
percent of the respective standard error.
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the sample is trimmed such that only districts with a c rank of no more than ten in absolute
value are included.
Standard errors are calculated as described above, that is we conduct an ordinary least
squares estimation of (2.2), calculate clustered standard errors, where a cluster is the set of
households residing in the same district in a given NSS round, and adjust the standard error
for bβ thus obtained according to equation 17 in Murphy and Topel (1985). The correction
factor that obtains for the estimations whose results are set out in Table 2.5 never exceeds 1.1.
All results in Table 2.5 are estimated from the 2006-07 and 2007-08 NSS rounds. From the
upper left panel, it is evident that the trimming results in a loss of 54 districts, 201 instead of
255. Since the 63rd NSS round fails to contain one of these 201 districts, there are 401 clusters.
Comparing the upper and center left panels, we see that 23 percent of the households that are
sampled in the two relevant NSS rounds and reside in either a Phase II or a Phase III district,
belong to scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. That this fraction is substantially smaller than
the share of SC/ST households in all rural households, 26.5 percent, is due to the sampling
stratification employed by the NSSO, by which relatively wealthy households are systemati-
cally oversampled in thin survey rounds (see Table 2.6). While the sampling methodology in
both NSS rounds ensures that almost all districts are represented in each round, SC/ST house-
holds are not sampled deliberately. Hence, even if there are SC/ST households in each district,
random sampling within each district results in no SC/ST households being interviewed in
some districts. Comparing the upper and center left panels of Table 2.5, we see that this has
happened in three instances, that is district-year pairs. A loss of clusters also occurs when we
consider observations from only one of the two agricultural seasons, that is July to December
or January to June. Comparing the center left with the two panels to its right, we see that
such random drawing of the interview date results in a loss of twenty and sixteen clusters in
fall and spring, respectively.
In each panel, the column "MPCE" has logarithmic monthly per capita consumption ex-
penditures at constant prices as dependent variable, while in columns HCR and PGR, the
headcount ratio and poverty gap ratio are the dependent variables, respectively. As pointed
out previously, the estimated effects are not average treatment effects for the set of all Phase
II districts, but local treatment effects capturing the expected program effect for a household
residing in a district that is on the edge of being allocated to Phase II or Phase III as predicted
by the district’s backwardness index.
Turning to the estimation results, there are only small and statistically insignificant results
for our full sample. For SC/ST households, we estimate an increase in logarithmic consump-
tion and economically significant decreases in poverty when pooling the observations from
both agricultural seasons (center left panel). The disaggregated seasonal analyses for SC/ST
households reveal that the effects for the full year are entirely driven by the spring season,
where we find large increases in consumption expenditures and decreases in poverty. Albeit
imprecisely estimated, the center right panel’s entry in the MPCE column implies that SC/ST
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consumption expenditures have increased by 37.3 percent on average due to the presence of
NREGA sights during the agricultural lean season, the spring of 2008. Turning to the poverty
measures, our estimates imply a reduction in the incidence of poverty as measured by the
headcount ratio of 45 percentage points and a decrease in the poverty gap measure of 11.7 per-
centage points. These effects are very large taking into account the 2006-07 reference values
of 69.3 and 19.8 for these two measures. The limited number of observations in the seasonal
SC/ST analyses, each of which comprises only a little more than a tenth of the observations
in our full data set, and the loss of clusters due to random sampling results in a considerable
loss in estimation precision and a lamentable increase in standard errors.
For reference, Table 2.16 contains estimates of β for a variation of (2.2) in which actual
Phase II program status, P has e2s d , is substituted for predicted program status
ÛP has e2s d . Such
a specification amounts to a standard differences-in-differences estimation of the NREGA’s
program effect. While it allows for different time trends in the outcome variable across dis-
tricts by centered rank, it fails to purge any bias in the estimation of β arising from selection
issues. Such a bias will occur in particular if, absent the NREGA, a district that is assigned
Phase II (III) status with a centered rank greater (weakly smaller) than zero exhibits a system-
atically different growth rate in the outcome of interest than predicted by that same district’s
c rank. To make a case, suppose that districts that should have been in Phase II according to
the state-wise PC index rule, that is P has e2s d = 1 if and only if c ranks d ≤ 0, but end up
in Phase III, have an especially poor administrative capacity. If administrative capacity of a
district is positively correlated with its rate of consumption growth absent the NREGA, then
such selection will bias an estimate ofβ upward because on average the growth rate of a district
actually in Phase II is greater than predicted by its c rank and the converse is true for Phase
III districts. Regarding the seasonal pattern of program effects, the point estimates obtained
from this approach exhibit marked qualitative differences relative to the ones obtained from
our two stage procedure for the sample of SC/ST households. As expected, the coefficients
are estimated much more precisely when actual rather than predicted Phase II status is used.
We will turn to the credibility of these differences-in-differences estimates in the context of a
placebo experiment in the next section.
2.5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
2.5.1 Alternative Sub-sample of Vulnerable Households
In this subsection we consider an alternative subgroup of especially poor and vulnerable house-
holds, rural laborers. This is facilitated by the fact that the NSS consumption questionnaires
report the household’s principal occupation. While we would have preferred to look at only
agricultural laborers, we found the resulting sub-sample too small. The union set of agricul-
tural and other laborers, in contrast, is of a similar size (twelve percent larger, to be precise) as
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the one comprising all SC/ST households. According to the descriptive statistics for our base
year 2006-07 in Table 2.14, this group’s and SC/ST’s welfare characteristics, as captured by
consumption and poverty, are very similar. Rural laborers’ average monthly per capita con-
sumption expenditure, headcount ratio and poverty gap ratio figure at Rs. 513, 51.4 percent
and 12.3 percent in 2006-07, which compares to Rs. 497, 52.7 percent and 13.5 percent among
SC/STs, respectively. Still, the two subgroups overlap only partially. In the data set that we use
for our core analysis, 26.5 percent of the population belong to scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes and 36.2 percent are laborers. A little more than half of the SC/ST population report
themselves as laborers. As a consequence, fifteen percent of the population in our full sample
are both SC/ST and laborers, which implies that the majority of laborers, 58 percent to be
precise, does not belong to scheduled castes and tribes. Analogous to our core analysis, we
estimate system (2.1) and (2.2) with the sub-sample of rural laborers only. According to the
bottom panel of Table 2.5, there is no statistically significant effect of the NREGA for this
part of the rural population.
We end this subsection by pointing out that the sub-sample of SC/ST households is our
preferred group of especially vulnerable households. Classification as rural laborer is in re-
sponse to a question regarding the household’s principal occupation, where the three rele-
vant categories for our purposes are laborer, self-employed, and other. In this connection, we
fear two potential problems in conjunction with the NREGA. The first one is a selection is-
sue. The presence of NREGA sights creates additional non-farm employment opportunities,
which may affect a household’s choice of principal occupation. For example, the extra avail-
ability of non-farm employment may prompt a household head that would have formerly
reported himself as working primarily as agricultural laborer to report the household as do-
ing primarily non-agricultural labor. Such an effect of the NREGA should not jeopardize the
consistency of our analysis of rural laborers’ welfare because we consider the union set of agri-
cultural and non-agricultural laborers. Among marginal farmers, however, it is conceivable
that NREGA employment opportunities prompt some households to move from the cate-
gory self-employed in agriculture to laborers. As a consequence, the laborer sub-samples in
our baseline and endline rounds would, in general, not be comparable. The second issue may
be labelled reporting bias. The answer to the occupational question is based on a perception of
the household head. Even if the household’s own occupational activities do not change with
the NREGA, the change in behavior among peer households, in this case working more in
non-farm wage employment, may affect a household’s perception of its principal occupation.
Any of these two effects is likely to result in biased program effect estimates, even within our
identification framework.
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2.5.2 Migration
A concern that arises in the context of our analysis is that the program potentially alters mi-
gration incentives and hence the composition of the rural population in the Phase II and III
districts differently between the baseline and endline surveys. For the Mexican PROGRESA,
for example, Stecklov et al. (2005) find that exposure to PROGRESA reduced out-migration
to the United States by about one fifth while it did not affect domestic migration in a measur-
able way. Given a rate of out-migration to the US of less than a one percent per year, however,
such a program effect on migration would not severely jeopardize an analysis like ours, where
baseline and endline together span no more than two years.
In rural India, migration is substantial. According to the 2001 Census of India, the annual
rate of rural-urban migration stood at around seven percent per year. Our results of substan-
tial welfare improvements among SC/ST households would be jeopardized if the availability
of NREGA sights increased the rate of out-migration among especially poor households or
decreased the rate of out-migration of especially wealthy, non-poor households. In such a sce-
nario, improvements in poverty due to the NREGA would merely be due to a relocation of
poverty away from the rural areas of the Phase II districts. Using a differences-in-differences
estimation approach and NSS migration modules from two years, Ravi et al. (2012) find that
the NREGA drives down migration in Phase II districts by as much as a quarter. Similarly, in
a study of two north-western states of India, Imbert and Papp (2014) find that the NREGA
reduces short-term migration of rural laborers. Such a pattern would lead to a systematic in-
crease in the population of Phase II districts relative to our control (Phase III) districts. While
these authors do not explicitly disaggregate migration flows by initial wealth, both papers find
that the entire effect of NREGA on migration is driven by laborers, which are far more likely
to belong to the poorer half of the rural consumption distribution (see Table 2.14). This im-
plies that the migration effect of NREGA will result in lower average consumption in Phase II
districts - as one would expect intuitively. Hence, our estimates regarding household welfare
should be conservative ones.
2.5.3 Placebo Experiment (or Falsification Test)
In this subsection, we assess the validity of one of the identifying assumptions underlying our
two-stage analysis. In particular, we test whether a district’s expected growth rate conditional
on its c rank does not exhibit a discontinuity at c rank equal to zero absent the NREGA.
Toward this, we estimate system (2.1) and (2.2) with data from the 62nd and 63rd NSS round.
Sample means for the 62nd NSS round are set out in Table 2.15. The results of this exercise
are set out in Table 2.7. For all sub-samples, the point estimates are far from being statistically
significant. The standard errors for the sub-sample of SC/ST households are around forty per-
cent larger in the placebo than in our core analysis, which is due to the smaller number of
observations in the 62nd NSS round relative to the 64th. This raises the issue whether the
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placebo analysis suffers from a lack of power. The absolute magnitude of the greatest point
estimates obtaining in the placebo, SC/ST during fall, is still only about a half of those for
SC/ST during spring in our main estimations, which we take as evidence in favor of the hy-
pothesis that there is no discontinuity in a district’s expected consumption growth rate at the
c rank-cutoff absent the NREGA.
Another potential issue with our placebo is that the NREGA started to operate in Phase II
districts in April 2007. Hence, in our Phase II districts, the last three months of the 63rd round
may be affected by the onset of the NREGA. As Figure 2.2 shows, however, this occurred
at a very low intensity. In particular, no wage expenditures are recorded for the month of
April 2007 and the somewhat greater expenditures during June 2007 are unlikely to affect
June consumption as the consumption data are based on a mixed recall of thirty and 365 days.
In line with this argument, all three point estimates for SC/ST households during spring are
small and insignificant.
Table 2.17 sets out the results of a placebo experiment for a differences-in-differences ver-
sion of (2.2), where P has e2s d is substituted for
ÛP has e2s d . There are large and significant
placebo effects for all rural households during the fall season and for SC/ST households during
spring. Accordingly, consumption growth and poverty reduction between the spring seasons
of 2006 and 2007 was about twice as large as between 2007 and 2008. Taken together, we con-
clude from the results of the two placebo experiments that the parallel time trend assumption
underlying a differences-in-differences approach is clearly violated while the identifying as-
sumptions of the fuzzy regression discontinuity design appear to be valid.
2.5.4 Sampling Weights and Two-stage Least Squares Implementation
of Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
As discussed in Section 2.3, our empirical specification as laid out in (2.1) and (2.2) assigns
equal weights to all districts in the first stage while each district’s weight in the second stage
estimation is equal to its population share. This is the fundamental difference to a textbook
implementation of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, which amounts to two stage least
squares estimation (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The latter can be implemented by conducting
an instrumental variables estimation of (2.2) with P has e2s d substituted for
ÚP has e2s d , where
P has e2s d is treated as endogenous regressor and
1{c ranks d ≤ 0}∗D0708t is used as identifying
instrument. In such a specification, each district is assigned the same weight in each estimation
stage, which equals its population share.
To illustrate the sensitivity of the Wald estimator of the program effect to the choice of
sub-sample within this approach, columns 3 to 8 of Table 2.4 set out alternative first stage
results of a standard instrumental variables version of system (2.1) and (2.2). The third column,
which uses data from all rural households, gives results very similar to the first column. On the
other hand, between the last two columns, which are for the sub-samples of SC/ST households
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during fall and spring, respectively, the difference in the estimated jump varies by almost a
quarter.
As expected, the magnitude of estimated coefficients, which are set out in Table 2.8, is even
more dramatic than in Table 2.5 for the sub-sample of SC/ST households during the spring
season. On the other hand, the order of magnitude and the pattern of statistical significance
across the different sub-samples is unchanged, at least as far as the five percent significance
level is concerned. We take this as support for the validity of our procedure for calculating the
standard errors in our preferred specification. As an additional robustness check, we also carry
out a placebo estimation using instrumental variables estimation and data from the 62nd and
63rd NSS rounds. According to Table 2.18, as in Table 2.7, none of the estimated coefficients
is statistically significant at conventional levels.
A third possibility of weighting districts in the two stages of the estimation is to give
each district an identical weight in both stages. This corresponds to Zimmermann’s (2012)
approach, who carries out all estimations with district averages. Such an approach yields a
program effect estimate which is representative for an average district at the cutoff of the cen-
tered rank, while the estimates set out in Table 2.5 are representative for the population in
districts located around the cutoff. Asymptotically, the resulting coefficients of interest will
be different if the local average treatment effect is heterogenous with regards to district popula-
tion size. The results of this exercise are set out in Table 2.9 and confirm our previous findings
qualitatively. The point estimates are much smaller with this alternative weighting scheme,
however, and only logarithmic monthly per capita consumption of SC/ST households during
the spring season increases in a statistically significant fashion.
2.5.5 Regression Discontinuity Design Applied to only Endline Data
Our estimation strategy in the main empirical analysis can be thought of as a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design applied to changes in welfare outcomes between two years, where the
relevant unit of observation is a district and district averages for each of the two years of data
are calculated from household-level data in a first step. One key identifying assumption of such
an approach is that the expected change in average household welfare in a district conditional
on the district’s backwardness index is continuous in that index absent the NREGA. Over the
last ten years, panel RDD analyses have become common in empirical economics and have
been applied fruitfully in many different contexts (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010, for references).
In this subsection we explore a simpler RDD specification using a cross section of districts
with data from the endline survey only, that is from 2007-08. This corresponds to the fuzzy
RDD textbook case. The underlying identifying assumption then is that the level of expected
average household welfare in a district conditional on the backwardness index is continuous
in that index absent the NREGA. The estimation continues to proceed in two steps. The first
step (2.1) for predicting Phase II remains unaffected. The estimating equation for the second
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step now becomes
ys d i =µs +β ÛP has e2s d +δ1 c ranks d +δ2 c ranks d ∗ 1 {c ranks d ≤ 0}+ εs d i ,
where all observations for y are from the 64th NSS round. We expect this approach to have less
power because pre-program differences between districts become unobserved heterogeneity in
this cross-sectional approach.
The results are set out in Table 2.10. While the pattern of the signs of the estimated coeffi-
cients is the same as in Table 2.5, none of the estimated effects is statistically significant at the
five percent level, which comes as no surprise given our just-mentioned reservations regarding
the power of such an approach in our small sub-samples.
2.5.6 Alternative Baseline Year
In this subsection, we explore the 62nd NSS round as an alternative baseline round. We see
two advantages and two disadvantages using the 62nd in place of the 63rd round as baseline.
Turning to the disadvantages, we expect the residual variance to be greater because of a longer
time spell between baseline and endline. Second, all estimates will be less precise as the sample
size in the 62nd round is only about half of that of the 63rd round. On the other hand, unlike
the 63rd, the 62nd round as a baseline is not affected by the onset of the NREGA in April
of 2007. Finally, compared to the 63rd round, it has a sampling strategy more similar to that
of the 64th round. As set out in Table 2.6, both the 62nd and 64th round follow the Indian
NSSO’s usual second stage stratification strategy, where an equal number of wealthy and non-
wealthy households is interviewed in each block that has been drawn for inclusion in the NSS
sample. It is only the definition of "wealthy" that varies across these two rounds. In particular,
land ownership serves as criterion in the 62nd round while it is the possession of certain assets
in the 64th. The 63rd round, on the other hand, has the singular feature of initially stratifying
by participation in public works. If the sampling weights, which the NSS includes with each
observation, were correct, variations in the second-stage stratification across survey rounds
should not matter. Given the sensitivity of various findings derived from these surveys, e.g.
regional poverty trends, to other survey features, such as the recall period (see, e.g., Deaton
and Kozel, 2005) , we are somewhat skeptical about variations in the sampling methodology,
however. In particular, since SC/ST households demand NREGA employment much more
often than non-SC/ST households, we suspect that the stratification by public works employ-
ment in the 63rd round could lead to a misrepresentation of such households, even when using
the weights supplied by the NSSO.
To assess this possibility, we estimate system (2.1) and (2.2) with the dependent variable
equal to a dummy which takes the value of one if the interviewed household belongs to a
scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe. We would like to stress that, as in all other regressions,
38
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Table 2.11: Regression Discontinuity Analysis of the Incidence of Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes and Laborers
Dependent Var.: SC/STa Laborer SC/STa Laborer SC/STa Laborer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: All Rural Households in 2006-07 and 2007-08
All Year Fall Spring
Year0708 * ÚP has e2 −0.128∗∗∗ 0.084∗ −0.151∗∗ 0.131∗ −0.072 0.054
(0.046) (0.043) (0.065) (0.067) (0.063) (0.066)
Households 22928 22920 11435 11432 11493 11488
Clusters 401 401 401 401 401 401
Dist. in both years 200 200 200 200 200 200
Sample: All Rural Households in 2005-06 and 2007-08
All Year Fall Spring
Year0608 * ÚP has e2 −0.036 0.073 −0.051 0.101 −0.010 0.089
(0.053) (0.050) (0.079) (0.063) (0.071) (0.083)
Households 17206 17202 8569 8567 8637 8635
Clusters 402 402 400 400 396 396
Dist. in both years 201 201 199 199 195 195
a Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Notes: See Table 2.5.
we use the weights provided by the NSSO. Hence, in principle, the estimated effects are rep-
resentative for the entire rural population. For the baseline and endline years underlying our
main analysis, the results are set out in columns 1, 3 and 5 of the upper panel of Table 2.11.
According to column 1, the incidence of SC/ST individuals has dropped by 12.8 percentage
points in response to NREGA’s Phase II. This point estimate is significant at the five percent
significance level and driven by the fall season, for which the point estimate equals more than
fifteen percent. For the spring season, there is no statistically significant effect. We have car-
ried out the same exercise with the dependent variable rural laborer, whose results are set out
in columns 2, 4 and 6 of the upper panel. Again there are statistically significant effects of
the NREGA, albeit of opposite sign. The lower panel of Table 2.11 sets out the results of the
same exercise with the 62nd and 64th rounds of NSS data. For SC/STs, all estimated effects
are small and statistically insignificant. Taken together, the pattern of results across the two
panels is suggestive of differences regarding the populations that are represented in the 62nd
and 64th round on the one hand, and the 63rd round on the other.
Sample means for the 62nd round are set out in Table 2.15 for SC/ST households. The
results for system (2.1) and (2.2) with the 62nd round as baseline are set out in Table 2.12. They
confirm our findings for SC/STs during the spring season both qualitatively and quantitatively.
As expected, the precision of the point estimates deteriorates relative to our main results in
Table 2.5.
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2.5.7 Timing of NREGA Onset and Consumption Survey Interviews
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, the program commenced in Phase III districts in April 2008.
While this occurred at a very low intensity, in principle this onset of the program in our con-
trol group of districts potentially biases our program effect estimates. This applies in particular
to the spring season, for which consumption interviews take place between January and June.
While we expect our program effect estimates set out in Table 2.5 to be downward-biased in
this scenario, we repeat our main analysis for SC/ST households during the spring season with
consumption interviews held only during the first quarter of 2007 and 2008. The results are set
out in column 6 of Table 2.13. With less than 1,500 observations, for logarithmic MPCE we
continue to find a statistically significant effect very similar in magnitude to the one in Table
2.5. The effects for the two poverty measures, on the other hand, are muted and insignificant.
2.5.8 Trimming, Functional Form of the Regression Discontinuity
Design and Control Variables
As pointed out by Lee and Lemieux (2010), unlike in many instances of panel data fixed effects
estimation, panel RDD regression equations do not require the inclusion of any controls or
fixed effects to ensure consistent estimation of causal effects. The essential explanatory vari-
ables are a polynomial in the continuous forcing variable, here the centered rank, and a dummy
for the discontinuity, each interacted with an endline dummy. In this subsection we explore
alternative specifications of our system of estimating equations regarding the choice of trim-
ming, fixed effects and control variables. For considerations of space, we discuss only results
for SC/STs during spring. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.13 set out results for different extents
of trimming. Neither widening nor narrowing the c rank window by five steps changes our
main results in a remarkable way, though narrowing decreases the precision greatly. In this
context, it is to be noted that further trimming, as in column 1, results in a loss of a third of
the districts used in our main estimations.
We also explore a local polynomial regression with distinct quadratic polynomials to the
left and right of the cutoff. To be precise, the first stage in this specification is
P has e2s d = cs +α
1{c ranks d ≤ 0}+η1 c ranks d +η2 c rank2s d
+ξ1 c ranks d ∗ 1 {c ranks d ≤ 0}
+ξ2 c rank
2
s d ∗ 1 {c ranks d ≤ 0}+ us d
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Table 2.13: Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Consumption and Poverty for Rural
Households Belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes during Spring, Alter-
native Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specifications for MPCE
Year0708 * ÚP has e2 40.373∗∗∗ 30.641∗∗∗ 48.481∗∗∗ 22.982∗∗∗ 30.700∗∗∗ 29.022∗∗
(14.805) (9.989) (9.184) (8.352) (9.015) (11.488)
Households 1992 3045 2678 2678 2678 1406
Clusters 253 456 382 382 382 341
Specifications for HCR
Year0708 * ÚP has e2 −33.340 −44.654∗∗∗ −63.720∗∗∗ −26.239∗ −36.297∗∗ −12.477
(23.850) (15.543) (14.887) (13.999) (15.256) (13.447)
Households 1992 3045 2678 2678 2678 1406
Clusters 253 456 382 382 382 341
Specifications for PGR
Year0708 * ÚP has e2 −8.148 −11.747∗∗∗ −16.900∗∗∗ −6.833∗∗ −9.631∗∗∗ −3.585
(6.338) (3.714) (3.679) (3.393) (3.673) (3.356)
Households 1992 3045 2678 2678 2678 1406
Clusters 253 456 382 382 382 341
Trimming ±5 ±15 ±10 ±10 ±10 ±10
Stage 1 State FE,
Stage 2 State-Year In-
teractions
Ye s Ye s Ye s N o Ye s Ye s
Polynomial Order 1 1 2 1 1 1
Household Size N o N o N o N o Ye s N o
January - March
only
N o N o N o N o N o Ye s
Notes: See Table 2.5. Household Size is a categorical variable. The seven categories are 1-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 or more members.
and the second stage
ys d i t = µs d + γs t +β ÛP has e2s d ∗D0708t +δ1 c ranks d ∗D0708t
+δ2 c rank
2
s d ∗D0708t +κ1 c ranks d ∗ 1 {c ranks d ≤ 0} ∗D0708t
+κ2 c rank
2
s d ∗ 1 {c ranks d ≤ 0} ∗D0708t + εs d i t .
According to column 3 of Table 2.13, our previous findings continue to obtain under this
modification and the point estimates are larger.
Column 4 is as our main specification but without state-endline year interactions. To be
precise, the terms cs and γs t in (2.1) and (2.2) are replaced by c and γt , respectively. As the point
estimates show, our main results are robust to these two omissions but the estimated effects
are muted. Figure 2.4 depicts the reduced form corresponding to system (2.1) and (2.2) with c
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and γt substituted for cs and γs t , respectively,
ys d i t = µs d + γt +β
1{c ranks d ≤ 0} ∗D0708t +δ1 c ranks d ∗D0708t
+δ2 c ranks d ∗ 1 {c ranks d ≤ 0} ∗D0708t + εs d i t ,
for logarithmic MPCE. Accordingly, there is an estimated downward jump at the discontinu-
ity of 17.5 percentage points, which, once divided by the estimated jump in the probability of
being notified under Phase II, 0.75 (see column 2 of Table 2.4), roughly gives the point estimate
in the fourth column of the upper panel of Table 2.13, 22.98.
Figure 2.4: NREGA Effect on Mean Logarithmic Monthly per Capita
Consumption Expenditures by Households Belonging to Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes
Finally, in column 5 we have added dummies for different household sizes as explanatory
variables, so the interpretation of the estimated program effect is conditional on household
size. Our main findings continue to obtain, albeit slightly muted in magnitude.
2.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis
We first summarize the empirical findings obtained thus far. While we have not found statis-
tically significant program effects for the sample of all rural households and the sub-sample of
rural laborers residing in NREGA Phase II and Phase III districts, we have found very large
and statistically significant local average treatment effects on consumption growth and poverty
reduction for the subgroup of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes during spring, which is
the agricultural lean season. While all point estimates in our disaggregated analyses suffer from
a lack of precision, the pattern of the Act’s welfare effects as elicited by our findings is clear.
The main beneficiaries are households belonging to a particularly deprived subgroup of the
rural population and the effects occur during the season in which the risk of consumption
shortfalls is greatest. For the subgroup of SC/STs, consumption gains are especially large in
the lower part of the consumption distribution. Given the lack of precision in the respective
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estimations, we view the pattern of welfare improvements generated by the NREGA as the
major insight of our empirical analysis, rather than the point estimates, which we think should
be taken with a grain of salt.
Figure 2.5: Estimated Effect of the NREGA on Seasonal Consumption
Patterns
Figure 2.5 depicts the estimated effect on consumption expenditures among SC/ST house-
holds in a stylized fashion. The solid and the dashed line depict fall and spring consumption
in 2006-07, respectively, by district backwardness. The location and slope of the two lines im-
ply that, in backward districts, spring consumption falls considerably short of fall consump-
tion, while fall and spring season consumption are similar in the less backward districts with
a c rank greater than zero. This is in line with the sample means set out in the center left
and bottom left panels of Table 2.3. Accordingly, Phase II districts experienced a consump-
tion drop of about eighteen percent from fall 2006 to spring 2007 while Phase III districts
enjoyed an increase of about two percent. In terms of Figure 2.5, our results imply a program
effect resulting in an upward shift of the left part of the dashed line. To be precise, the esti-
mated local average treatment effect only tells that there is an upward shift at zero, the cutoff
value of the centered rank. For the figure we have implicitly assumed a homogeneous treat-
ment effect of the NREGA with regards to a district’s centered rank, which implies a parallel
shift upwards of the dashed line to the left of zero. The resulting new situation clearly implies
smoother consumption across the two seasons for SC/ST households in backward districts,
and this is in fact what the sample means in the center right and bottom right panels of Table
2.3 imply. Accordingly, mean per capita consumption increased by about two percent for both
the Phase II and III districts from the second half-year of 2007 to the first half-year of 2008.
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Figure 2.6: Mean Logarithmic Monthly per Capita Consumption Ex-
penditures by Rural Households Belonging to Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in NREGA Phase II and III Districts and All-India
Food Grain Production by Agricultural Season
To assess whether the NREGA has had a lasting impact on seasonal consumption patterns of
SC/ST households, Table 2.15 sets out SC/ST consumption and poverty by NREGA phase
and season for all NSS rounds featuring a consumption expenditure module since 2003. The
upper panel covering the agricultural year 2003-04 is calculated from two rounds, the 59th
and 60th, as the former covers the calendar year 2003 and the latter only the first half-year of
2004. Figure 2.6 depicts the time series of logarithmic MPCE among households belonging to
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes by NREGA phase together with all-India agricultural
production for each half-year from fall 2003 to spring 2012. Two stylized facts emerge from
the table and figure. First, consumption averaged over an agricultural year tracks agricultural
output closely in both groups of districts, that is consumption smoothing across years is far
from complete irrespective of NREGA phase status. Second, prior to the NREGA, the risk
of a consumption shortfall during the second half of an agricultural year is far greater in Phase
II than in the less backward Phase III districts. To be precise, according to Table 2.15, average
logarithmic consumption is lower in spring than in fall in Phase II districts in all years up to
2006-07, while Phase III districts enjoyed a moderate increase in logarithmic consumption at
the same time. This seasonal consumption pattern in Phase II districts is in accordance with
the seasonality in agricultural output, which is on average roughly ten percent larger in fall
than in spring. Given an increase in logarithmic consumption between 2003-04 and 2011-12
of 14.5 and 20.1 in Phase II and Phase III districts, respectively, a perfectly smooth consump-
tion path involves an increase in logarithmic consumption of 0.90 and 1.25 from fall to spring
in each agricultural year, respectively.7 It is evident from Table 2.15 that Phase III districts
get much closer to such a pattern than Phase II districts prior to the NREGA. In particular,
for the four agricultural years between 2003-04 and 2006-07, intra-year changes in logarithmic
7There are sixteen half-years between January 2004 and January 2012. The two numbers 0.90 and 1.25 are
obtained from dividing 14.5 and 20.1 by sixteen, respectively.
46
consumption averaged at -8.1 in Phase II compared to +4.5 in Phase III districts with standard
deviations equal to 7.5 and 3.4, respectively. In the three consumption surveys available since
2007-08, the mean changes between the two seasons of the same agricultural year are -0.1 and
+1.1, respectively, with standard deviations equal to 3.5 and 3.8, respectively. A related fact
that emerges from Figure 2.6 is that the consumption paths of Phase II and Phase III districts
co-move much more closely from 2007-08 onward. To elaborate, the correlation coefficient be-
tween the two consumption time series is -0.15 up to the spring of 2007 and+0.96 afterwards.
Together, we take these facts as suggestive evidence for a sustained effect of the NREGA on
consumption smoothing among SC/ST households in backward districts.
The pattern of program effects that we find is consistent with the pattern of NREGA
program expenditures. Regarding the beneficiaries of the program, Table 2.1 tells that almost
half of all NREGA work days in our sample was performed by SC/STs. The figures imply that
non-SC/ST individuals performed only 1.23 person days on average, about a third of the 3.51
person days performed by a representative individual from scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes. Regarding seasonality, Figure 2.2 plots monthly NREGA wage expenditures in our
sample’s 92 Phase II districts relative to the rural population and wages paid to SC/STs relative
to the rural SC/ST population. Accordingly, expenditures between January and June 2008
were on average three times the expenditures during the agricultural peak season in the fall
of 2007. Combining the information on NREGA expenditures with our point estimates, we
conclude that the estimated increases in SC/ST consumption are large relative to NREGA
wage expenditures. The monthly wage expenditures of close to Rs. 60 per SC/ST capita during
the spring season of 2008 come together with estimated consumption benefits of between
Rs. 61 and Rs. 140, depending on whether we take the smallest of our point estimates for
MPCE from Table 2.10 or the one from our preferred specification (Table 2.5). Hence, the
Act appears to have been cost-effective in improving welfare among SC/ST households by
reducing exposure to systematic seasonal consumption shortfalls. This conclusion continues
to hold even if our point estimates overstated the true effect by a factor of two or four. A
qualification that has to be made regarding the methodology of this cost benefit analysis is
that we have compared our local average treatment effect as an estimate of the benefit of the
program to the cost measured as an average difference between Phase II and III districts.
Deininger and Liu (2013) find similarly large short-term effects, of Rs. 140 per month, on
SC/ST consumption in Phase II and III districts in the state of Andhra Pradesh. These authors’
findings also imply that the welfare effects exceed the direct transfers to workers from the
program. As their data cover only the agricultural peak season, however, their analysis does
not address the seasonal pattern of program effects.
In principle, there are three channels by which income of poor rural households may ben-
efit from a public employment program, first, wage income increases from more days of em-
ployment due to work on the NREGA sites, second, wage income increases from earnings in
non-NREGA employment due to an increase in the equilibrium wage rate in the rural labor
47
market and, third, income increases from wage labor and self-employed activity due to a higher
marginal product of labor, which arises from the infrastructure put in place by NREGA work.
As Berg et al. (2012) point out, the third of these channels appears to be negligible in the con-
text of our analysis. Given that we consider only the first year of the program’s second phase
and that much of the activity unfolded not before January 2008, it is unlikely that household
consumption benefited much from such infrastructure by the first half-year of 2008. Regard-
ing the second channel, Berg et al. (2012) find that impacts on non-NREGA wage rates are
lagged by about nine months, which is at odds with Zimmermann (2012), who finds a large
instant, but imprecisely estimated, effect of the NREGA’s Phase II on female casual wages dur-
ing the fall season of 2007, that is when the program operated at a low intensity in the Phase II
districts compared to the first half-year of 2008 (see Figure 2.2). Our empirical analysis leaves
open the potential contributions of the just-mentioned three channels to the consumption in-
creases that we estimate. Moreover, in principle, NREGA employment and the high female
participation rate may also affect consumption through changes in household savings or intra-
household decision making processes. Still, a rough calculation with Zimmermann’s estimates
suggests that the effect on female private-sector wages will result in a per capita monthly in-
come increase of no more than Rs. 15 (this is based on a five person household with two female
laborers) while the program expenditure data in Figure 2.2 implies that NREGA employment
increases monthly per capita income by around Rs. 35 during the first half-year of 2008 (which
is based on the assumption that no private sector employment is crowded out and that the pro-
gram’s wage expenditures fully reach the employed laborers). Hence, our impression is that
the NREGA’s short-term effect on consumption in Phase II districts is mostly attributable
to the program’s direct effect on households’ labor incomes rather than any of the indirect,
general equilibrium, effects.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
Governments of low and middle-income countries around the globe have been and are using
large-scale public employment programs to provide livelihood security and combat poverty
in their rural areas. Given that more than a third of the world’s rural poor who live on less
than a dollar per day resided in India in 2002 (Ravallion et al., 2007), assessing the costs and
benefits of India’s thus far largest public employment program is of immediate interest. We
have embarked on our analysis of welfare and poverty effects of India’s National Rural Em-
ployment Guarantee Act arguing that a pure labor market perspective is certainly important
in its own right but not sufficient to judge an employment program’s effect on rural house-
holds’ livelihoods. Previous, often qualitative, field studies have claimed that many workers
employed under India’s NREGA use their public works’ wages for goods and services which
they previously considered prohibitive, like bicycles or children’s education (Khera, 2011). In
this paper, we have explored quantitatively whether NREGA employment opportunities have
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translated into higher levels and smoother patterns of consumption at an all-India level.
While we have not found statistically significant program effects in a sample representative
for the entire rural population in the districts that we study, we have found economically and
statistically significant poverty-reducing effects for the sub-sample of households belonging
to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes during spring, which is the agricultural slack season.
Our econometric findings for the time period 2006 to 2008 combined with patterns emerging
from descriptive statistics for the years 2003 to 2012 suggest that the NREGA has helped this
group of households in a sustained fashion to smooth consumption between the agricultural
peak and slack seasons. Our main conclusion is hence that the NREGA has been successful
not only in increasing consumption levels of particularly vulnerable households but also in
reducing these households’ exposure to the risk of seasonal drops in consumption. The pattern
of these effects is consistent with the pattern of program expenditures. We have documented
that, in our sample, about one in two workers on NREGA sites belongs to a scheduled caste or
a scheduled tribe, and that the bulk of NREGA work is carried out during the spring season.
Combining this information with our estimated welfare effects, we conclude that much of the
public works’ wages appear to have contributed to additional consumption by marginalized
rural households during the agricultural off-season.
The text of the Act itself specifies among the main goals of the scheme "ensuring livelihood
security for the poor" and "ensuring social protection for the most vulnerable people living in
rural India" (Government of India, 2013b). In the language of economists, the former calls for
risk reduction while the latter highlights the aspect of proper targeting. Our analysis suggests
that the Act has successfully delivered on both of these two objectives.
In our view, the main shortcoming of our empirical analysis is the low precision of the
estimated program effects, which is rooted in three reasons. First, we identify program effects
from district-wise changes in consumption and there are only 255 districts available for our
analysis. Second, our analysis relies on so-called thin rounds of India’s National Sample Sur-
vey, where the sample size is comparatively small. Third, we conduct disaggregated analyses by
agricultural seasons and population subgroups, which cuts the size of our sample further by a
factor of up to ten. To deal with these complications, first, we have employed a modification of
the usual instrumental variables implementation of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design,
which substantially reduces the variability of program effect estimates in our small samples
when program status is assigned at a higher than the individual level, in our case the district.
Second, we have carefully examined the validity and robustness of our main findings by sub-
jecting them to numerous robustness checks and extensions. Third, we have pointed out that
we view the seasonal and subgroup-specific pattern of welfare improvements generated by the
NREGA as our major insight, rather than the magnitude of the point estimates.
Finally, there are limitations to the scope of our analysis. Driven by the objective to iden-
tify causal program effects, we have examined only one, the first, year of that phase of the
Act which was the smallest among the three phases of the NREGA roll-out, covering merely
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a fifth of India’s rural population. Since then the NREGA’s scale has further grown, from
about 2.1 billion person-days in the fiscal year 2008-09 to 2.3 billion person-days in 2012-13.
Moreover, several important design features, including mandatory bank payments and admin-
istrative processes such as linking the NREGA with India’s Unique Identification Project have
been added. Hence, a comprehensive analysis of the Act’s welfare impacts since its inception
is warranted, but the methodological challenges of such an endeavor appear to prevail.
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2.A Tables
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Table 2.14: Summary Statistics for Rural Households whose Principal Occupation is
Labor
2006-07 2007-08
All Year Fall Spring All Year Fall Spring
Phase II and Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 513.49 517.71 509.28 549.31 540.36 557.95
Log. MPCE 612.34 613.87 610.82 621.66 620.45 622.81
HCR 51.41 52.09 50.72 42.83 43.75 41.94
PGR 12.33 11.99 12.67 8.47 8.89 8.06
HH-size 5.59 5.75 5.43 5.37 5.43 5.33
Crank 2.91 3.86 1.96 3.03 3.12 2.94
SC/ST? (in %) 43.40 43.06 43.74 42.84 40.86 44.75
Number of HHs 5299 2648 2651 2898 1405 1493
Districts 255 252 252 254 249 246
Phase II Sample Districts
MPCE 439.18 451.64 427.59 495.05 505.88 484.38
Log. MPCE 599.67 603.10 596.48 612.67 614.90 610.48
HCR 59.39 57.64 61.01 49.31 45.60 52.96
PGR 15.59 14.28 16.81 10.12 9.43 10.80
HH-size 5.64 5.91 5.39 5.35 5.35 5.34
Crank −2.43 −1.65 −3.17 −2.12 −1.85 −2.40
SC/ST? (in %) 45.70 40.50 50.55 45.13 39.53 50.66
Number of HHs 2050 1039 1011 1254 616 638
Districts 92 89 91 92 91 89
Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 578.14 571.68 584.96 589.60 566.46 611.55
Log. MPCE 623.36 622.66 624.10 628.32 624.66 631.80
HCR 44.46 47.55 41.19 38.02 42.36 33.90
PGR 9.50 10.12 8.84 7.25 8.49 6.07
HH-size 5.54 5.61 5.47 5.40 5.48 5.31
Crank 7.56 8.36 6.71 6.85 6.89 6.82
SC/ST? (in %) 41.40 45.16 37.43 41.14 41.86 40.45
Number of HHs 3249 1609 1640 1644 789 855
Districts 163 163 161 162 158 157
a Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
Notes: See Table 2.2.
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Table 2.15: Sample Means for Various Years of NSS Consumption Surveys, Rural House-
holds Belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
Phase II Phase III
All Year Fall Spring All Year Fall Spring
2003-04 (59th/60th Round) 2003-04 (59th/60th Round)
MPCE 511.49 529.96 500.53 562.68 536.43 577.47
Log. MPCE 613.16 615.65 611.67 621.96 618.66 623.83
HCR 48.20 44.19 50.58 44.95 48.40 43.00
PGR 11.29 10.26 11.90 9.31 11.12 8.29
Observations 1641 756 885 1677 753 924
2004-05 (61st Round) 2004-05 (61st Round)
MPCE 462.22 461.45 463.00 489.74 488.41 491.07
Log. MPCE 604.07 604.46 603.68 610.33 609.48 611.18
HCR 57.69 57.72 57.67 56.80 57.64 55.95
PGR 14.32 14.12 14.52 13.49 14.09 12.88
Observations 3556 1807 1749 4390 2168 2222
2005-06 (62nd Round) 2005-06 (62nd Round)
MPCE 487.40 507.22 469.71 536.51 532.65 540.39
Log. MPCE 608.94 613.91 604.50 619.95 618.85 621.06
HCR 53.36 46.21 59.75 44.46 46.98 41.93
PGR 13.55 10.82 15.98 10.19 11.28 9.10
Observations 697 333 364 934 447 487
2006-07 (63rd Round) 2006-07 (63rd Round)
MPCE 446.23 494.02 412.67 553.33 526.26 582.13
Log. MPCE 599.00 609.55 591.58 622.64 618.25 627.31
HCR 61.44 50.25 69.31 43.02 48.14 37.57
PGR 17.25 13.60 19.80 9.33 10.73 7.84
Observations 1661 829 832 1918 947 971
2007-08 (64th Round) 2007-08 (64th Round)
MPCE 517.34 511.50 522.40 573.77 567.20 580.53
Log. MPCE 615.88 614.50 617.07 626.47 624.09 628.91
HCR 46.35 46.50 46.21 39.24 41.67 36.75
PGR 9.57 10.32 8.92 7.77 9.25 6.25
Observations 1341 643 698 1383 707 676
2009-10 (66th Round) 2009-10 (66th Round)
MPCE 506.14 519.56 492.04 576.50 588.12 564.10
Log. MPCE 612.47 614.55 610.30 626.66 627.98 625.25
HCR 50.20 50.12 50.29 38.05 38.09 38.00
PGR 11.87 11.26 12.52 7.49 7.56 7.42
Observations 2677 1295 1382 3490 1795 1695
2011-12 (68th Round) 2011-12 (68th Round)
MPCE 590.03 590.71 589.34 682.28 680.68 683.64
Log. MPCE 627.65 627.07 628.22 642.05 641.40 642.61
HCR 33.21 34.46 31.97 22.69 23.38 22.10
PGR 6.91 7.88 5.96 4.01 4.49 3.61
Observations 2462 1206 1256 3128 1521 1607
See Table 2.2, except for data.
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Chapter 3
Income Shocks, Consumption
Smoothing, and Financial Market
Transactions: Evidence from Indian
Villages
Christian Oldiges
Heidelberg University
A large body of economic development literature finds that despite unstable income rural
households’ consumption remains relatively smooth, while categories of risk coping mecha-
nisms are range real asset sales and credit to mutual insurance. In this paper, I examine changes
in both consumption and financial market transactions as a response to changes in income
in four South Indian villages over a span of four years. I combine self-collected local admin-
istrative data on India’s public employment program with household-level data. Identifying
monthly wage income shocks, I run high-frequency panel data regressions. I find that among
the poorest households consumption and repayments of microfinance loans respond statisti-
cally significantly to changes in income, and in particular to changes in female wage income.
I conclude that consumption is largely well-insured against moderate income shocks, except
among the poorest households. Further, women empowerment via the provision of public
works and innovative microfinance institutions helps to mitigate the risks of income volatil-
ity.
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3.1 Introduction1
Poor households, in particular the rural poor in low income countries (LICs), are exposed to
unsteady flows of income. The reasons are many, including seasonal unemployment related to
the agricultural labor cycle, sickness or death in the family, weather shocks, or political unrest
among many others. Furthermore, these households’ access to formal financial institutions is
limited or comes at exorbitant costs. In such a scenario it is crucial for researchers and policy-
makers to understand the response of rural households and their mechanisms to cope with
such vulnerabilities. Most important to understand is whether households are able to foresee
income shocks to some extent, save in advance and forego some consumption during good
times. Do local arrangements within communities or villages help to insure against risk and
thus smooth consumption? What forms of finance or public safety nets help best to smooth
consumption?
Tests for consumption smoothing have been carried out in a variety of settings. Much of
the vast body of empirical work is, in one way or another, based on the permanent income
hypothesis (PIH) developed by Friedman (1957). The complete market hypothesis, implicit
in the PIH, has been tested by several researchers. In one of the most prominent and early
micro-economic studies, Mace (1991) tests this hypothesis using panel data on consumption
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) survey for the entire US economy. While
Mace largely fails to reject the complete market hypothesis, Cochrane (1991) demonstrates that
idiosyncratic shocks of sickness and sudden unemployment do impact consumption. Other
studies rejecting the complete market hypothesis and using PSID data include for example
Zeldes (1989), Altonji et al. (1992) and Hayashi et al. (1996), whereas Altug and Miller (1990)
fail to reject the null hypothesis.
In a different literature, several studies of efficient risk sharing test the null hypothesis
that only average consumption of, for example, the village explains changes in individual con-
sumption. Arguably the most prominent study is the seminal work by Townsend (1994). He
shows that consumption does not react much to changes in income. Townsend (1994) uses
yearly household panel data, collected during the 1970s and 1980s in three Indian villages by
the International Crop Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). He finds that
individual consumption co-moves with average village consumption, but only to a limited ex-
tent with individual income. Utilizing the same data, Mazzocco and Saini (2012) show that
risk sharing takes place at the caste level rather than at the village level. In contrast, Kazianga
and Udry (2006) find almost no evidence for full insurance among rural households in Burkina
1I want to thank Sudha Narayanan for her ideas and the research collaboration. Also, I am very grateful to
Abhiroop Mukhopadhay for advising me during my stay as a research visitor at the ISI, Delhi in February/March
2015 when most of this paper was developed. Further I would like to thank Christine Binzel, Jean Drèze, Magnus
Hatlebakk, and in particular Stefan Klonner for their ideas and guidance. Field work was funded by the German
Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). This paper benefited greatly from discussions, seminars, and conferences
at the Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, Heidelberg University, and Oxford University. All errors remain mine.
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Faso during long periods of drought. Instead, Kazianga and Udry (2006) point out clearly that
“village-level risk pooling mechanisms were not effective”. There is additional empirical evi-
dence that risk sharing is hard to accomplish among very poor communities in sub-Saharan
Africa and Asia. For example, Harrower and Hoddinott (2005) study households in one of
the poorest regions of Mali. They find that even though idiosyncratic shocks do not influence
income growth, controlling for covariate shocks, total household income does impact con-
sumption. Jalan and Ravallion (1999) also reject the full insurance model using six years of
panel data on Chinese rural households. They emphasize the relatively greater vulnerability
of the poorest households. In particular, Jalan and Ravallion (1999) find that “the marginal
propensity to consume out of current income implied by the test equation is higher for less
wealthy households.” More recent studies testing risk sharing employ a large monthly panel
data set on Thai households - the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey (e.g. Kinnan and Townsend,
2012; Karaivanov and Townsend, 2014; Alem and Townsend, 2014; Chiappori et al., 2014).
Largely, risk sharing at the village level is not rejected by these studies. However, Kinnan and
Townsend (2012) find that households that are not even indirectly connected to formal bank-
ing nor to a social network, are the most vulnerable to idiosyncratic changes in income. In the
regional context of this paper, Gaurav (2015) tests for risk sharing, using yearly self-collected
panel data for 120 households in five villages of one of India’s poorest regions, Vidarbha, in
Western India. Similar to Jalan and Ravallion (1999), his estimations yield a rejection of full
risk sharing. He conjectures that wealthier, more land owning households are less exposed to
idiosyncratic risks than poorer households.
Many studies on consumption smoothing in LICs find that at least some “smoothing takes
place, and that consumption is not equal to income, even among very poor households”
(Deaton, 1989). Mechanisms to mitigate risks are plenty, but are often difficult to identify
given varying data constraints. Townsend (1994), for instance, cannot statistically determine
“how households smooth so well.” He can only speculate that “credit markets and gifts seem
to smooth much of the fluctuations in income, and probably smooth as well fluctuations in-
duced by erratic timing in asset purchases and sale.” Using data for the same ICRISAT villages,
Kochar (1995, 1999) finds that well-functioning labor markets serve as a mechanism to insure
against idiosyncratic crop shocks, which is in line with the income-smoothing argument (Mor-
duch, 1995).2 In general, mechanisms to smooth consumption seem to be highly context de-
pendent, and apart from smoothing labor they can be clubbed into five categories, which have
been studied extensively.3 In the following, I present four forms of consumption smoothing
mechanisms, that can broadly be categorized as related to: 1) real assets , 2) financial assets ,
3) financial credit, either formal or informal, 4) mutual insurance . The first three are related
to the complete markets literature as these involve mostly individual and longitudinal-based
2For more research on changes in the supply of labor as a response to idiosyncratic risks see for example Saha
(1994), Rose (2001), Lamb (2003), and Ito and Takashi (2009).
3For additional literature on consumption smoothing mechanisms, refer to the extensive literature review by
Dercon (2002).
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risk coping mechanisms. The fourth mechanism, mutual insurance, however, is concerned
with cross-sectional rather than individual longitudinal risk-coping, making it a risk-sharing
mechanism, as discussed above.
First, in times of distress, households could sell real assets in the form of accumulated buffer
stocks. The buffer saving model proposed by Deaton (1989, 1991) provides for a theoretical
framework. Accordingly, even households with no access to credit can smooth consumption
over time as long as some assets are left as a buffer stock. Testing the buffer-stock model, Udry
(1995) shows that households in northern Nigeria sell buffer stocks of grain to cope with
adverse shocks such as sudden flooding of their lands. Fafchamps et al. (1998) find that in rural
Burkina Faso at least 15 percent of income shortfalls are compensated with livestock sales as
a response to adverse shocks for households. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) examine the role
of bullock sales as a mechanism to smooth consumption in the ICRISAT villages. They find
that households do not invest sufficiently in bullocks to smooth income. This is surprising,
given the farmers’ risk aversion and the “importance of bullock ownership in producing crops
efficiently and its value in mitigating consumption volatility” (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993).
In contrast to the null hypothesis of the buffer saving model, Kazianga and Udry (2006) find
for households in Burkina Faso, during times of drought, traditional practices of risk sharing
or buffer stock sales do not suffice to smooth consumption completely. Similarly, using panel
data on Tanzanian farmers Dercon (1998) argues that investments in cattle as a form of buffer
stock is “lumpy” and only possible for relatively richer households.
Second, financial assets in the form of precautionary savings serve as a cushion to fall back
on during income shortfalls, as research on rural societies in LICs has shown. Deaton (1992a)
provides evidence on households in the Ivory Coast, which anticipate income shortfalls and
save in advance. While Deaton cannot measure to what extent households save in advance,
Paxson’s (1992) study of Thai rice farmers shows that the marginal propensity to save from
transitory income is high. Dercon (1996) shows for rural Tanzanian households that savings
in the form of liquid asset holdings help to smooth consumption and induce farmers to invest
in riskier crops.
The third mechanism involves financial credit either from formal or informal institutions.
Formal financial institutions have increasingly become an option even for rural households
over the past decades. Recent government banking schemes, for example, a state-led bank
branch expansion program in India (Burgess et al., 2005), or large scale government-led mi-
crofinance schemes like the Thai Baht Village Fund program in Thailand have tried to expand
access to formal finance institution to a wider population (Kaboski and Townsend, 2011). Us-
ing the Townsend Thai data, Alem and Townsend (2014) examine the importance of formal
financial institutions for consumption smoothing in Thai villages. They find that access to a
government development bank helps in smoothing consumption and that such “commercial
banks are smoothing investment, largely through formal savings accounts.” Microfinance can
be thought of as one subcategory of formal finance. Providing access to credit and formal fi-
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nance institutions, often via some form of group liability, microfinance has much potential as
a consumption smoothing mechanism (Morduch, 1999a,b). Kaboski and Townsend (2011), for
example, underscore the role of microfinance in mitigating consumption volatility in the Thai
villages. Similarly, Gertler et al. (2009) show that microfinance in Indonesia helps to smooth
consumption after illness. In his study on microfinance and its indirect impacts on consump-
tion in Bangladesh, Morduch (1999a) attributes the mitigated volatility in consumption to the
reduction in “income variability across seasons, which is made possible by the employment
diversification that [microfinance] credit affords.”
The fourth mechanism concerns informal transactions as a form of mutual insurance to
smooth consumption. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) find that borrowing among friends and rel-
atives increases when households face adverse rainfall shocks in rural Philippines. Udry (1994),
too, finds that gifts and transfers lead to smooth consumption for households in Nigerian vil-
lages; Chiappori et al. (2014) cannot statistically identify such mechanisms but consider these
as potential mechanisms for consumption smoothing in the Thai villages. Using the same Thai
data, Kinnan and Townsend (2012) are able to identify channels to establish the importance
of kin and family networks in sharing risks. They find that “being indirectly connected to the
financial system is as beneficial as a direct connection.” This means that not everyone needs to
be connected to formal banking as long as “interpersonal gifts and lending are widespread”.
Jacoby and Skoufias (1998) identify several insurance mechanisms at play to mitigate risk in
the ICRISAT villages. These include both credits and gifts among households.
The major challenge to research on the literature on income risk, consumption and mech-
anisms to smooth consumption, either from a complete market or risk sharing perspective,
is that income is a) measured with error and b) endogenous with respect to consumption. In
the PSID data used for example by Mace (1991), there is a high chance of measurement error
since income is self reported. Deaton (1992a) argues that “even if markets are far from com-
plete, measurement error in income changes will bias the regression coefficient towards zero,
apparently in favor of the complete markets model.” Regarding the ICRISAT data for Indian
villages Townsend (1994) acknowledges that “individual crop profits are no doubt measured
with error, as are incomes generally.” Deaton (1990) comments on the Ivory Coast data: “The
consumption estimates are almost certainly a good deal more reliable than those for income.”
It is widely accepted that income data come with huge measurement errors - for that reason,
they are usually not collected for the purpose of poverty estimations.
To circumvent both the measurement error problem and the endogeneity of income with
respect to consumption or savings, various techniques have been proposed. Chaudhuri and
Ravallion (1997) suggest using time dummies and the non-crop component of income as an
instrument for income in their critique of Townsend (1994). Udry (1994) employs exogenous
income shocks in the form of adverse transitory production shocks. He explains that “[t]he
availability of this direct measure of transitory shocks at the household level means that shocks
need not be inferred from the residual between actual income and some measure of permanent
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income.” A number of studies on risk-sharing use positive or negative rainfall shocks as an
instrument for income (Paxson, 1992; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Gaurav, 2015; Jacoby and
Skoufias, 1998). Jacoby and Skoufias use rainfall data to proxy income shocks in the Indian
ICRISAT villages. They argue that village-level rainfall impacts households of the same village
differently and find that households are able to self-insure themselves against such idiosyncratic
weather shocks. The above discussion of existing studies demonstrates how significant the
strength of the instrument chosen is to the conclusions drawn.
In this paper, I test empirically a) how consumption of South Indian households responds
to changes in wage income, and b) what financial mechanisms are in place to mitigate income
volatility. I test all but the first of the above mentioned categories of consumption smooth-
ing mechanisms. Accounting for the measurement error and endogeneity problem of self re-
ported income, I depart from the methodology of existing literature and instead exploit an
exogeneous income variable provided by a third party. To this end, I exploit an income vari-
able provided by a third party and I show its exogeneity. The income variable I utilize is drawn
from administrative wage payment records for ICRISAT households participating in a nation-
wide workfare program - the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). The ad-
ministrative records include the date of payment and the amount paid, as well as the date and
number of workdays. I show empirically to what extent the monthly NREGA wage payments
can be considered as exogenous events. In particular, I demonstrate that the date of wage pay-
ments often does not coincide with the month of work - the month during which consump-
tion decisions are made. This allows me to exploit the monthly variation in administrative
wage payments to measure any changes in consumption and forms of financial transactions as
a response to changes in wage income.
I merge this administrative data on NREGA worksites and wage payments with recently
released ICRISAT monthly longitudinal household data. This data set was collected in four
Indian villages in the state of Andhra Pradesh over 52 months between July 2010 and October
2014. Finally, I merge this combined data set with self-collected data from ICRISAT-NREGA
households.
To expand the existing risk sharing related literature, I use household fixed effects to con-
trol for average village consumption and run village wise regressions similar to Townsend
(1994). I test for consumption smoothing via high frequency panel estimations using the ex-
ogenous wage payment as an explanatory variable. I find that consumption is highly sensitive
to changes in income in one of four villages, while I find no evidence against consumption
smoothing in the other three villages. To test several financial mechanisms of consumption
smoothing, I exploit the same identification strategy that is discussed above. In this way, I find
that in the poorest village, in particular, microfinance institutions play an important role in
the portfolio of financial transactions. My estimations for this village yield that the propen-
sity to pay back loans to microfinance institutions is around .2. Estimates for payments into
saving accounts are of similar magnitude. Thus, I am able to identify several mechanisms of
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consumption smoothing utilized by the poor. Findings from a self-conducted survey during
months of field work in the sample villages echo the empirical results. Sixty percent of the
sample households state that they utilize income from NREGA wages for loan repayments to
microfinance institutions. In addition, I empirically identify gender-wise NREGA wage pay-
ments. This allows me to test whether changes in female wage income induce proportionately
more or less a change in consumption or financial transactions. I find that higher female wage
income leads to both higher household consumption expenditures and loan repayments to
microfinance institutions.
The contribution of this paper to the literature on tests for risk sharing and on consump-
tion smoothing mechanisms is fourfold. First, I use an income variable that does not contain
the measurement error that self-reported income does, and it varies exogenously in time. In
contrast to earlier studies based on ICRISAT data (Townsend, 1994; Chaudhuri and Ravallion,
1997; Mazzocco and Saini, 2012, among many others), using an exogenous income and no IV
framework in the manner that I have, is an advantage because I measure a kind of reduced
form effect, whose power of interpretation does not hinge on the strength of any instrument.
Second, my results on consumption smoothing reiterate and extend earlier findings question-
ing the possibility of poor households to smooth consumption efficiently. On the one hand,
my finding of no violation of the full risk sharing hypothesis in three villages reiterates work
based on the Townsend Thai data (e.g. Chiappori et al., 2014). On the other hand, my findings
on the poorest village echo the findings by Gaurav (2015) on Central Indian villages and ear-
lier research by Jalan and Ravallion (1999) on Chinese households. By rejecting the null, and
estimating propensities to consume of .66, I show that the consumption of the poor depends
to a great deal on idiosyncratic changes in wage income.
Third, by testing a plethora of financial transactions as potential mechanisms to smooth
consumption, I depart from studies testing just one major category of mechanisms, e.g. only
savings (Paxson, 1992), and follow Fafchamps and Lund (2003) to test other categories sep-
arately. The financial transactions include borrowings and savings from formal and informal
institutions, friends and relatives, and microfinance institutions in the form of self-help groups
(SHGs). Especially the latter have not been studied much in the context of mitigating the
potential consequences of volatile income.4 My analyses provide new insights on the effec-
tiveness of microfinance in smoothing consumption (Morduch, 1995; Chiappori et al., 2014;
Kinnan and Townsend, 2012). In this aspect, too, it is advantageous in comparison to other
microfinance-consumption smoothing studies, to employ a unique form of income to identify
effects on microfinance outcomes without any threat of reverse causality. Fourth, disaggregat-
ing wage income shocks by gender, I contribute to the dimension of intra-household eco-
nomics and allocations, as well as the literature on the role of women empowerment in LICs
(see e.g. Pitt et al., 2006; Siwan Anderson, 2002; Duflo, 2012). In the context of the NREGA, it
4Studies on SHGs in Africa include for example recent work by Greaney et al. (2016), who evaluate the effects
of a cost reduction experiment on several performance indicators of SHGs.
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has been argued and shown that female employment has positive welfare impacts (Narayanan,
2008; Khera and Nayak, 2009), for example in education and health (Afridi et al., 2012; Das
and Singh, 2013). However, it has been difficult to identify female wage income empirically,
which is a well-known problem (Haddad, 1999; Hopkins et al., 1994). In this paper, I identify
gender-wise payments in a unique fashion, and thus add a valuable contribution to the larger
literature in the field of gender and intra-household allocations (Thomas, 1990; Bourguignon
et al., 1993; Browning et al., 1994; Browning and Chiappori, 1998, see for example).
Based on these four major contributions, I conclude the following. First, the null-
hypothesis of full risk sharing at the village level cannot be rejected in three of the four villages.
Second, the poorest village is the least well-insured, as consumption is very sensitive to changes
in wage income. Three, households in this village are induced to depend to a great extent on
microfinance loans. Fourth, my estimation technique allows me to track almost financial path
ways. For the poorest village, for instance, I find that from a positive wage income shock of Rs.
100, about Rs. 60 are spent directly on consumption, Rs. 20 on the repayment of microfinance
loans, and another Rs. 20 are deposited into saving accounts. I conjecture that the portfolio
choice of the poor is multifaceted. Given that my study only tracks financial transactions, and
not real asset sales or agricultural investments aimed at smoothing consumption during phases
of distress, it is very likely that the extent and variety of the options are not fully captured.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the theoretical background
of the study, focusing on the standard predictions of the PIH framework following Deaton
(1992b). In addition, Townsend’s (1994) version of a test for mutual insurance is presented as
it will be the basis for this paper’s empirical strategy. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the key
features of the NREGA in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Section 3.4 introduces the three data
sets and establishes that the date of wage payments can be considered as exogenous events. In
Section 3.5, the methodology to test for consumption smoothing and risk coping mechanisms
are presented. This is followed by a discussion of the results in Section 3.6, robustness checks
in Section 3.7 and a conclusion in Section 3.8.
3.2 Theoretical Background
In this section, I present the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) as modeled by Deaton
(1992b) and a typical test for full insurance as modeled by Townsend (1994). Both frameworks
yield testable implications. The main argument under the PIH is that consumption is a func-
tion of life-time income and should not react to any changes in current income. First hypoth-
esized by Friedman (1957), who applied it to macro-data on consumption and income, tests of
the PIH show that consumption is much smoother than income. In the PIH framework, the
focus is on the longitudinal perspective of individuals’ income and consumption paths, it is
concerned with today’s idiosyncratic shocks given expectations about future income. In con-
trast, the full insurance framework is concerned with idiosyncratic shocks in the cross-section
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of households. That is, given average consumption of a community how does individual con-
sumption react to idiosyncratic shocks? The hypothesis is that idiosyncratic shocks do not
matter as consumption co-moves with average consumption of the community.
I do not attempt to either advance the PIH or full insurance model nor prove them empir-
ically. Instead, the possible predictions hypothesized by the models shall provide yardsticks
for the results of my empirical analyses. In the latter, I test how consumption and other out-
come variable react to changes in wage income using monthly household panel data in four
village-wise fixed-effects regressions. Thus, I deal with a cross-sectional component, namely the
changes in income and consumption across households within a village, which is controlled
for by household fixed effects. Also, the regressions include a longitudinal component, namely
monthly variations in household consumption and income over the span of four years, which
is controlled for by month fixed effects.
3.2.1 Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH)
Hand to Mouth
Before thinking of consumption as a function of expected future incomes, I consider a situation
in which any income is immediately consumed irrespective of any future or past income flows.
Metaphorically speaking, income moves directly from “hand to mouth.” Consumption c of
person i in time t is then just a function of y, so that
ci t = yi t , (3.1)
with the prediction of
∂ ci t
∂ yi t
= 1. (3.2)
Thus, any change in income should be entirely reflected in the change of consumption. Given
equation 3.1, and assuming that savings si t are equal to disposal income (yi t − ci t ), savings are
zero in the hand to mouth model:
si t = yi t − ci t = yi t − yi t = 0 (3.3)
Therefore, with predictions for savings being
∂ si t
∂ yi t
= 0, (3.4)
changes in income are predicted not to induce changes in savings. I present such a simple
thought experiment here, as it may be quite an accurate prediction of the relationship between
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consumption, savings and income for very poor households.
Permanent Income Hypothesis
Following Deaton’s (1992b) version of the PIH, consumption is a function of net present
value of expected income, Et yi t . Under assumptions of quadratic preferences, infinite life, and
a constant real interest rate r equal to time preference
ci t =
r Ai t
1+ r
+
r
1+ r
∞∑
k=0
(1+ r )−k Et yi t+k , (3.5)
consumption equals the “annuity value of lifetime wealth,” which is the sum of by expected
income Et yi t and assets Ai t of household i in period t . It is evident that consumption in t does
not depend on realized income, as it only depends on changes in expected income. According
to (3.5), the prediction for any changes in realized income on consumption conditional on
expected incomes is:
∂ ci t
∂ yi t
= 0, (3.6)
Thus, testing the PIH in a regression framework one expects betas of zero for any idiosyncratic
changes in current income or characteristics. Savings, si t , on the other hand, are a function of
realized income, following (Deaton, 1992b):
si t = yi t +
r Ai t
1+ r
− ci t , (3.7)
Any changes in realized income should be fully absorbed by changes in savings. Conditional
on expected incomes the prediction according to (3.7) is:
∂ si t
∂ yi t
= 1 (3.8)
Now, one may object that savings and consumption are not only a function of realized in-
come but also of wage income claims or expected wage income, e.g. delayed payments. In the
following, I show the case for savings. For consumption an analogous argument holds. Any
estimation of the form:
si t = γ +δ wa g ei t + ui t , (3.9)
would underestimate the effect of expected wage income on savings as only changes of realized
wages (wa g ei t ) are in the regression equation. The true effect should instead be measured via
the following specification:
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si t = α+β1 wa g ei t +β2 wa g eEX Pi t + vi t , (3.10)
with wa g eEX P being expected wage income. Then, according to the PIH:
β1 = 1
β2 <
r
1+ r
,
(3.11)
since expected wages enter the equation with a discount factor of r1+r .
I want to argue, however, that any estimation which disregards wage claims comes close to
predicting the true effect. I consider two scenarios: a) wa g e and wa g eEX P are uncorrelated,
and b) there is perfect correlation between wa g e and wa g eEX P .
In the case of a), the prediction for equation 3.9 according to the PIH is:
δ = 1 (3.12)
while wa g eEX Pi t +vi t are fully absorbed in ui t since the error terms are orthogonal. Hence,
this is the same as when only realized wage income is included in the regression equation.
In case b) of perfect correlation, the prediction is:
δ =β1 +β2 < 1+
r
1+ r
(3.13)
With r1+r as an upper bound and assuming that r is very small
5
δ ≈ 1 (3.14)
Therefore, both cases (equations 3.12 and 3.14) yield the same estimates as the specification
of equation 3.9. In any estimation one can thus ignore wage claims and focus on realized wage
income.
3.2.2 Mutual Insurance
One of the most influential works on mutual insurance in village economies is the one by
Townsend (1994). Based on assumptions by Wilson (1968) and Diamond (1967) that pref-
erences are time separable and display weak risk aversion, if all individuals discount the fu-
ture at the same rate, and if all information is held in common (Townsend, 1994), individual
5In the empirical analyses, where I employ monthly data on wages and consumption, I can assume that the
monthly interest rate is no larger than 5 per cent, given that yearly interest rates for loans are at the most 30 or
40 per cent. Thus, r1+r is at the most around 0.05 in magnitude.
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consumption co-moves with aggregate consumption, independent of idiosyncratic shocks. In
other words, in a village economy, individual consumption should not react to any idiosyn-
cratic changes in income when average village consumption is controlled for.
The basic specification to test for mutual insurance at the village level is the following
reduced form version tested by Townsend (1994):
ci t = α+βc¯t +δHi t + ζ yi t + ui t (3.15)
with average village consumption for N households is
c¯t =
1
N
N∑
j=1
ct j (3.16)
and where Hi t captures demographic components and yi t is income for household i in time t .
Full insurance implies that individual consumption is only dependent on changes in average
consumption, as follows:
β=
∂ ci t
∂ c¯t
= 1 (3.17)
At the same time, according to the null hypothesis, idiosyncratic changes should not matter
at all, so that consumption remains insensitive to changes in income as follows:
ζ =
∂ ci t
∂ yi t
= 0 (3.18)
To reject the null hypothesis of full insurance requires ζ 6= 0. In his paper on three ICRISAT
villages, Townsend’s (1994) major finding is that consumption responds to individual changes
in income, albeit to a very low degree. Even though full insurance is rejected, his estimates
of ζ are very small in magnitude and thus he concludes that households come close to full
insurance. It is important to note that Townsend does not use the monthly ICRISAT data,
but yearly aggregates. In Section 3.5, I show how the basic predictions of the mutual insurance
model can be considered using month and household fixed effects.
3.3 NREGA Background and Modus Operandi
3.3.1 Background on the NREGA
India’s first United Progressive Alliance (UPA I) government passed several laws between 2004
and 2009. These laws aimed to improve the livelihood of the poor ”ensuring inclusive growth
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in rural India” through its ”impact on social protection, [and] livelihood security.”6 The Na-
tional Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) is one of them, it guarantees 100 days
of employment to every rural household whose members are willing to do unskilled manual
labor at the statutory minimum wage.7 The NREGA was originally designed as a demand-
driven program, in which workers self-select themselves for manual labor at the minimum
wage. However, many studies show that, effectively, participation in NREGA works is supply-
driven rather than demand-driven (Chopra, 2014). For example, research on the state of Ra-
jasthan reveals that the allocation of NREGA funds is often diverted to worksites situated
closely to the residence of local leaders, say, the village head (Himanshu et al., 2015). Related
research on Rajasthan shows that competition among political parties influences the flow of
NREGA funds at the block level (Gupta and Mukhopadhyay, 2014). Furthermore, Dutta et al.
(2014) establish that rationing of workdays exists in the state of Bihar, which means that works
do not respond to the existing demand, which in turn means that the demand for work is
higher than the supply of workdays. Das (2013) provides for similar, albeit weaker evidence of
rationing for the state of West Bengal during 2009-10 and 2011-12.
At the time of writing, the NREGA has been studied widely. National-level labor market
studies include works by Azam (2012) and Imbert and Papp (2015) whose analyses are based
on National Sample Survey (NSS) data and difference-in-difference estimations.8 They show
that the Act resulted in an increase of rural wages ranging between 4 and 8 per cent. Berg
et al. (2012) find similar effects using district-level wage data. Further, female workers and
marginalized groups belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (SC/ST) are among
the main beneficiaries. These studies underscore that the demand for NREGA employment
varies seasonally and is highest during the lean season. The NREGA is shown to be a safety
net during the lean season when agricultural work opportunities are scarce. Estimates of a
regression discontinuity design (RDD) by Zimmermann (2014), however, somewhat mitigate
the above mentioned findings as she finds only a very small, positive wage impact for female
workers during the fall season - and not during the spring season.
Work on aggregate welfare effects by Klonner and Oldiges (2014) using NSS data on
monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) suggest large seasonal effects for SC/ST
households during spring. Raghunathan and Hari (2014) study the program’s effects on behav-
ioral choices of farmers and find that farmers who participate in the NREGA adopt riskier
and higher productivity crops. In contrast to the studies employing difference-in-difference es-
6See MGNREGA Guidelines 2013: http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/WriteReaddata/Circulars/
Operational_guidelines_4thEdition_eng_2013.pdf/
7As shown by Klonner and Oldiges (2014), the NREGA stands in line with similar workfare programs around
the globe (Subbarao, 2003). In sub-Saharan Africa alone, around 150 public works programs are currently active
(World Bank, 2013). For research on the theory of of self-selection inherent to most workfare programs to ensure
targeting of those in need see among many others Datt and Ravallion (1995), Besley and Coate (1992), Basu
(1981). See Galasso and Ravallion (2004) on Argentina’s Jefes program from 2002, and Berhane et al. (2011) on
the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) from 2005.
8The cited studies exploit the phase-wise role-out of the NREGA across Indian districts over a three year time
period.
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timations, Raghunathan and Hari (2014) follow Zimmermann’s (2014) identification strategy
of an RDD, whereas Klonner and Oldiges (2014) employ a sharp RDD in their latest work-
ing paper. Deininger and Liu (2013) demonstrate similar evidence to findings by Klonner and
Oldiges (2014). Using longitudinal data of 4,000 households residing in Andhra Pradesh for
the years 2004, 2006 and 2008 and employing double and triple differences as well as propen-
sity score matching estimations they find large short-term effects on SC/ST consumption in
the state of Andhra Pradesh. Similarly, based on propensity score matching estimations Ravi
and Engler (2009) use a smaller panel of 320 households in Andhra Pradesh and find that the
Act did increase consumption expenditures.
3.3.2 The NREGA in Andhra Pradesh: Modus Operandi
Praised as the Andhra Model, the NREGA in the state of Andhra Pradesh9 has received a lot
of attention from academia, from civil society organisations and the media. The state’s perfor-
mance and its well-functioning state machinery of employment generation is well established
(Maiorano, 2014; Drèze and Oldiges, 2009). At the same time, the Andhra model is known for
its transparency mechanisms which entail, chiefly among others, the mandatory undertaking
of so called social audits by civil society organizations (Aakella and Kidambi, 2007a,b; Afridi,
2008; Afridi and Iversen, 2014). By employing mostly female workers and thereby improving
educational outcomes of children the Andhra model has gained further credit (Afridi et al.,
2012). At the same time, however, it is known that the Andhra model intentionally circum-
vents important provisions of the NREGA’s Guidelines. In particular, as Maiorano (2014)
thoroughly explains, the Andhra model is in effect supply-driven rather than demand-driven,
preventing workers to provide their labor as per their request. The entire system is organized
in a top-down fashion from the state’s chief minister to the ultimate implementing agent, the
Field Assistant. The latter has the crucial role of forming labor-groups10 at the village level.
Once assigned to such a labor-group, workers remain in the very same group during the sub-
sequent years. The FA is also in charge of supervising the worksites and posting labor-groups
to worksites as per his or her judgment. Keeping this in mind, workers in the states of Andhra
Pradesh and Telangana cannot demand work as stipulated in the Act. They need to wait for the
FA’s assignment. In section 3.4, the uncertainty involved in the timing of NREGA-worksites
and the timing of NREGA wage payments is presented. Establishing this feature is crucial to
consider the group-wise wage payments as exogenous events.
9Andhra Pradesh was divided into two states Telangana and Andhra Pradesh with effect from June 2, 2014
when the first phase of the NREGA had already been in place for 8 years. A note on the data and the partition
is provided in Section 3.4.
10These labor-groups are called Shrama Shakti Sanghas (SSS) and were formed in 2010.
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3.4 Data, Summary Statistics, Exogenous Variation
Among the second generation of ICRISAT’s Village Level Studies, the ICRISAT has collected
monthly panel data from four villages in Andhra Pradesh via its resident field investigators
between July 2010 and June 2015. While the two villages of Aurepalle and Dokur belong to the
district of Mahbubnagar, the villages of JC Agraharam and Pamidipadu belong to the district
of Prakasam.11 The districts are depicted in Figure 3.8, which shows that Prakasam is situated
closer to the coast, whereas Mahbubnagar is in the interior of India.12 Village-wise information
on demographics and key institutions situated in each village is presented in Table 3.1. Among
the four villages, Pamidipadu is the most populated with more than 1,200 households, whereas
JC Agraharam and Dokur are the smallest with about 500 and 400 households, respectively.
In terms of castes, three caste groups, namely Scheduled Castes (SC), Other Backward Castes
(OBC), and Upper Castes (UC) are more or less evenly distributed in Pamidipadu. In the
other three villages, the OBC group dominates (between 50 and 60 per cent), followed by SC in
Aurepalle (32 per cent) or UC in JC Agraharam. In Pamidipadu, 50 per cent of the households
are landless, which is quite remarkable especially when compared to the other three villages,
where the share of landless households is at most 22 per cent (JC Agraharam).
With stratification based on land ownership, in each village 40 households are interviewed
monthly. Since households in Aurepalle and Dokur have been interviewed since the 1970s,
the total number of households interviewed has increased due to family growth and the subse-
quent splitting of households (Dercon et al., 2013). All data are based on a monthly recall, so
that irrespective of the interview date households provide information regarding the preced-
ing month. The data include information on household demographics, consumption, income,
financial transactions, land holding, and agriculture related topics.
I combine these monthly data with self collected data at the household level. The self col-
lected data include each household’s NREGA job card number if it exists and information
retrieved from qualitative questions regarding the NREGA. I collected the data in research col-
laboration with Sudha Narayanan (IGIDR, Mumbai) and Krushna Ranawale (IGIDR, Mum-
bai)13 during September and October 2014. We visited each ICRISAT household which, ac-
cording to ICRISAT’s detailed records, had at least one member employed under the NREGA.
We asked each ICRISAT-NREGA household various questions regarding the NREGA and its
process of implementation within the village. Crucially for this paper, we asked about the
formation of labor groups and who was in charge of deciding on the composition of groups.
11Until June 2014 the two districts belonged to the same state, Andhra Pradesh. Since June 2014 Prakasam has
been part of to the newly formed state of Andhra Pradesh, and Mahbubnagar of the state of Telangana. In the
paper we only refer to Andhra Pradesh, since most of the sample period is covered under the old regime.
12More information on the villages of Aurepalle and Dokur based on the 1980s can be found in Walker and
Ryan (1990).
13Monica Saranya and Srilatha Jinne were part of the survey team, and I am very grateful for their excellent
assistance during the survey. Further, I want to thank the ICRISAT staff, in particular the resident field investi-
gators in Aurepalle and Dokur who have been very helpful and accommodating throughout the time.
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Table 3.1: Four Villages at a Glance
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Households 984 545 382 1,214
Households belonging to (in %):
Scheduled Castes 32 17 16 29
Scheduled Tribes 1 1 0 2
Other Backward Castes 59 64 53 32
Upper Castes 11 18 31 38
Households by Landownership (in %)
Landless 15 10 22 49
Marginal (< 1 ha) 27 44 34 29
Small (≥ 1 ha & < 2 ha) 38 31 21 11
Medium (≥ 2 ha & < 4 ha) 19 10 20 7
Large (≥ 4 ha) 8 4 4 4
Village has:
Banking Facility no no no ye s
Post Office ye s ye s ye s ye s
Public Health Facility ye s ye s no ye s
Primary School ye s ye s ye s ye s
Higher Secondary School ye s ye s no ye s
Notes: Based on ICRISAT Census data (December 31, 2010).
Sources: Reddy et al. (2011), Krishna et al. (2011), Ramesh et al. (2012), Siddappa et al. (2012).
Further, we asked key stake holder such as the Field Assistant, the village head, and block
and district officials about the procedures of providing work and paying wages on time. We
also met officials at the state level and the data processing unit who explained us the various
bureaucratic steps. In summary, a picture emerged that the potential for delay caused by sys-
tem inherent failures is considerable and that the demand-driven aspect of the Act is largely
circumvented.
Using the job card number allows me to merge those ICRISAT households who have ever
been employed under the NREGA with administrative records as provided by the Govern-
ment of Andhra Pradesh.14 The administrative data include each worker’s job card number
along with a vast array on information including, crucially for this paper, the worker’s group,
the exact opening and closure dates of group-wise worksites and the date and amount of group-
wise wage payments. In total, I am able to merge three data sets using the job card number as
a link: ICRISAT panel data, administrative program data, and primary data collected from
households belonging to the ICRISAT panel. An illustration of merging the three data sets is
14The Society for Social Audit, Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT,
http://www.socialaudit.ap.gov.in/) was very helpful in obtaining the data and explaining the inherent
processes of the “Andhra model.”
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Admin. NREGA Data
Job Card ID
ICRISAT Panel Data
Household ID
Self-Collected Data (2014):
Job Card ID AND Household ID
Unique and Novel Data Set
1. Admin. NREGA Data: Wages, Payment Details, labor
Groups
2. ICRISAT Panel Data: Socio-Economic Info
3. Self-Collected Data: Qualitative NREGA Info
Figure 3.1: Merging of Three Data Sets
depicted in Figure 3.1. The final data set includes 82 ICRISAT-NREGA households, spanning
four villages interviewed monthly over five years. While ICRISAT’s monthly interviews took
place between July 2010 and June 2015 administrative data from the Government of Andhra
Pradesh are only available up to October 2014. As explained below, each village-wise sample
period is trimmed depending on the village-wise NREGA activity.
3.4.1 Sample Summary Statistics
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To introduce the village-wise sample periods I begin by presenting the actual timing of
NREGA activity in the sample villages according to which the sample will be trimmed.
Figure 3.2 depicts the monthly variation of the average number of work days per NREGA
household15 and per ICRISAT-NREGA household16 over the time span for which ICRISAT
data are available. Across the four villages it is evident that NREGA work days normally take
place during the agricultural lean season, i.e. during the months between January and July
with peaks in NREGA activity normally in June of each year. However, certain deviations
from this rule are apparent. For example, in Aurepalle the real activity in terms of NREGA
work days seems to begin only by January 2012 with the last peaks observed in July 2014. In
Dokur, the more prominent peaks are only visible for the period between March 2011 and
July 2012, whereas in JC Agraharam the period between March 2011 and July 2014 is the
most relevant time span. In Pamidipadu we observe two intervals of activity, one between
March 2011 and July 2012 and the other between January 2014 and July 2014. We use these
village-wise intervals to trim the sample for the subsequent analyses accordingly. Also, we
take into account that wage payments may come with a delay of up to three months. Hence,
the latest month included for all villages is October 2014, whereas the initial month of each
interval varies by village.
Consumption Expenditure
Table 3.2 presents sample summary statistics by village. The sample data adheres to the
trimming of time spans according to NREGA activity with the beginning of each sample
period indicated by “Min Month” and the end of each period indicated by “Max Month”. The
unit of analysis is a household. All prices are deflated to July 2010 prices using the monthly
and state-wise consumer price index for agricultural laborers (CPI-AL) (Government of
India, 2013a). According to the sample means, Pamidipadu accounts for the highest mean
consumption per household and month (INR 8,794), which is almost twice as large as the
average monthly consumption for JC Agraharam. In between the two are Aurepalle and
Dokur with both household consumption expenditure of around INR 5,500. To put into
perspective, average monthly per capita consumption expenditure in 2009-10 in rural Andhra
Pradesh is INR 1,234 (National Sample Survey Organisation, 2011). Hence, with an average
household size of four, consumption of sample households is close to the state’s average.
Complementing the sample summary statistics, Figure 3.9 depicts the monthly variation
in household consumption expenditure. Regular peaks occur during the festive or harvest
season around October. However, some potential outliers can be observed. For example, in
the village of Pamidipadu unusual peaks in consumption occur in the early months of 2014.
These peaks can be corroborated in the data and it becomes evident that these consumption
15An NREGA household is a household employed under the NREGA as reported by the administrative data.
16An ICRISAT-NREGA household is a household holding an NREGA job card while also being part of the
ICRISAT sample.
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peaks are driven by very high expenses for marriage ceremonies or education. These seem to
happen for a number of households in Pamidipadu at the same time.
Financial Transactions
Table 3.2 reports four major categories of borrowing (loans) and and three for saving: Formal,
informal (only for borrowing), microfinance, friends and relatives (loans) or loans to other
(savings). Formal borrowing and saving considers all transactions with formal institutions such
as banks, co-operatives and the like. According to the sample means formal borrowing is highly
prevalent in Pamidipadu, somewhat less in Aurepalle and Dokur, but as good as non-existent
in JC Agraharam. Informal loans entail loans borrowed from a money lender. In Pamidipadu,
this practice seems to have faded away, whereas in Dokur and JC Agraharam it is still quite
prevalent. In Aurepalle, the sample mean of informal loans is about 75 percent the size of the
sample mean for formal loans (repaid).
Borrowing from friends and relatives seems to top all of the financial channels. Even
though monthly average repayments in Dokur and JC Agraharam are not as high as in the
other two villages, loans received from friends and relatives are higher than loans from any
other categories. Microfinance loans and savings, too, seem to play a major role in financial
transactions for households across villages, albeit to varying degrees. Average monthly
repayments and receipts of microfinance loans are the highest in Pamidipadu, followed by
Aurepalle, JC Agraharam and Dokur.
Microfinance - Self Help Groups
In the sample villages, microfinance loans and savings are predominantly transactions with
Self Help Groups (SHGs) which are part of the Government’s SHG-bank linkage program.
According to Basu and Srivastava (2005), the latter is “[...] somewhat unique to India,
particularly given its preponderance in the country’s microfinance landscape. The model
evolved so that the SHG-bank linkage today involves having the group save, and then linking
it to a bank. Banks typically provide the group a loan amounting to four times the group’s
savings but, as the group matures, and based on the group’s track record, banks are ready to
lend more. Borrowed and saved funds are rotated through lending within the group using
flexible repayment schedules (usually monthly repayment); SHGs thus save, borrow and
repay collectively.” It is important to stress here that repayment schedules are flexible. At the
same time, members “decide the terms of loans to their own members” while “peer pressure
ensures timely repayments” (Puhazhendi and Badatya, 2002). Such a framework induces
members “to recycle loans within the group, as the bank loans are often taken for longer
duration of 3 years” (National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, 2013). Most
of the SHGs are formed by women, and according to Parida and Sinha (2010) female groups
adhere to “financial management practices” of much higher standards than male groups.17
17Suda and Bantilan (2014) use a special survey on SHG groups in the sample village of Aurepalle and Maha-
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Since the most frequent financial transactions undertaken are monthly loan repayments to
microfinance institutions we take a closer look at the monthly fluctuation in Figure 3.10.
With several spikes across varying seasons, there does not seem to exist a particular period
for such loan repayments. Instead, while microfinance loan repayments in Aurepalle seem to
begin only in January 2012 they follow a stable path with minor peaks here and there. For
JC Agraharam, microfinance loan repayments decline continuously from the end of 2013
onwards. In Dokur, there is a decline between 2010 and 2013 before these loan repayments
pick up again in 2014. Only in Pamidipadu they remain constant at a certain level - at a level
much higher than in the other three villages. Only one steep decline can be observed in May
2014 before the earlier level is reached again.
Wage Income and Work Days
According to Table 3.2, village-wise self reported total wage income is of a similar magnitude as
the village-wise consumption expenditure. Hence, equivalent to the consumption-based rank-
ing of villages, Pamidipadu accounts for by far the highest average wage income with INR
10,000. The average wage income is not even half as much in the other three villages. Looking
at income from NREGA wages, there are two sources: a) self reported, meaning as reported
by households during the monthly ICRISAT interviews, and b) administrative, meaning as
recorded by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. Self reported NREGA wage is the highest
in JC Agraharam (approx. INR 500), followed by Aurepalle (INR 466), Pamidipadu (INR 432)
and Dokur, where average NREGA wages are only around INR 260. The latter is probably
due to much less NREGA work days in Dokur. In fact, self reported NREGA work days (4)
in Dokur are half as much as those in JC Agraharam (8). The self reported NREGA wage of
around INR 500 in JC Agraharam is quite substantial given that it is the average amount over
all months, including months when no NREGA wages are paid. Therefore, one may consider
that monthly NREGA wage income reach up to INR 1,000 during months of the spring sea-
son. This would correspond to one fifth of total household consumption expenditure. Since
total wage income and consumption expenditure are of similar magnitude NREGA wage in-
come can be quite substantial with regards to total wage income. The monthly variation of
the share of NREGA wage income in total wage income is depicted in Figure 3.11. For one,
the seasonality in NREGA activity is revealed also by administrative data on NREGA wage
payments. And second, peaks of up to 20 per cent corroborate the point that NREGA wages
can be of considerable importance for households in certain months.
Table 3.2 also lists the number of self reported NREGA work days and total work days.
These yield ratios of NREGA to total work days similar to those based on wages indicating
that NREGA work days may take up between 20 to 30 per cent of all work days in a month
when NREGA works occur. Interestingly, however, self reported and administrative data
on work days seem to tally only for the sample of Pamidipadu. As observed for the data on
rashtrian villages to discuss potential welfare effects of the SHG-bank linkage program.
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NREGA wage payments, the self reported figures are higher than the figures obtained from
administrative records on NREGA work days in Aurepalle and JC Agraharam. There may be
at least two conceivable reasons for this mismatch: a) a reporting problem during the ICRISAT
interview, or b) the possibility that the household holds more jobcards than reported to us.
The latter results in matching less work days from administrative records to a given ICRISAT
household. In Dokur, on the other hand, the pattern is reversed: self reported NREGA days
(4) are much less than administrative NREGA days (8). In contrast to the other case this
may potentially indicate a scam at the supply side, meaning for example, that bogus days are
reported in administrative records. In Pamidipadu, too, the ratio of administrative NREGA
wages to self reported NREGA wages hints towards such a scenario. Therefore, any results de-
pending on administrative data for Dokur and Pamidipadu should be taken with a grain of salt.
Qualitative Data
Linking NREGA wage income with consumption and financial transactions - the main focus
of this paper - it is worthwhile to take a look at some of the qualitative data self-collected from
ICRISAT-NREGA households in 2014. Table 3.16 reports frequencies of answers to general
questions regarding the use of NREGA wages. Accordingly, NREGA wages are often spent
on consumption and frequently utilised to repay loans to microfinance institutions. As per
ICRISAT data a large proportion of all loans taken up are from such informal or semi-formal
institutions, as reported in Table 3.17.
3.4.2 Financial Market Access of Sample Households by Village
The ICRISAT data allow us to take a closer look at the portfolio of financial market
transactions from two angles. First, yearly balance sheets taken on July 1 of each year
illustrate the stock of borrowings and savings (Tables 3.18 and 3.19). Thus, the yearly balance
sheet highlights access to finance in general. Second, by observing monthly incidences and
monthly average transactions of payments and receipts we gain information about the flow
of borrowings and savings (Table 3.3). These also tell us about the general access to finance
but also highlight the monthly exposure to formal and informal financial markets.
Monthly Incidences and Yearly Balance Sheets
To begin with a general view on the flows (Table 3.3), the most frequently undertaken monthly
transactions are microfinance loan repayments. These occur at least every other month in
each village, followed by financial transactions with friends and relatives. All other borrowing
transactions occur only a few times in the sample period indicating that other loans mature
probably after one year or more and are not to be repaid in monthly instalments.
In terms of general access to formal finance institutions, approximately 60 per cent of all
households across villages are connected to formal banking, as inferred from the yearly data on
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Table 3.3: Financial Transactions: Monthly Incidences
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Rec. Rep. Rec. Rep. Rec. Rep. Rec. Rep.
Borrowing (Incidence in %):
Formal 1.70 4.64 2.26 3.20 0.23 0.81 4.59 5.24
Informal 1.92 1.13 2.63 2.07 3.46 2.88 1.31 0.22
SHG 1.92 76.92 3.76 61.09 1.73 47.93 4.80 76.86
Friends & Rel. 9.50 5.32 9.96 5.45 7.14 2.19 5.02 5.68
Others 50.79 49.10 1.50 1.69 37.44 37.44 35.15 34.06
Households 26 26 19 19 20 20 17 17
Months 34 34 28 28 44 44 27 27
Number of Observations 884 884 532 532 868 868 458 458
Savings (Incidence in %):
Formal 0.68 4.41 2.07 4.51 1.15 23.16 3.71 27.95
SHG 0.90 92.19 0.38 73.87 0.00 83.76 1.75 97.60
Loan to Other 0.45 0.90 3.38 0.00 0.35 0.35 1.09 0.00
Households 26 26 19 19 20 20 17 17
Months 34 34 28 28 44 44 27 27
Number of Observations 884 884 532 532 868 868 458 458
Notes: Author’s calculations of monthly household averages from ICRISAT data.
The sample is restricted to ICRISAT-NREGA households.
borrowings (Table 3.18). However, some yearly variation is visible, especially so in JC Agra-
haram and Pamidipadu where during the years 2010 and 2011 average access hovers around
30 per cent. In Dokur, a decline to such a low level can be noted only in 2014. The monthly
data (Table 3.3) underscore the broad access to formal banking as monthly savings (received
or paid) via formal banking institutions happen regularly and about every two months, with
Dokur being the exception. Borrowings from formal institutions do not happen as frequently,
which is visible both in the yearly as well as in the monthly data. The latter suggests that on
average households take up and pay back such a loan once in a year or so.
Access to microfinance loans is on average even higher than access to loans from formal
institutions, as one can infer from incidences of the yearly data which hover around 70 per
cent (Table 3.18). Exceptions are Dokur in 2013 and JC Agraharam in 2014. In terms of mag-
nitudes, loans from microfinance institutions are much smaller than loans borrowed from for-
mal institutions. Importantly, monthly loan repayments to microfinance institutions occur
in 60 per cent of all sample months (Table 3.3), underscoring the nature of flexible microfi-
nance repayments in monthly instalments. Even higher frequencies for microfinance savings
indicate monthly commitments to local microfinance groups (Table 3.3). On the other hand,
microfinance loans are received usually only about once a year.
In all villages access to loans borrowed from friends and relatives is equally important and
of similar magnitude as loans taken from formal institutions (Table 3.18). This may vary from
village to village and from year to year but the general access to such loans from this network is
quite prominent. Such loans are taken and repaid quite frequently (Table 3.3). Loans received
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and repaid to friends and relatives are relatively huge in magnitude (Table 3.2). However, such
transactions take place only three to four times during the sample period (Table 3.3).
In summary, the following stylised facts emerge: households in Dokur have the least ac-
cess to formal banking in terms of saving behaviour. In JC Agraharam formal borrowing is
abysmally low while informal borrowing is relatively high. In comparison, households in Au-
repalle and Pamidipadu are the most frequent borrowers from formal institutions. In all vil-
lages saving and borrowing via microfinance institutions is very prominent. Borrowing from
friends and relatives is also of considerable magnitude across villages.
3.4.3 Labor Groups in ICRISAT Villages
Among the sample households who are both part of the ICRISAT panel and work under
the NREGA we identify 58 SSS groups: 16 in Aurepalle, 14 in Dokur, 15 in JC Agraharam,
and 13 in Pamidipadu. In self-conducted interviews we asked ICRISAT-NREGA households
about the formation of groups, as presented in Table 3.16. Overwhelmingly, they had no say
which group they join. The reason cited - in more than 60 percent of all answers - for being
in a particular group was given as “Field Assistant”, followed by “neighborhood” and “caste”.
Further and crucially, in more than 70 percent of all cases it was not the household’s decision
to be in the particular group, but instead the Field Assistant’s.
The evidence highlighted here shows that there is no room for self-selection into labor
groups. Therefore, self-selection into worksites can be ruled out as well if the demand for
NREGA work always meets the supply of NREGA works. The extent to which this may
be assumed at the village level is explained in the following subsections via the variation in
worksites per group, and the extent of workday smoothing.
3.4.4 Group-wise Variation in Open Worksites
The number of monthly worksites available per group and month are depicted as an example
for Aurepalle and Dokur in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. During Spring 2011 (for illus-
trative purposes this season only is depicted here) the number of open worksites per group
varies greatly. Clearly, some groups have higher chances of receiving work than others. Thus,
rationing of labor as discussed for example by Das (2013) in the context of West Bengal or by
Dutta et al. (2014) in the context of Bihar does seem to happen in our sample villages as well.
Since workers do not have any say about when their group should receive work but are solely
dependent on the field assistant, one may consider the timing of open worksites as exogenous
events.
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Figure 3.3: Variation of Open Worksites in Aurepalle by Month and
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Figure 3.4: Variation of Open Worksites in Dokur by Month and
Group
3.4.5 Supply Shocks of NREGA Work Days?
In this section, I test whether the supply of NREGA work days can be considered as a supply-
driven shock to total working days. For this purpose, I regress self reported total work days on
self reported NREGA days in a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) framework, where self reported
NREGA days are instrumented by administrative NREGA days. The regression equations for
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the OLS (3.19), the first stage (3.20), and second stage (3.21)are specified as
T W Di t =µi + γt +
3∑
τ=0
βτ SN Di t−τ + εi t (3.19)
SN Di t =µi + γt +
3∑
τ=0
βτ ADM I Ni t−τ + εi t (3.20)
T W Di t =µi + γt +β SN Di t
∧
+ εi t , (3.21)
where T W Di t corresponds to the number of total self reported work days, SN Di t to the
number of self reported NREGA work days, and ADM I Ni t to NREGA work days as recorded
in administrative data, each for household i in month t . µi is a household fixed effect and γt
a month fixed effect. εi t is a stochastic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the group-
month level. Each summation term in equation 3.19 and 3.20 includes one contemporaneous
and three lagged forms of the explanatory variable, which thus yield four betas in total. If
NREGA days are a true and fully utilized supply shock, the coefficient in the 2nd stage should
be positive and relatively high, so that any additional NREGA work day positively impacts
total work days. In other cases of statistically significant but smaller coefficients in magnitude,
NREGA work days might still be considered as a supply shock, albeit one which is of no great
relevance to the households. For instance, household might undertake a form of workday
smoothing, utilize NREGA days when needed or substitute them for other work days.
Regression results are set out in Table 3.4, where three columns for each village present the
first stage, OLS, and second stage results. According to the 2nd stage results, NREGA work
days impact the total number of monthly work days in Dokur, Pamidipadu, and Aurepalle.
The coefficient of interest is highly statistically significant in the village-wise regressions
in these three village-wise regressions. The first stage results corroborate impressions from
the sample summary statistics: for Dokur and Pamidipadu, administrative data do not tally
with self-reported data and since the former are higher than the latter, suspicions for a
supply-side scam may be warranted. In accordance, the first stage estimates for Dokur and
Pamidipadu are not statistically significant.18 Hence, the second stage results for Dokur and
Pamidipadu should be considered with caution, not least because of the smaller sample size.
The regression results for Aurepalle and JC Agraharam on the other hand look promising,
although they yield different interpretations. For Aurepalle, the highly significant coefficient
of .6 in magnitude can be interpreted as a supply-side related increase of total work days. This,
however, cannot be found in JC Agraharam, since the coefficient of interest is not statistically
significant at conventional levels. Hence, there does not seem to be evidence for a supply-side
shock but rather for work day smoothing.
18For illustrative purposes, the ratio of self reported to administrative NREGA days is depicted in Figure 3.12.
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In support of the above findings, the density graphs depicted in Figure 3.5 illustrate that
there is evidence for a supply-side shock in Aurepalle and evidence for work day smoothing in
JC Agraharam. Using group-wise information from administrative data on the total number
of possible NREGA work days for each ICRISAT-NREGA household we calculate the ratio
of monthly realised work days by a household to monthly supplied work days for a group. In
Figure 3.5 frequencies of such a demand-supply ratio are plotted for each village. In the case of
Aurepalle a bunching towards the 100 per cent mark is visible whereas in JC Agraharam there
is an even distribution around that threshold, which indicates smoothing of work days. For
Dokur and Pamidipadu a clear bunching towards the 100 per cent mark cannot be found.
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of NREGA Work Days in Supplied Group Days
per Month
3.4.6 Variation in Monthly Wage Payments
While NREGA work days may not come as a surprise or may be smoothed as shown above,
workers might still face some uncertainty regarding the exact timing of wage payments. Ac-
cording to the Act NREGA wages are supposed to be paid within 15 days after work. But
across India, most often wage payments reach workers much later for a variety of reasons
including inherent problems with the payment system(Khera, 2010). Based on a survey of
NREGA laborers conducted in 10 states during the year 2008, more than 50 percent of the
respondents complain about a delay in wage payments (Drèze and Khera, 2009).19 Basu and
19For all-India figures on payment delay since 2012-13 see the following insightful report in the Hin-
dustan Times: http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/sharp-rise-in-timely-wage-payment-to-mgnrega-
workers/story-jj01pMVXeXmMZk9lIUWUUP.html
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Sen (2015) provide for a theoretic model conceptualizing how a delay in wage payment can be
a multifaceted welfare loss.
Our interviews with the sample households also indicate that workers may have to wait
for several months to get paid. As listed in Table 3.16, a large proportion of ICRISAT-NREGA
households (about 40 percent) complain about a delay in wage payments. From administrative
records, too, such evidence emerges. As shown in Figure 3.6, even though ICRISAT-NREGA
households do not face delays in 60 to 70 per cent of all cases, when delays occur these may
take up to three months. Wage payments may then be considered as random events as the
delays are due to bureaucratic obstacles and the banking system. Both are beyond the reach of
the ordinary worker or field assistant.
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Figure 3.6: Uncertainty of Date of Payment
For purposes of identifying the NREGA wage payments and classifying them as potential
“income shocks”, it is important to establish that the date of wage payment does not occur in
the same month when NREGA work days take place and consumption decisions are made.
In fact, if one were to rely on the self-reported ICRISAT data, one would identify wage claims
rather than actual wage payments in most cases. That is because during the interview house-
holds are first asked about the number of work days and then about their wages. So one would
expect households to first report the number of work days followed by the expected and not
necessarily the real wage income, as the latter can be paid out later. Figure 3.7 depicts admin-
istrative data on NREGA wage payments and its timing. It illustrates that wage payments are
often paid in the month after NREGA works took place. Hence, self-reported data on wage
payments would likely be wage claims rather than actual payments. Therefore, to identify the
true wage payment and exploit the monthly variation and uncertainty in the timing of wage
payments the administrative data on monthly payments is employed in the empirical analyses
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of this paper. So, even if work days can be smoothed, in for example JC Agraharam, the date
of payment may still vary and is still somewhat uncertain.
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Figure 3.7: Month of Wage Payment
3.5 Regression Model
In this section, I present the regression model and possible predictions. The aim of the re-
gression analysis is to estimate a) whether households are able to smooth consumption and b)
what kind of financial transactions are utilised. The regression estimates depend heavily on
the identification of income shocks and to what degree these can be considered as exogenous
events. From the discussion in Section 3.4 the major take-away is that at least the timing of
wage payments can be considered as exogenous to consumption behaviour and financial trans-
actions. The variation in the monthly timing of wage payments as per administrative records
- wage payments may or may not happen in the month when works take place - is impor-
tant to identify exogenous income shocks. To clarify, the main explanatory variable is wage
income as recorded in administrative records which is not equal to the self reported wage in-
come. As discussed for example by Deaton (1990) and Townsend (1994), self reported income
is often measured with error. This measurement error correlates with the error of the self re-
ported outcome variable, say consumption. To avoid this, one can either use an instrumented
variable (IV) framework or exploit the exogenous variation in another variable which also cap-
tures household income. The latter is often hard to get by and hence IV frameworks are the
most common approaches. In this paper, I consider NREGA wage payments as recorded in
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administrative data to capture reasonably well the income from NREGA activities.20 During
the spring season such income from NREGA activities may be substantial for a household.
3.5.1 Regression Model
Townsend (1994) argues that the ICRISAT villages are very heterogeneous in nature. They are
more than 100 kilometres apart and differ in agricultural activities and in their socio-economic
setting. Therefore, we follow Townsend (1994) and subsequent empirical studies by for exam-
ple Mazzocco and Saini (2012) on some of the same villages and run village-wise estimations.
As Mazzocco and Saini (2012), we exploit the nature of the high-frequency panel data set by
employing the monthly data. In contrast to Townsend we do not need to aggregate at the yearly
level, and in contrast to Mazzocco and Saini (2012) we do not need to adjust the monthly data
as the recall periods are constant and always refer to the previous month, even though the
interview date might vary. Thus we can employ month fixed effects without any tweaking of
the monthly data. To account for the heterogeneity across households within a village we use
household fixed effects.
The basic panel OLS regression with household and month fixed effects is of the form
ci t =µi + γt +
3∑
τ=0
βτ ADM I Ni t−τ + εi t , (3.22)
where ADM I Ni t is the NREGA wage as recorded in administrative records for household
i in month t . µi is a household fixed effect, γt is a month fixed effect, and εi t is a stochas-
tic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the group-month level. As before, the sum-
mation term contains one contemporaneous and three lagged forms of the explanatory vari-
able, which thus yield four betas in total. Equation 3.22 follows equation 3.15 quite closely.
Household and month fixed effects cancel out all household demographics captured in Hi t ,
while the household fixed effects also cancel out village average consumption, c¯t . To test for
consumption smoothing, the outcome variable ci t is household consumption expenditure for
household i in month t . To test for mechanisms of consumption smoothing in separate regres-
sions, ci t captures several forms of borrowings and savings. Doing so, I follow Fafchamps and
Lund (2003), who regress gifts, loans, and change in assets on negative income shocks for rural
households in the Philippines to test which of the three serves to smooth consumption. As
discussed in Section 3.2 I ignore wage claims and only include realized wage income as regres-
sors of interest. Since the primary data (Table 3.16) suggest that NREGA wages are likely to
20Still, one may think of several occasions when the wage payment as recorded on bank statements may not
be wage earned of households. For instance, it could be that due to corrupt official at the bank or post office
only some part of the wage is paid out. Or it could be that powerful Field Assistants open their hands after the
wage was paid out. Such cases have been told to us during our field work. However, it is likely that such inherent
corruption does not vary across households. In contrast to self reported income, such measurement error would
not be correlated with the measurement error in the self reported outcome variables.
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be utilized for purposes of savings and repayments of loans to microfinance groups, if not for
direct consumption, I focus on those forms of financial transactions, in particular. The sample
is restricted to ICRISAT-NREGA households, so that only households who have ever been
part of any NREGA labor group are included in the sample. For logarithmic transformations
of outcome and explanatory variables ones are added to every non-missing observation.
3.5.2 Gender-wise Payments and Intra-household Allocations
In South India, and in particular in the state of Andhra Pradesh, women constitute the ma-
jority of the NREGA workforce. Since the beginning of the NREGA in 2006, annually more
than 60 per cent of all workers in Andhra Pradesh are female workers (Drèze and Oldiges,
2011). There are numerous studies on female employment under the NREGA, which high-
light the beneficial effects on women empowerment, women’s bargaining power, and child
education (Narayanan, 2008; Khera and Nayak, 2009; Afridi et al., 2012). Under the NREGA
female workers are entitled to the same minimum wage as male workers. Also, female workers
are entitled to collect wages at the bank or post office. Thus, as some of the above mentioned
studies highlight, NREGA employment of women has the potential to directly impact intra-
household finance decisions. Such intra-household allocations are often difficult to statistically
identify and have not been studied much in the context of the NREGA.
Doing so, I contribute to a larger literature in the field of gender and intra-household al-
locations (Thomas, 1990; Bourguignon et al., 1993; Browning et al., 1994; Browning and Chi-
appori, 1998, see for example). It is widely accepted that women and men “spend income dif-
ferently,” measurement error problems (female income may have a higher measurement error
than male income) and endogeneity issues have, however, complicated much research in this
field (Haddad, 1999) and induced many to instrument labor income with non-labor income
Hopkins et al. (1994). The latter estimate the response of seasonal household consumption to
seasonal male and female wage income on in rural Niger and find that the gender of income
matters.
In this paper, I contribute to the literature by exploiting gender-wise data on wage pay-
ments and ICRISAT’s rich data on financial transactions. The share of female workers varies
by village, according to the administrative data on work days (Table 3.2). The female share is
almost 90 per cent in Aurepalle, about 70 per cent in Dokur, 45 per cent in JC Agraharam,
and 60 per cent in Pamidipadu. The administrative data on gender-wise work days allow me to
infer the share of female wages in total NREGA wage payments. Based on that I impute female
and male NREGA wages and include these as separate regressors in the regression equation.
However, since I cannot statistically distinguish wage shares of zero from monthly wages
of zero21 my framework departs from the often used technique of using female and male wage
21Recall that in many winter months the NREGA is not operating or that in some cases households chose not
to participate. For such months wage payments of zero go into the regression. If at the same time but for other
months wage shares of zero enter the regression no distinction between the two cases would be possible.
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shares along with total household income as regressors of interest (Bourguignon et al., 1993;
Browning et al., 1994; Browning and Chiappori, 1998). The regression equation only includes
the imputed gender-wise wage incomes as separate regressors in log form. In fact, my regression
equation is similar to the specification adopted by Hopkins et al. (1994). Using household and
month fixed effects as before in equation 3.22, the regression equation is then
ci t =µi + γt +
3∑
τ=0
βτ F EMi t−τ +
3∑
τ=0
βτ M ALi t−τ + εi t , (3.23)
where F EMi t−τ and M ALi t−τ are female and male NREGA wage payments, respectively. We
include four time periods for each, yielding eight betas of interest in total.
3.6 Main Results and Discussion
In this section, I present the main results of tests for consumption smoothing and for mecha-
nisms of consumption smoothing. After highlighting the key findings, an attempt is made to
place these into the context of the village economies and the village-wise access to finance.
3.6.1 Results
Consumption Smoothing
Table 3.5 presents the village-wise regression results for the tests on consumption smoothing.
Each column corresponds to one regression as specified in equation 3.22 with both the depen-
dent variable (DV) and each independent variable (IV) in log terms. Therefore, the coefficients
can be interpreted as elasticities. The table also reports the p-value of the F-test for joint signif-
icance of the explanatory variables. I include two F-tests, one to test for the joint significance
of only the lagged variables and one for the joint significance of both the lagged variable and
the contemporaneous term.
The results indicate that only in JC Agraharam consumption responds to changes in
income. In the other three village-wise regressions, coefficients are statistically insignificant
and very small in magnitude. This is evidence for consumption smoothing. These results are
in line with those of Townsend (1994) who finds that consumption responds only in rare
cases to changes in income, and if so at very low degrees. For JC Agraharam, on the other
hand, the magnitude of the sum of the point estimates (.045) is quite considerable, since it
implies a propensity to consume of .66. This means that a INR 100 increase in wages leads to
an increase in consumption of INR 66. In the context of possible predictions, the results for
JC Agraharam are somewhat between the predictions of the PIH and the “hand to mouth”
model (see equations ?? and 3.8).
Financial Transactions: Borrowings
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Table 3.5: Consumption Regressed on NREGA Income
DV: HH Consumption Expenditure (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Admin. NREGA Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.003 0.004 −0.001 −0.002
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010)
Lag 1 −0.004 −0.005 0.025∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015)
Lag 2 −0.008 −0.003 0.003 −0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Lag 3 −0.010 0.002 0.017∗∗ −0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.20 0.89 0.00 0.73
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.27 0.96 0.00 0.81
Mean: DV 5820 5517 4806 8795
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 329 561
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
Table 3.7 set out regression results for tests on mechanisms of consumption smoothing in
the form of borrowing. Each column represents one village-wise regression with a given loan
category in logs as the dependent variable. As before, the explanatory variables are in logs as
well, so that the coefficients may be interpreted as elasticities. The regression specification is
according to equation 3.22. Also, p-values of the F-test on joint significance are reported for
each regression.
In order to get an overview of the many results, I let p-values of the F-tests guide us in focus-
ing on the most conservative results. From such a conservative view, it appears that only loan
repayments to microfinance groups respond to changes in income as identified by NREGA
wage payments. In particular, for the two villages of Dokur and JC Agraharam positive elas-
ticities can be observed which are statistically significant. In the case of Dokur, the third lag
is highly statistically significant with an elasticity of 0.086. The sum of the coefficients is near
0.1, yielding a propensity to repay loans of about 0.05. Thus, five per cent of an income in-
crease is diverted to the repayment of microfinance loans. For JC Agraharam, the propensity
to repay microfinance loans to is much higher (.21).
In terms of interpreting the results, one has to keep in mind the small sample size for
Dokur and Pamidipadu. Thus, the propensities for Dokur are to be treated with caution. The
ratio between the mean of the dependent variable and the mean of the independent variable
(administrative income) is the key multiplier for the calculation of propensities. In Dokur,
however, as shown in Section 3.4, wage income based on administrative records is much
higher than self reported wage income. As this might point towards a supply-side scam any
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results for Dokur should be treated with an additional grain of salt. In fact, such high values
for administrative income in the ratio’s denominator reduce the multiplier substantially.
Thus the low propensities might be underestimates given the elasticities.
Financial Transactions: Savings
Regression results for savings are presented in Tables 3.20 to 3.24. Analogous to results dis-
cussed above, coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. As in the preceding interpretation
of results we let the p-values of the F-test be the conservative guide for analyzing only the most
robust results. Recall that incidences for most forms of Saving (Received) are very low, hence
it is very difficult to run meaningful regressions. In the case of savings from microfinance in-
stitutions in JC Agraharam the incidences are so low that no regression can be run, and hence
the blank space in the respective column of Table 3.21.
In JC Agraharam, savings received from formal institutions respond to changes in wage
income. However, the estimated propensity is very low with a magnitude of 0.03. Related
to this finding, savings deposited at formal institutions react to a much greater extent in JC
Agraharam. Propensities to save at formal institutions are around 0.17, meaning that INR
17 of a INR 100 increase in wages are deposited into saving accounts. At the same time, in
JC Agraharam informal savings reduce as a response to wage increases. The corresponding
propensity, however, is relatively small at 0.025. For Aurepalle, too, I find that informal savings
reduce as a response to an increase in wage income. With informal savings being much more
prevalent in Aurepalle (higher mean), the propensity of .92 to reduce informal savings is much
higher than in JC Agraharam. As the last finding to be discussed, I focus on microfinance
Saving (Paid) in Dokur. The sum of coefficients yield an elasticity of about .8, which yields a
propensity to deposit such savings of about .6.
3.6.2 Discussion of Main Results
At the outset of this discussion of results, it is important to note one caveat of the study. For
two reasons, I can only test a limited number of consumption smoothing mechanisms. First,
financial transactions need to occur with a reasonable frequency in order to be measured in
a regression framework. Therefore, even though gifts, for example, might play an important
part in consumption smoothing, I cannot include these as potential outcome variables as they
happen much too rarely. Second, by focusing only on financial transactions I ignore other
investments, for example investments in agriculture-related activities or products which are
also aimed at smoothing consumption. Thus, this paper provides insights and evidence of
several mechanisms at work, albeit no claim is made to portray them all. From the findings
presented above a few patterns emerge. Sticking to the conservative focus on regarding only
regression results with p-values of smaller than 0.10, I come to the following four conclusions.
First, only households in JC Agraharam utilize income from NREGA wages immediately
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for consumption expenditures. Thus, there is evidence for consumption smoothing in Au-
repalle, Dokur, and Pamidipadu, but not in JC Agraharam. Second, from all forms of bor-
rowings loan repayments to microfinance institutions are the only mechanisms identified to
be responding to changes in wage income. It is worth noting, that I find such behavior for
JC Agraharam - the only village where consumption is not insured against income shocks.
Recall that JC Agraharam is also the village with the least exposure to formal banking (see
Table 3.18 or Section 3.4.2). Hence, new forms of insurance in the form of an employment
guarantee (NREGA) and microfinance might be vital to increase consumption. Besides this,
JC Agraharam is the poorest village of the four in terms of household consumption expen-
diture. From this perspective, the regression results underscore the immediate benefits public
initiatives like the NREGA or new forms of finance may bring about. Overall, for JC Agra-
haram, I can track the utilization of an additional INR 100 almost entirely; at least in so far
as about INR 66 are used for consumption, INR 20 are used to pay back microfinance loans
and INR 17 are deposited into saving accounts while INR 3 are deducted from informal sav-
ing accounts. Third, in the slightly richer villages, consumption does not react to changes in
wage income from the NREGA. This may be so, since NREGA income is relatively small in
comparison to consumption expenditure in these villages. At the same time, I find that cer-
tain financial market transactions can be statistically identified in these villages. Aurepalle, the
most diverse village in terms of financial means, sees savings deposited at informal institutions
being reduced as a response to positive changes in wage income. While it is certainly an in-
teresting finding, I cannot statistically identify other mechanisms or outflows to track where
the savings are invested. Even though the statistical properties for the sample of Aurepalle
speak for the possibility of identifying mechanisms - such as sample size, supply-side shocks
in NREGA works - the huge portfolio of financial options may be a constraint in itself. For
instance, if a household diverts tiny amounts of the small increase in wages to every single
kind of loan repayment or saving option the statistical framework employed cannot identify
such movements. In addition, there may be other financial transactions such as investments
in agriculture or education which are not captured in this analysis. And finally, in Dokur, the
second poorest village of the four sample villages, I see an increase in microfinance loan re-
payments as a response to changes in wage income. As discussed in Section 3.4.2 both Dokur
and JC Agraharam are the least exposed to formal banking as inferred from either their sav-
ing or borrowing behaviour. Hence, one may reason that these households are particularly
vulnerable and depend even more on microfinance institutions as estimated in the regression
analyses.
3.6.3 Results and Discussion of Gender-wise Payments
Recall that women account for at least 50 per cent of all NREGA workers in the sample
villages, and depending on the village, for example Aurepalle, the share may even reach
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Table 3.8: Consumption Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: HH Consumption Expenditure (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.011 0.022 −0.014∗ −0.005
(0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010)
Lag 1 −0.009 0.007 0.014 0.015
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
Lag 2 0.022 0.003 0.015 −0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012)
Lag 3 0.006 −0.003 0.002 −0.012
(0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.004 −0.008 0.019∗∗ −0.001
(0.006) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010)
Lag 1 −0.000 −0.008 0.016 −0.018
(0.008) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Lag 2 −0.015∗∗ −0.012 −0.012 0.013
(0.007) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Lag 3 −0.013∗ −0.004 0.017∗ 0.010
(0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.019)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.34 0.97 0.45 0.63
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.27 0.07 0.29 0.75
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.03 0.51 0.20 0.31
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.06 0.34 0.02 0.47
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.07 0.21 0.00 0.73
Mean: DV 5820 5517 4806 8795
Mean: Male Income 44 195 181 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 148 336
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
90 per cent. In this section, I present and discuss the results based on regression equation
3.23 where imputed gender-wise wage payments are included as explanatory variables.
For briefness, I focus in this discussion on the results for consumption smoothing (Table
3.8) and the results for microfinance loan repayments (Table 3.9).22 In each table, I report
two separate blocks of coefficients: one for imputed male wage payments and one for im-
puted female wage payments, along with block-wise p-values of the F-test on joint significance.
Consumption Smoothing
The F-test is our guide for the most conservative estimates. Based on that, I find for JC
Agraharam that consumption responds positively to changes in female wage income but
not to changes in male wage income. With a propensity of higher than one (1.29) female
wage income is fully utilized for consumption. Therefore, I conjecture that the evidence
against consumption smoothing in JC Agraharam (Section 3.6.2) is largely driven by female
22Tables 3.26 to 3.32 present results for all other outcome variables. Mostly, the p-values of the F-tests are very
high.
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wage income. To put the results in context, think of the total propensity to consume (.6) as
the sum of the wage-share-weighted female and male propensities to consume. The female
wage-share-weighted propensity to consume is 1.29 ∗ (148/329) = 0.6. Hence, female wage
payments alone suffice to explain the propensity in consumption. For Aurepalle, on the
other hand, negative coefficients for female wage income point towards a different direction
and possibly a different scenario altogether. Here, an increase in female wage income reduces
expenditures for consumption as the corresponding propensity is negative and similarly huge
in magnitude (-1.3).
Financial Transactions: Microfinance
In Table 3.9, the statistically significant results for JC Agraharam indicate that repayments of
microfinance loans respond to female wages. Propensities are relatively huge (1.01), so that
the wage-share-weighted propensity to pay back microfinance loans (0.45) overshoots the
total propensity (0.2). Since the wage-share-weighted propensity for male wages is negative
(-.23) in total the propensity of 0.2 can be established. In Dokur, the relationship is reversed.
Here, male NREGA income is largely used to repay microfinance loans instead of female
income. In fact, an increase in female wage payments lowers repayments to microfinance
institutions. In Pamidipadu, several statistically significant point estimates for male wage
income with negative and positive signs add up to an elasticity of -0.03 and yield a propensity
of -0.09. For Pamidipadu, I also find that female wages and not male wages are used to pay
back loans borrowed from friends and relatives. As these effects cancel out, no effects can be
found when wage payments are not dis-aggregated by gender (see Table 3.7).
Discussion
The gender-wise results yield that especially in JC Agraharam female wages seem to have a
great impact on intra-household financial decision making. Female workers appear to have
autonomy over their wages and decide that they be spent on consumption and microfinance
groups, which happen to be largely populated by women. However, such high propensities
on both consumption and microfinance repayments seem puzzling as they add up to much
more than one. Consider though, that the ratio of administrative to self reported NREGA
work days is about one half, implying that the administrative work days are under-reported
by 50 per cent.23 This leads to biased results in the propensities. A lower denominator in the
multiplier of the elasticity - and one may argue this case especially for female wages - increases
the multiplier and thus increases the propensity. Therefore, to yield conservative estimates for
JC Agraharam one would have to divide all propensities by a factor of two.
23There is a variety of reasons for such a mismatch. One may be that additional job cards used by households
were not reported to us during the survey.
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Table 3.9: Microfinance Loan Repayments Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Microfinance Loans (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.036 0.063 −0.086 −0.063
(0.056) (0.041) (0.060) (0.051)
Lag 1 0.021 0.065∗ −0.084 −0.097∗
(0.065) (0.040) (0.062) (0.059)
Lag 2 −0.046 0.069∗ −0.039 −0.010
(0.068) (0.042) (0.062) (0.055)
Lag 3 0.123∗∗ 0.074∗ −0.022 0.140∗∗
(0.058) (0.044) (0.064) (0.061)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.041 −0.091∗∗ 0.108 −0.001
(0.038) (0.043) (0.066) (0.053)
Lag 1 0.040 −0.010 0.149∗∗ −0.028
(0.040) (0.037) (0.068) (0.058)
Lag 2 −0.044 0.044 0.123∗ −0.008
(0.039) (0.041) (0.067) (0.053)
Lag 3 −0.005 0.067 0.106 0.037
(0.038) (0.043) (0.065) (0.055)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.18 0.00 0.50 0.05
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.20 0.00 0.32 0.02
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.54 0.17 0.01 0.91
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.40 0.07 0.01 0.97
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.13
Mean: DV 494 319 308 688
Mean: Male Income 44 195 181 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 148 336
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
3.7 Robustness Checks
3.7.1 Serial Correlation in Wage Income
Based on the PIH equation 3.5 one may conjecture that realized income is correlated with
income of the preceding period. I test for serial correlation in the main explanatory variable,
wage income as recorded in administrative records by regressing wage income in month t on
wage income of eight preceding periods. The panel data regressions are similar to the main
specification of equation 3.22, such that:
ADM I Ni t =µi + γt +
8∑
τ=1
βτ ADM I Ni t−τ + εi t , (3.24)
where µi is a household fixed effect, γt a month fixed effect, and the summation includes
eight betas of interest. As before εi t is a stochastic error term. Table 3.10 presents the village-
wise regression results for the test of serial correlation in wage income. Even though in every
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village-wise regression the coefficient for the first lag is statistically significant, it is quite small
in magnitude and far below one, indicating that there is no evidence for serial correlation.
3.7.2 Sample Period Extension
One may argue that the main results depend heavily on the sample period chosen, and that
the village-wise trimming has been hand-picked. In this section, we present evidence against
this argument. As a robustness check I change the trimming of sample months to a uniform
period across villages, i.e. to the period applied in tests for JC Agraharam. Results for tests
on consumption smoothing are reported in Table 3.11. While the number observations for
JC Agraharam remains the same as before, I now include more observations in every other
village-wise regression. The sample period now begins earlier in Aurepalle, April 2011 instead
of January 2012; it ends later in Dokur, October 2014 instead of October 2012; and no intervals
occur for Pamidipadu.
Results in Table 3.11 show that the main results remain robust to the inclusion of addi-
tional months. Evidence for consumption smoothing in three villages remains stable. In Ta-
bles 3.12 and 3.13, I report results for the untrimmed sample analogous to Table 3.7, where
results for the trimmed sample are set out. The majority of results remains stable, as most of
the p-values of the F-tests remain high, except as before for regressions with loan repayments to
microfincance groups as the outcome variable, in JC Agraharam and Dokur. The only change
occurs for Dokur: the estimates for formal borrowings (received) are now jointly significantly
different from zero according to the F-test. This is due to a lower standard error of the coef-
ficient for contemporaneous income which is probably induced by the increased sample size,
and thus the higher precision of the estimate.
3.8 Conclusion
Much research on testing full insurance in village economies yields that consumption is largely
insured against idiosyncratic income shocks. Like Townsend (1994), however, while providing
evidence for almost full insurance, many studies conjecture that especially the poorest cannot
compensate for the risks of volatile income sufficiently. Jalan and Ravallion (1999) show in
their study of rural Chinese households that the poorest are the least able to smooth consump-
tion. Gaurav (2015) finds such “wealth differentiated heterogeneity” in the ability of coping
with risk for rural households in central India.
In this paper, tests for consumption smoothing in Indian villages extend the above argu-
ments. On the one hand, the results echo earlier findings in support of quasi-full insurance:
consumption is robust to changes in income in the majority (three of four) of sample villages.
On the other hand, in the smallest and poorest sample village, consumption reacts strongly
to changes in income. Furthermore, and in particular in this village, while formal borrowing
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Table 3.10: Test for Serial Correlation in Admin. NREGA Wage
DV: Admin. NREGA Wage , contemporaneous (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Admin. NREGA Income (in logs)
Lag 1 0.245∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.061) (0.042) (0.065)
Lag 2 0.111∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ −0.051 0.192∗∗
(0.042) (0.054) (0.043) (0.081)
Lag 3 −0.007 0.007 0.025 −0.004
(0.037) (0.066) (0.042) (0.076)
Lag 4 −0.051 −0.193∗∗∗ −0.051 0.076
(0.035) (0.067) (0.036) (0.078)
Lag 5 −0.069∗ 0.090 −0.059 −0.234∗∗
(0.036) (0.066) (0.043) (0.091)
Lag 6 0.015 0.020 −0.029 0.044
(0.029) (0.057) (0.042) (0.083)
Lag 7 −0.040 −0.028 0.011 0.140
(0.030) (0.063) (0.041) (0.101)
Lag 8 −0.017 −0.200∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗ −0.014
(0.035) (0.069) (0.040) (0.087)
P-value (F): Sum of Lagged Income = 0 0.02 0.13 0.29 0.02
Mean: DV 272 756 346 373
Months 34 20 38 21
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 380 742 356
Min Month 2012m1 2011m3 2011m9 2011m9
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households. All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
Table 3.11: Consumption Regressed on NREGA Income with “Untrimmed” Sample
DV: HH Consumption Expenditure (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Admin. NREGA Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.002 0.011 −0.001 −0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Lag 1 −0.005 −0.002 0.025∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
Lag 2 −0.006 −0.005 0.003 −0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
Lag 3 −0.008 0.002 0.017∗∗ −0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.30 0.88 0.00 0.84
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.45 0.71 0.00 0.93
Mean: DV 6148 4947 4806 8887
Mean: Admin. Income 248 427 329 358
Months 43 43 43 43
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 1118 813 842 730
Min Month 2011m4 2011m4 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2014m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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practices are not common, microfinance institutions provide a vital tool for accessing finance.
Findings for the said village reveal that wage income gains from public works translate almost
entirely into consumption expenditure and the repayment of microfinance loans. Thus, this
paper provides empirical evidence to substantiate that the poorest depend on at least two in-
stitutions to cope with volatile income: public safety nets for wage income and microfinance
institutions for credit. In addition, changes in the same outcome variables as a response to
gender-wise wage payments shed light on intra-household allocations of income and the posi-
tive effects women empowerment has on household welfare.
Furthermore, this study highlights that a plethora of financial means may exist to varying
degrees in Indian villages, ranging from formal banking, microfinance, borrowing and lending
among friends and relatives to borrowing from the traditional money lender. The adoption of
these is highly context dependent. In panel estimations, several of them respond statistically
significantly to changes in income, contributing to the literature on consumption smoothing
mechanisms in developing countries (e.g. Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Chiappori et al., 2014).
Village-wise data on financial access indicate the importance of mutual insurance in the form
of borrowing and lending among relatives and friends.
While previous studies on consumption smoothing are either potentially biased towards
the null hypothesis of complete markets due to measurement error in self reported income
or need to rely on instruments for income, this paper’s estimation strategy exploits a unique
source for income data. Administrative records on monthly wage payments from a public
works program provide for an ideal income measure. It is shown empirically that the date
of monthly wage payments varies exogenously due to inherent delays in the administrative
setting. The empirical strategy of applying high-frequency panel data to household and month
fixed effects estimations circumvents both the measurement error problem and commonly
faced endogeneity issues. Since the administrative data may carry other reporting problems
and may thus bias propensities upwards, I propose conservative estimates for propensities to
consume and pay back loans.
In summary, the results of this paper suggest that innovations in access-to-finance policies
as well as in social safety nets benefit from a holistic and context-dependent view. It is evi-
dent that households rely both on public employment as well as on innovative microfinance
institutions to mitigate the risks of volatile income flows.
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3.A Figures
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Figure 3.8: District Map of India with Districts of Sample Villages
106
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
H
H
 C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 in
 R
s.
20
10
m7
20
10
m9
20
10
m1
1
20
11
m1
20
11
m3
20
11
m5
20
11
m7
20
11
m9
20
11
m1
1
20
12
m1
20
12
m3
20
12
m5
20
12
m7
20
12
m9
20
12
m1
1
20
13
m1
20
13
m3
20
13
m5
20
13
m7
20
13
m9
20
13
m1
1
20
14
m1
20
14
m3
20
14
m5
20
14
m7
20
14
m9
20
14
m1
1
20
15
m1
20
15
m3
20
15
m5
20
15
m7
Aurepalle Dokur
JC Agraharam Pamidipadu 
Based on ICRISAT data; all in July 2010 prices using the CPI−AL.
Figure 3.9: Variation of Monthly Household Consumption Expendi-
ture by Village
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Figure 3.10: Variation of Monthly Loan Repayments by Village
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Figure 3.11: Monthly Share of Official Wage in Total Wage
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Table 3.14: Summary Statistics by Village and Calendar Year
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2011
Self Reported NREGA Wage 241 543 83 355 256 662 535 1308
Admin. NREGA Wage 130 359 687 1336 120 414 575 1084
Total Self Reported Wage 4661 3906 3973 3362 5364 3641 11076 7909
Consumption Expenditure 6965 17101 7915 37469 4601 7272 9254 14744
Loan (Institutional) Repaid 292 1809 272 2260 64 695 9 93
Loan to Self Help Group Repaid 112 559 367 452 258 292 704 662
Loan to Friends Repaid 552 2973 680 5044 28 301 1124 3776
Loan to Money Lender Repaid 1393 6847 485 4468 39 586 0 0
Loan (Institutional) Received 438 4421 192 2081 0 0 2103 10808
Loan from Self Help Group Received 649 2863 332 2348 39 583 913 4102
Loan from Friends Received 1593 5641 1503 9111 288 2529 2227 19318
Loan from Money Lender Received 916 5769 480 4002 440 5447 309 3144
Number of Observations 312 228 222 204
2012
Self Reported NREGA Wage 429 732 427 809 530 1053 161 590
Admin. NREGA Wage 332 616 584 1165 342 881 352 904
Total Self Reported Wage 5089 4583 6198 4867 5170 3211 10629 7302
Consumption Expenditure 6292 8092 3011 2024 5775 11943 8151 10276
Loan (Institutional) Repaid 297 2922 586 7708 49 338 1677 9688
Loan to Self Help Group Repaid 557 348 218 284 353 497 781 461
Loan to Friends Repaid 640 3365 147 753 230 1731 714 3106
Loan to Money Lender Repaid 242 1849 4 38 1323 8371 13 182
Loan (Institutional) Received 1312 16611 1631 10156 72 1109 2471 14748
Loan from Self Help Group Received 232 1635 165 1231 624 3080 1001 4696
Loan from Friends Received 934 4500 447 2378 989 5233 1181 6819
Loan from Money Lender Received 1100 8164 4 55 1722 12117 4 60
Number of Observations 312 228 240 203
Notes: Author’s calculations of monthly household averages from ICRISAT data.
Administrative NREGA wage and NREGA group membership is collected from administrative records.
The sample is restricted to ICRISAT-NREGA households.
Table 3.15: Summary Statistics by Village and Calendar Year
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2013
Self Reported NREGA Wage 359 756 125 455 501 892 0 0
Admin. NREGA Wage 251 582 123 402 206 594 61 350
Total Self Reported Wage 5385 4785 5394 4351 4365 2455 9745 6744
Consumption Expenditure 5581 5060 4112 4300 4059 2500 6683 5377
Loan (Institutional) Repaid 505 2388 568 4381 0 0 1320 6186
Loan to Self Help Group Repaid 481 663 112 281 440 482 752 375
Loan to Friends Repaid 2583 13732 390 1836 205 2183 1705 18341
Loan to Money Lender Repaid 271 4063 81 1005 0 0 0 0
Loan (Institutional) Received 1643 19340 1110 9195 97 1498 3099 17973
Loan from Self Help Group Received 158 1633 871 4042 228 2049 739 3746
Loan from Friends Received 2949 14744 1274 5994 2560 17398 1358 14296
Loan from Money Lender Received 243 2107 354 5102 0 0 0 0
Number of Observations 312 228 240 204
2014
Self Reported NREGA Wage 535 867 0 0 567 882 274 598
Admin. NREGA Wage 189 418 139 367 504 1337 294 630
Total Self Reported Wage 4124 4279 4793 3683 4112 2373 10256 6495
Consumption Expenditure 5316 13157 4475 10435 4465 5703 11350 44242
Loan (Institutional) Repaid 569 4557 684 1800 0 0 753 3212
Loan to Self Help Group Repaid 451 494 292 311 109 311 677 615
Loan to Friends Repaid 1274 9706 469 2150 654 4941 408 3609
Loan to Money Lender Repaid 321 5668 32 202 0 0 24 346
Loan (Institutional) Received 682 5736 0 0 0 0 2287 18185
Loan from Self Help Group Received 79 762 159 1706 0 0 908 4925
Loan from Friends Received 1542 9091 1692 7076 591 2316 2875 30194
Loan from Money Lender Received 327 5669 87 771 0 0 21 297
Number of Observations 312 222 240 204
Notes: Author’s calculations of monthly household averages from ICRISAT data.
Administrative NREGA wage and NREGA group membership is collected from administrative records.
The sample is restricted to ICRISAT-NREGA households.
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Table 3.16: Summary Statistics of Primary Data
Percentage of Households responding that All Villages Aurepalle Dokur Pamidipadu JC Agraharam
NREGA Income is spent on Normal HH Expenses 81.48 84.62 89.47 87.50 65.00
NREGA Income is spent on SHG or Chit Fund 48.15 61.54 52.63 37.50 35.00
NREGA Income is spent on Food 35.80 26.92 36.84 43.75 40.00
NREGA Income is spent on Medical Expenses 25.93 19.23 31.58 18.75 35.00
NREGA Income is spent on School Fees 4.94 3.85 10.53 0.00 5.00
NREGA Income is spent on Dowry 1.23 0.00 5.26 0.00 0.00
NREGA Income is spent on Transport Expenses 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NREGA Income is spent on Debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NREGA Income is spent on House related Expenses 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NREGA-Wages are Delayed 40.74 42.31 57.89 37.50 25.00
Neighbourhood is reason for being in this group 24.69 19.23 5.26 68.75 15.00
Caste is reason for being in this group 12.35 11.54 5.26 25.00 10.00
FA is reason for being in this group 61.73 69.23 84.21 6.25 75.00
I decided that I be in this group 12.35 7.69 26.32 12.50 5.00
Caste decided that I be in this group 14.81 23.08 0.00 25.00 10.00
FA decided that I be in this group 71.60 69.23 68.42 62.50 85.00
Number of Households 82 26 19 17 20
Source: From own survey of ICRISAT-NREGA households in September-November 2014.
Table 3.17: Sources of Loans to be Repaid (in %)
Type Non-NREGA NREGA Groups Total
Self Help Group (SHG) 28 83 38
Bank or Finance Company 5 5 5
Cooperatives 1 0 1
Friends/Relatives 23 5 20
Money Lender 3 4 3
Shopkeeper 30 0 24
Other 11 2 9
Total 100 100 100
Source: ICRISAT data and self collected data on NREGA groups
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Table 3.18: Financial Balance Sheet, Borrowings (Yearly)
Sample: ICRISAT-NREGA
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Source: Inci. (%) Amt. Inci. (%) Amt. Inci. (%) Amt. Inci. (%) Amt.
1st July, 2010
Formal 69 19935 58 19368 24 3588 29 17435
SHG 69 4975 79 3084 94 10000 71 8118
Rosca 12 1592 5 1316 0 0 0 0
Informal
Friends & Relatives 62 19135 47 12368 88 47882 29 15588
Money Lender 50 26923 37 7158 0 0 0 0
Others 54 4929 11 1368 0 0 6 588
Households 26 26 19 19 17 17 17 17
1st July, 2011
Formal 88 24371 63 21505 35 18007 35 21603
SHG 77 4383 68 6281 60 5420 65 5550
Rosca 23 9132 0 0 0 0 0 0
Informal
Friends & Relatives 73 20281 58 19329 25 8714 29 27723
Money Lender 42 8756 32 21529 45 29345 6 209
Others 42 3188 11 1498 10 2579 12 889
Households 26 26 19 19 20 20 17 17
1st July, 2012
Formal 62 19825 53 29236 65 22519 71 31743
SHG 85 6105 53 4390 55 9049 82 9248
Rosca 23 2149 21 7024 0 0 0 0
Informal
Friends & Relatives 77 26497 68 37006 65 32528 65 29732
Money Lender 38 17355 47 24583 0 0 0 0
Others 54 5280 16 2546 0 0 29 6623
Households 26 26 19 19 20 20 17 17
1st July, 2013
Formal 58 18825 53 23171 62 22005 88 45105
SHG 73 3265 26 249 48 2607 76 7953
Rosca 0 0 5 1343 0 0 0 0
Informal
Friends & Relatives 31 21208 84 47761 81 53902 59 44247
Money Lender 19 12012 5 5754 0 0 0 0
Others 62 21726 16 2302 0 0 12 2401
Households 26 26 19 19 21 21 17 17
1st July, 2014
Formal 61 25142 32 9739 59 20208 79 63569
SHG 75 5759 63 4338 9 1132 68 11630
Rosca . . . . . . . .
Informal
Friends & Relatives 46 25762 79 51528 86 64443 53 44569
Money Lender 18 1226 0 0 0 0 0 0
Others 32 12353 0 0 5 673 5 531
Households 28 28 19 19 22 22 19 19
Notes: Author’s calculations of household averages from ICRISAT data as reported on 1st July of every year.
The sample is restricted to ICRISAT-NREGA households. All amounts in July 2010 prices.
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Table 3.19: Financial Balance Sheet, Savings and Lendings (Yearly)
Sample: ICRISAT-NREGA on 1st July, 2011
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Inci. (%) Amt. Inci. (%) Amt. Inci. (%) Amt. Inci. (%) Amt.
1st July, 2010
Formal 62 20985 32 15340 35 5555 76 47188
SHG 85 2456 79 2043 88 1576 94 3988
Rosca 8 1577 47 10763 0 0 12 2647
Informal
Friends & Relatives 19 7692 63 55053 0 0 71 39588
Others (Informal) 0 0 5 1842 0 0 0 0
Others 4 4808 21 1053 0 0 0 0
Households 26 26 19 19 17 17 17 17
1st July, 2011
Formal 62 22773 42 14221 60 6166 82 51942
SHG 88 2999 74 1722 75 2014 88 2171
Rosca 19 3882 21 1170 0 0 24 6852
Informal
Friends & Relatives 23 17956 32 12402 5 978 71 59578
Others (Informal) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Others 0 0 32 828 5 133 6 340
Households 26 26 19 19 20 20 17 17
1st July, 2012
Formal 62 19806 26 9864 55 7252 82 53313
SHG 92 2913 74 2313 80 2152 94 783
Rosca 31 6432 5 658 0 0 29 5348
Informal
Friends & Relatives 31 13473 16 3292 25 2877 65 55931
Others (Informal) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Others 69 1317 21 1712 0 0 12 1251
Households 26 26 19 19 20 20 17 17
1st July, 2013
Formal 54 13122 26 9660 67 10869 100 60914
SHG 88 3029 74 1052 81 2183 82 617
Rosca 50 27703 11 1688 0 0 35 11791
Informal
Friends & Relatives 35 28875 11 3836 33 4061 71 47216
Others (Informal) . . . . . . . .
Others 0 0 21 1726 0 0 6 468
Households 26 26 19 19 21 21 17 17
1st July, 2014
Formal 50 15310 5 1062 64 11677 100 50074
SHG 96 1973 63 2107 82 2289 100 891
Rosca . . . . . . . .
Informal
Friends & Relatives 21 13698 16 3896 32 3640 53 30102
Others (Informal) . . . . . . . .
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Households 28 28 19 19 22 22 19 19
Notes: Author’s calculations of household averages from ICRISAT data as reported on 1st July of every year.
The sample is restricted to ICRISAT-NREGA households. All amounts in July 2010 prices.
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Table 3.20: Formal Saving (Received) Regressed on NREGA Income
DV: Formal Saving (Received) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Admin. NREGA Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.016∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.023 −0.066∗
(0.009) (0.028) (0.019) (0.038)
Lag 1 −0.014∗ −0.019 0.021 0.043
(0.008) (0.023) (0.019) (0.032)
Lag 2 −0.006 −0.047 −0.018 0.040
(0.007) (0.033) (0.022) (0.037)
Lag 3 −0.000 0.007 0.011 0.012
(0.007) (0.021) (0.016) (0.040)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.35 0.31 0.53 0.45
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.42 0.27 0.35 0.47
Mean: DV 175 268 85 416
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 329 561
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
Table 3.21: Microfinance Saving (Received) Regressed on NREGA Income
Microfinance Saving (Received) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Admin. NREGA Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.027 −0.004 −0.020
(0.020) (0.007) (0.025)
Lag 1 0.016 0.001 −0.007
(0.014) (0.004) (0.037)
Lag 2 0.003 −0.001 −0.015
(0.010) (0.004) (0.043)
Lag 3 0.001 −0.001 0.006
(0.012) (0.006) (0.034)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.37 0.99 0.99
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.36 0.98 0.91
Mean: DV 404 72 452
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 561
Months 34 25 26
Households 26 19 17
Observations 884 475 4825 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.22: Loan to Other (Received) Regressed on NREGA Income
Loan to Other(Received) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Admin. NREGA Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.004 0.006 −0.017 0.008
(0.006) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011)
Lag 1 −0.002 −0.007 0.003 −0.002
(0.004) (0.030) (0.004) (0.008)
Lag 2 0.001 −0.007 −0.010 0.015
(0.004) (0.024) (0.007) (0.010)
Lag 3 −0.000 −0.013 −0.001 0.004
(0.004) (0.032) (0.003) (0.010)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.95 0.59 0.51 0.40
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.92 0.73 0.59 0.40
Mean: DV 270 469 19 18
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 329 561
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
Table 3.23: Formal Saving (Paid) Regressed on NREGA Income
DV: Formal Saving (Paid) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Admin. NREGA Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.018 −0.015 0.043 −0.105∗∗
(0.030) (0.037) (0.028) (0.046)
Lag 1 −0.019 0.015 0.052∗∗ 0.056
(0.026) (0.041) (0.026) (0.068)
Lag 2 0.001 0.007 0.061∗∗ 0.047
(0.024) (0.038) (0.027) (0.069)
Lag 3 −0.010 0.007 0.055∗∗ 0.011
(0.025) (0.038) (0.026) (0.066)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.80 0.92 0.00 0.62
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.89 0.95 0.00 0.20
Mean: DV 174 136 233 791
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 329 561
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
115
Table 3.24: Microfinance Saving (Paid) Regressed on NREGA Income
Microfinance Saving (Paid) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Admin. NREGA Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.007 −0.020 0.015 −0.004
(0.029) (0.029) (0.014) (0.027)
Lag 1 0.010 −0.007 0.006 0.043
(0.030) (0.031) (0.012) (0.027)
Lag 2 −0.046 0.067∗∗ −0.017 0.056∗
(0.029) (0.034) (0.013) (0.029)
Lag 3 −0.034 0.036 0.003 −0.041
(0.029) (0.029) (0.012) (0.034)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.13 0.03 0.63 0.10
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.22 0.06 0.42 0.13
Mean: DV 1290 445 36 944
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 329 561
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
Table 3.25: Loan to Other (Paid) Regressed on NREGA Income
Loan to Other(Paid) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Admin. NREGA Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.005 −0.029 −0.011 −0.023
(0.021) (0.028) (0.016) (0.040)
Lag 1 0.023 −0.017 −0.012 −0.042
(0.021) (0.028) (0.014) (0.049)
Lag 2 −0.001 0.040 0.003 0.004
(0.013) (0.028) (0.019) (0.051)
Lag 3 −0.023 −0.022 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗
(0.017) (0.031) (0.019) (0.042)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.49 0.44 0.06 0.14
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.66 0.48 0.08 0.22
Mean: DV 320 269 80 792
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 329 561
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.26: Formal Loan Repaid Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Formal Loans (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.020 0.018 −0.010 0.029
(0.030) (0.039) (0.007) (0.039)
Lag 1 −0.046 0.031 −0.003 0.013
(0.032) (0.041) (0.006) (0.043)
Lag 2 0.054 0.037 −0.001 −0.001
(0.044) (0.051) (0.006) (0.044)
Lag 3 −0.021 −0.002 −0.002 0.016
(0.032) (0.045) (0.005) (0.045)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.029 −0.012 −0.001 −0.037
(0.030) (0.029) (0.005) (0.038)
Lag 1 −0.005 0.015 0.008 −0.017
(0.025) (0.029) (0.007) (0.042)
Lag 2 0.026 −0.067 0.003 −0.041
(0.029) (0.047) (0.008) (0.048)
Lag 3 −0.006 0.034 0.005 −0.010
(0.028) (0.042) (0.007) (0.047)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.44 0.46 0.93 0.95
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.57 0.40 0.67 0.88
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.85 0.56 0.47 0.39
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.85 0.61 0.63 0.20
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.88 0.62 0.81 0.58
Mean: DV 432 404 25 857
Mean: Male Income 44 195 181 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 148 336
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.27: Informal Loan Repaid Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Informal Loans (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.037 −0.008 0.053 0.008
(0.026) (0.011) (0.036) (0.008)
Lag 1 −0.025 0.018 −0.039 0.002
(0.021) (0.023) (0.030) (0.003)
Lag 2 −0.008 0.011 0.052∗∗ 0.004
(0.013) (0.030) (0.023) (0.004)
Lag 3 −0.029 0.011 −0.056 0.009
(0.019) (0.030) (0.036) (0.009)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.018 −0.007 −0.047 −0.006
(0.012) (0.013) (0.038) (0.006)
Lag 1 0.007 0.005 0.034 −0.007
(0.014) (0.019) (0.035) (0.007)
Lag 2 −0.023 −0.036 −0.014 −0.002
(0.015) (0.034) (0.025) (0.003)
Lag 3 −0.012 −0.030 −0.001 −0.001
(0.019) (0.029) (0.034) (0.002)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.42 0.68 0.12 0.77
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.57 0.79 0.19 0.88
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.39 0.20 0.78 0.78
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.29 0.32 0.67 0.89
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.60 0.77 0.25 1.00
Mean: DV 295 245 388 6
Mean: Male Income 44 195 181 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 148 336
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.28: Loan Repaid to Friends and Relatives Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA
Income
DV: Loan Repayments to Friends & Relatives (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.053 −0.002 −0.027 −0.017
(0.055) (0.035) (0.030) (0.051)
Lag 1 0.005 0.005 −0.051 −0.116∗∗
(0.049) (0.041) (0.034) (0.058)
Lag 2 −0.036 0.004 −0.044 0.061
(0.049) (0.056) (0.041) (0.051)
Lag 3 −0.036 −0.047 0.001 −0.096
(0.063) (0.061) (0.024) (0.061)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.027 0.047 −0.002 0.073
(0.023) (0.039) (0.027) (0.052)
Lag 1 −0.014 0.025 0.052 0.159∗∗
(0.028) (0.038) (0.035) (0.067)
Lag 2 0.022 −0.074 0.027 −0.066
(0.031) (0.064) (0.042) (0.056)
Lag 3 0.022 0.023 −0.003 −0.015
(0.034) (0.057) (0.025) (0.054)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.73 0.87 0.45 0.04
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.52 0.95 0.32 0.06
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.60 0.69 0.50 0.09
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.41 0.62 0.67 0.05
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.48 0.82 0.55 0.08
Mean: DV 1511 494 318 751
Mean: Male Income 44 195 181 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 148 336
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.29: Formal Loan Received Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Formal Loans Received (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.037∗ 0.040 −0.005 0.054
(0.022) (0.025) (0.004) (0.048)
Lag 1 −0.005 −0.053 0.000 −0.015
(0.047) (0.039) (0.003) (0.049)
Lag 2 0.107∗ −0.068∗ −0.001 −0.013
(0.059) (0.037) (0.003) (0.059)
Lag 3 −0.087∗∗ 0.041 −0.001 0.022
(0.037) (0.038) (0.002) (0.048)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.010 −0.097∗∗ −0.000 0.018
(0.027) (0.044) (0.004) (0.048)
Lag 1 0.006 0.029 −0.003 0.015
(0.022) (0.047) (0.003) (0.055)
Lag 2 −0.011 0.046 0.004 0.030
(0.030) (0.043) (0.008) (0.059)
Lag 3 −0.005 −0.029 −0.003 −0.117∗
(0.028) (0.037) (0.003) (0.068)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.09 0.08 0.97 0.95
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.17 0.13 0.85 0.84
P-value (F): Lagged F. Share 0.97 0.59 0.76 0.36
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged F. Share 0.96 0.15 0.88 0.51
Mean: DV 432 404 25 857
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 329 561
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.30: Informal Loan Received Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Informal Loans Received (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.053∗ −0.027 −0.068∗∗ −0.035
(0.028) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031)
Lag 1 −0.023 −0.020 0.058 0.035
(0.022) (0.028) (0.047) (0.024)
Lag 2 −0.025 −0.020 −0.004 −0.017
(0.020) (0.038) (0.044) (0.029)
Lag 3 −0.028 −0.016 −0.000 0.024
(0.021) (0.025) (0.022) (0.036)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.009 −0.044∗∗ 0.056∗ 0.011
(0.023) (0.022) (0.034) (0.018)
Lag 1 −0.024 −0.012 −0.032 −0.003
(0.020) (0.015) (0.047) (0.024)
Lag 2 −0.004 0.003 −0.031 −0.045
(0.030) (0.014) (0.039) (0.033)
Lag 3 0.000 −0.006 0.039 0.034
(0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.34 0.67 0.64 0.56
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.24 0.52 0.23 0.61
P-value (F): Lagged F. Share 0.60 0.81 0.36 0.29
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged F. Share 0.73 0.22 0.36 0.42
Mean: DV 295 245 388 6
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 329 561
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
121
Table 3.31: Microfinance Loan Received Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: SHG Loans Received (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.026 −0.043 −0.003 −0.029
(0.047) (0.029) (0.023) (0.046)
Lag 1 −0.008 0.071∗∗ 0.004 0.078
(0.036) (0.035) (0.050) (0.057)
Lag 2 0.025 0.070 −0.036 0.067
(0.035) (0.044) (0.039) (0.051)
Lag 3 −0.061∗∗ −0.030 0.039 −0.030
(0.025) (0.043) (0.045) (0.052)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.066∗∗ 0.028 −0.010 0.035
(0.032) (0.031) (0.024) (0.041)
Lag 1 0.054∗ −0.039 0.003 0.013
(0.031) (0.038) (0.056) (0.056)
Lag 2 0.010 −0.039 0.047 0.005
(0.020) (0.039) (0.040) (0.058)
Lag 3 −0.008 −0.008 −0.059 −0.008
(0.024) (0.039) (0.048) (0.059)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.06 0.02 0.78 0.25
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.11 0.05 0.89 0.39
P-value (F): Lagged F. Share 0.28 0.25 0.50 1.00
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged F. Share 0.32 0.40 0.63 0.94
Mean: DV 494 319 308 688
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 329 561
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.32: Loan Received from Friends and Relatives Regressed on Gender-wise
NREGA Income
DV: Loan Received from Friends & Relatives (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.041 0.036 −0.040 0.047
(0.081) (0.068) (0.079) (0.039)
Lag 1 −0.135∗ −0.039 0.036 0.020
(0.077) (0.090) (0.072) (0.053)
Lag 2 0.034 0.041 0.098 −0.003
(0.074) (0.066) (0.072) (0.058)
Lag 3 −0.029 0.037 0.018 0.047
(0.071) (0.070) (0.076) (0.059)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.014 0.007 0.085 −0.013
(0.043) (0.073) (0.084) (0.042)
Lag 1 0.074 −0.001 −0.053 0.088
(0.051) (0.082) (0.077) (0.068)
Lag 2 0.001 −0.035 −0.062 −0.057
(0.051) (0.059) (0.073) (0.070)
Lag 3 −0.002 −0.048 −0.029 −0.075
(0.043) (0.059) (0.074) (0.067)
P-value (F): Lagged Income 0.28 0.89 0.39 0.74
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Income 0.42 0.93 0.46 0.70
P-value (F): Lagged F. Share 0.50 0.76 0.57 0.40
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged F. Share 0.66 0.88 0.53 0.40
Mean: DV 1511 494 318 751
Mean: Admin. Income 272 605 329 561
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.33: Formal Saving (Paid) Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Formal Saving (Paid) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.074 0.027 −0.030 −0.059
(0.052) (0.036) (0.042) (0.061)
Lag 1 0.047 −0.050 0.002 0.077
(0.045) (0.033) (0.043) (0.066)
Lag 2 0.011 −0.010 0.045 0.123∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.056) (0.061)
Lag 3 −0.088∗∗ 0.057∗ −0.035 0.060
(0.045) (0.031) (0.042) (0.067)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.020 −0.024 0.084∗ −0.059
(0.030) (0.036) (0.045) (0.060)
Lag 1 −0.021 0.041 0.048 0.047
(0.026) (0.040) (0.046) (0.066)
Lag 2 0.003 0.021 0.019 −0.038
(0.023) (0.038) (0.056) (0.072)
Lag 3 0.001 −0.004 0.104∗∗ −0.062
(0.025) (0.035) (0.044) (0.071)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.21 0.28 0.77 0.02
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.30 0.42 0.83 0.03
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.87 0.60 0.04 0.66
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.93 0.73 0.02 0.71
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.66 0.63 0.01 0.06
Mean: DV 174 136 233 791
Mean: Male Income 44 195 181 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 148 336
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.34: Microfinance Saving (Paid) Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Microfinance Saving (Paid) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.022 0.008 −0.032 0.048
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Lag 1 0.052 0.038 −0.031 0.042
(0.035) (0.033) (0.026) (0.032)
Lag 2 −0.065∗ 0.013 −0.064∗∗ 0.031
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Lag 3 0.059∗ −0.047 −0.037 0.004
(0.033) (0.032) (0.027) (0.040)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.005 0.007 0.053 −0.064∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.028)
Lag 1 −0.003 −0.029 0.033 0.026
(0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.033)
Lag 2 −0.028 0.054 0.047 0.046
(0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035)
Lag 3 −0.041 0.055∗ 0.038 −0.046
(0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.035)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.07 0.39 0.05 0.17
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.11 0.48 0.05 0.07
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.30
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.37 0.14 0.09 0.12
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.02
Mean: DV 1290 445 36 944
Mean: Male Income 44 195 181 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 148 336
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.35: Loan to Other (Saving) Paid Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Loan to Other (Saving) Paid (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.008 0.010 −0.002 0.046
(0.012) (0.029) (0.012) (0.041)
Lag 1 −0.005 −0.011 −0.013 −0.096∗∗
(0.012) (0.025) (0.015) (0.045)
Lag 2 −0.001 −0.017 0.050 −0.032
(0.014) (0.030) (0.044) (0.037)
Lag 3 0.002 0.003 −0.034∗ −0.009
(0.013) (0.025) (0.018) (0.048)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.009 −0.038 −0.011 −0.042
(0.021) (0.026) (0.015) (0.051)
Lag 1 0.023 −0.009 −0.001 0.016
(0.022) (0.025) (0.013) (0.046)
Lag 2 −0.001 0.048 −0.052 0.012
(0.013) (0.033) (0.047) (0.035)
Lag 3 −0.022 −0.013 −0.018 0.097∗∗
(0.017) (0.031) (0.017) (0.038)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.98 0.90 0.30 0.15
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.95 0.96 0.43 0.25
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.52 0.51 0.35 0.08
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.67 0.51 0.45 0.14
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.90 0.71 0.42 0.33
Mean: DV 320 269 80 792
Mean: Male Income 44 195 181 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 148 336
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.36: Formal Saving (Received) Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Formal Saving (Received) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.003 0.036 0.005 0.024
(0.009) (0.026) (0.015) (0.032)
Lag 1 −0.002 −0.075∗∗ 0.042 0.028
(0.008) (0.036) (0.032) (0.034)
Lag 2 0.001 −0.005 −0.055 0.014
(0.009) (0.021) (0.034) (0.037)
Lag 3 −0.003 0.030 0.012 0.030
(0.008) (0.036) (0.013) (0.039)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.017∗ 0.024 0.026 −0.067∗
(0.009) (0.028) (0.019) (0.039)
Lag 1 −0.016∗ 0.020 −0.018 0.049
(0.008) (0.027) (0.036) (0.033)
Lag 2 −0.007 −0.030 0.034 0.034
(0.007) (0.031) (0.036) (0.031)
Lag 3 0.000 −0.038 0.002 −0.029
(0.007) (0.036) (0.015) (0.040)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.98 0.15 0.28 0.55
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.99 0.15 0.39 0.65
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.25 0.35 0.82 0.31
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.32 0.45 0.73 0.34
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.68 0.45 0.65 0.65
Mean: DV 175 268 85 416
Mean: Male Income 44 195 181 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 148 336
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.37: Microfinance Saving (Received) Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Microfinance Saving (Received) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.021 −0.007 −0.028
(0.029) (0.006) (0.028)
Lag 1 −0.023 −0.001 0.034
(0.022) (0.005) (0.028)
Lag 2 −0.028 0.000 0.023
(0.022) (0.005) (0.037)
Lag 3 0.015 0.001 −0.029
(0.031) (0.004) (0.054)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.010 0.002 0.021
(0.011) (0.006) (0.017)
Lag 1 0.021 0.001 −0.034
(0.015) (0.005) (0.032)
Lag 2 0.007 −0.001 −0.039
(0.011) (0.005) (0.028)
Lag 3 0.001 −0.001 0.015
(0.012) (0.007) (0.042)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.44 0.99 0.55
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.51 0.83 0.63
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.21 0.99 0.23
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.34 0.98 0.26
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.72 0.99 0.65
Mean: DV 404 72 452
Mean: Male Income 44 195 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 336
Months 34 25 26
Households 26 19 17
Observations 884 475 4825 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.38: Loan to Other (Saving) Received Regressed on Gender-wise NREGA Income
DV: Loan to Other (Savings)(Received) (in logs)
Aurepalle Dokur JC Agraharam Pamidipadu
Imputed Male Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous 0.008∗ 0.004 −0.018 0.006
(0.005) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011)
Lag 1 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.001
(0.004) (0.026) (0.004) (0.009)
Lag 2 0.009∗ −0.012 −0.011 0.012
(0.005) (0.022) (0.008) (0.009)
Lag 3 0.006 −0.010 0.001 0.007
(0.005) (0.030) (0.003) (0.014)
Imputed Female Income (in logs)
Contemporaneous −0.006 0.016 −0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.021) (0.008) (0.011)
Lag 1 −0.003 −0.010 −0.003 −0.004
(0.005) (0.027) (0.004) (0.008)
Lag 2 −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.014
(0.004) (0.019) (0.005) (0.009)
Lag 3 −0.001 0.003 −0.004 −0.002
(0.005) (0.025) (0.005) (0.008)
P-value (F): Lagged Male Income 0.29 0.89 0.53 0.60
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Male Income 0.43 0.93 0.61 0.56
P-value (F): Lagged Female Income 0.90 0.98 0.85 0.42
P-value (F): Contemp. & Lagged Female Income 0.84 0.93 0.93 0.46
P-value (F): Male & Female Income 0.85 0.98 0.93 0.78
Mean: DV 270 469 19 18
Mean: Male Income 44 195 181 226
Mean: Female Income 229 409 148 336
Months 34 25 43 26
Households 26 19 20 17
Observations 884 475 842 441
Min Month 2012m1 2010m10 2011m4 2011m4
Max Month 2014m10 2012m10 2014m10 2014m10
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the group month level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample: Only ICRISAT-NREGA households.
All regressions include household and month fixed effects.
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Chapter 4
Measuring Malnutrition and Dietary
Diversity: Theory and Evidence from
India
Christian Oldiges
Heidelberg University
Adequate nutrition constitutes one of the most basic dimensions of human well-being. Am-
ple evidence exists for the functional link between a diverse diet and health outcomes or
economic performance. However, a concise measure to capture nutritional diversity that uti-
lizes typical household level data, often the only data available in developing countries, is
yet to be developed. I develop a theoretical framework for such a measure by extending the
Alkire-Foster (AF) methodology. The new framework enables the calculation of both the
incidence and intensity of nutritional deprivation. Applying this framework, I construct a
Nutritional Deprivation Index (NDI) for Indian states using household survey data on food
consumption. The NDI is unique, and compared to existing measures, it is more effective
in identifying the inadequately nourished while also revealing the extent and kind of food
inadequately nourished deprived face.
4.1 Introduction
“[H]ealth is among the most important conditions of human life and a critically significant
constituent of human capabilities which we have reason to value” (Sen, 2002). Within the
capability space of health, being well-nourished to enjoy a life free of hunger and starvation is
certainly the most basic functioning.1 In this context, while arguing for the right to food the
United Nations (1999) states in Comment No. 12: “The right to adequate food is realized when
every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has the physical and economic
access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement."
1For more on Amartya Sen’s capability approach and the terminology, see for instance Sen (1981, 1992, 2002).
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I want to discuss two key points of this Comment. One, the focus is on the access to food
and not just the availability of food. Sen (1981) argues for such a distinction. “Starvation is the
characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there
being not enough food to eat. While the latter can be a cause of the former, it is but one of
many possible causes." Existing measures of food availability within a country fail to account
for the question of adequate access and can be misleading due the inherent and “inevitable" in-
equality in terms of access to food (Barrett, 2010). Second, the Comment concerns the right to
adequate food and not just some quantity of food. There is widespread consensus that merely
meeting standardized calorie norms, as set for example by the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (FAO), does not translate into adequate food or nutrition. Instead, measuring adequate
nutrition involves measuring access to dietary diversity (Deaton and Drèze, 2009). According
to Gopalan (1992), there are two practical ways to measure undernutrition which, in combina-
tion, provide valuable information to combat undernutrition: either through anthropometric
data collection or through surveys of diets. This paper focuses on utilizing the latter.
Both intrinsic as well as functional arguments make the case for the importance of dietary
diversity. Studies on nutrition in India show that diets have become somewhat more diverse
with increasing income levels over the last decades, though not much (Deaton and Drèze,
2009). Trends of the “nutrition transition” in industrialized countries across continents during
the last century reveal preferences for diverse diets, even across income groups (Drewnowski
and Popkin, 1997; Smith et al., 2016; Tilman and Clark, 2015). In this paper, the reason for
measuring progress in dietary diversity in poor societies of low income countries (LICs) is
to examine the extent and occurrence of a shift away from the traditional staple-based diets,
which are based on just a few food groups and contain mostly just starchy roots and coarse
grains (Drewnowski and Popkin, 1997). Therefore, problems arising with more diverse but
more sugary or fat diets are not discussed here (Tilman and Clark, 2015). Besides the intrinsic
value and pleasure in a diverse diet, there is ample evidence for the functional link between
a diverse diet and health outcomes, and between a diverse diet and economic performance.
Alderman et al. (2005), for instance, highlight the long chain between diverse childhood nu-
trition to cognitive development, physical stature, strength, earlier school enrollment, more
regular school attendance, greater learning and eventually greater adult productivity. Simi-
larly, various studies using cross-sectional data for sub-Saharan African and South Asian coun-
tries including India show a direct link between dietary diversity and the nutritional adequacy
of a diet, per capita consumption, total per capita caloric availability, household per capita
daily caloric availability from staples, and household per capita daily caloric availability from
nonstaples (Hoddinott and Yohannes, 2002; Ogle, 2001; Bhargava, 2014; Hatloy et al., 1998).
Further, Steyn et al. (2006) show that dietary diversity correlates with micronutrient intake.
Arimond and Ruel (2004b) show that dietary diversity does predict height-for-weight z-scores
(HAZ), weight-for-age (WAZ) z-scores and undernutrition.2 For the Indian context, Menon
2Definition as given by Barrett (2010): “[...] hunger refers to the physical discomfort caused by a lack of food
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et al. (2015) use nationally representative data (National Family Health Survey 3, 2005-06) to
show that dietary diversity of children aged 6-23 months is “strongly and significantly associ-
ated with HAZ, WAZ, stunting and underweight". Their results are robust to the inclusion
of controls for household wealth. Earlier studies, too, establish such a correlation and praise
the usefulness of a dietary diversity index or child feeding index to predict anthropometric
outcomes in settings ranging from Latin America to rural Kenya (Onyango et al., 1998; Ruel
and Menon, 2002, for instance). Thus, one may infer a great deal from dietary diversity on
anthrometrics even when data on the latter or not available.
The most widely used method to measure dietary diversity is to capture the simultaneous
consumption of food groups via “a simple count of food groups over a given reference period”
(Ruel, 2002).3 This can be summarized in the dietary diversity index (DDI). For a diet to
qualify as diverse it must include the minimum number of food groups defined as mandatory.4
The ratio of those consuming less than the threshold to overall population yields the DDI .
Some studies count the number of individuals whose number of diverse food groups is at least
as high or above the threshold. In such cases, the DDI is the ratio of those obtaining a diverse
diet to the overall population. In this paper, however, I consider the DDI as the incidence of
those not obtaining a diverse diet. The DDI is considered a promising indicator of dietary
quality in the field of development economics (Villa et al., 2011).
However, there are several drawbacks to this approach. For one, the DDI reflects merely
the incidence of inadequate food consumption and neglects the extent of inadequacy. In doing
so, the DDI treats the absence of a diverse diet in such a way that the extent of nutritional
deprivation across different food groups is not accounted for. For instance, individuals con-
suming very few diverse food groups are considered as equally deprived as those consuming
just below the required minimum of groups.5 The second weakness relates to minimum re-
quirements of a food group. By not considering the quantity consumed of a food group but
merely counting incidences of consumption, the DDI may underestimate the number of in-
adequately nourished individuals. For example, an individual may consume a food group in a
quantity that is insufficient for a healthy life, but sufficient to be counted within the framework
of the DDI . The third weakness is related to the previous one. The DDI neglects idiosyncratic
variations in food requirements. While every person is in need of a diverse diet, the extent of
and can only be properly gathered at the individual level. Underweight summarizes individual anthropomet-
ric measures - such as weight-for-height, weight-for-age, or mid upper-arm circumference - at least two standard
deviations below global reference values. Undernutrition reflects insufficient dietary energy (caloric) intake, ac-
cording to internationally agreed standards. Malnutrition refers to undernutrition, obesity, and micronutrient
(mineral and vitamin) deficiencies.”
3See, for example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Food and Nutrition Technical
Assistance Project (FANTA) at http://www.fantaproject.org/monitoring-and-evaluation/household-dietary-
diversity-score. The FAO has carried out much research using such a counting score, and provides guidelines
to conduct dietary diversity surveys. See, for example, http://www.fao.org/publications/card/en/c/5aacbe39-
068f-513b-b17d-1d92959654ea/.
4The mandatory number is arbitrary and context-dependent.
5This violates dimensional monotonicity.
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minimum requirements varies greatly by age, gender, health status, and occupation (Gopalan,
1992; Kakwani, 1992), besides other individual factors and even varying intra-individual re-
quirements (Srinivasan, 1992; Kakwani, 1992). Therefore, a dietary measure should ideally
apply person-specific thresholds for each food group.6
In this paper, I develop a framework for a Nutritional Deprivation Index (NDI) to measure
access to diverse diets using individual-level data. An alternative framework is also defined for
when only household level data are available. I apply the household framework to compute an
NDI using household-level data on food consumption from India’s 2011-12 National Sample
Survey (NSS). The N DI overcomes the above mentioned weaknesses of the DDI by adapting
and extending the Alkire-Foster counting approach (Alkire and Foster, 2011), which is a tech-
nique widely used in multidimensional poverty measurement. The NDI addresses the first two
weaknesses of the DDI by accounting for the actual amount consumed of each food group as
well as the number of under-consumed food groups. By doing so, the framework yields both
the incidence and intensity of nutritional deprivation. The absence of idiosyncratic thresholds
in the DDI is also addressed by the N DI . It allows for minimum food group requirements
which vary by food group as well as by individual characteristics such as age, gender, and occu-
pation. Overall, the NDI is superior to the DDI in measuring dietary diversity for a variety of
reasons. First, it overcomes the three weaknesses of the DDI . Second, it provides information
about both the incidence and intensity of nutritional deprivation. Third, the N DI framework
inherits several properties of the AF methodology which allow for useful decompositions of
the N DI and its components (the incidence and the intensity of nutritional deprivation).
This is demonstrated in the paper by applying the N DI and DDI framework to the
household-level data on food consumption amongst India’s rural population. The analysis
reveals that the DDI underestimates the extent of food inadequacies. According to the DDI
approach 67 per cent is deprived in at least one food group. In contrast, applying the N DI
framework yields that around 60 per cent is nutritionally deprived in at least five of eight food
groups. Further, the N DI highlights that the nutritionally deprived are primarily deprived of
leafy vegetables, fruits, and dairy products. Finally, the N DI reveals that the average intensity
of nutritional deprivation amongst those experiencing the lack of diverse diets is nearly 70 per
cent. Decomposing the NDI by state and social subgroups highlights considerable variation
in the kinds of food deprivation. For example, in the northern state of Punjab, nutritional de-
privation in cereals contributes to overall nutritional deprivation. In the most populous state
of Uttar Pradesh, however, cereals are sufficiently consumed while the consumption of leafy
vegetables and fruits is insufficient. Decompositions by social groups reveal that almost 50 per
cent of the Scheduled Tribes are inadequately nourished in five of eight food groups, whereas
it is just 22 per cent for the “Others”. I also find that larger households are less adequately
nourished according to the headcount ratio of the N DI than smaller ones. In this manner, the
6Kakwani (1992) and Osmani (1992) discuss possible errors when average requirements are used despite given
inter-individual variation in dietary requirements.
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NDI addresses the gaps in the existing measure (DDI ) and proves to be a more accurate tool
to quantify access to diverse diets, using data that are readily available in a significant number
of surveys. It is a step forward in measuring the most basic functioning of human well-being
in the capability space of health.
At the outset of this paper, a few caveats to using household data to measure dietary in-
adequacies have to be mentioned. Household level data on consumption, as NSS data for In-
dia, may not map onto nutritional adequacy for a number of reasons. One, intra-household
inequalities in food consumption cannot be accounted for. There is a large literature on intra-
household allocation of nutrients showing that individual consumption or nutrient intake re-
sponds differently to, say, changes in income, and that the response can be gender-specific (e.g.
Behrmann, 1992). Second, person-specific differences in metabolism exist (Gopalan, 1992), and
thus individual nutritional needs vary beyond age, gender, and occupation. Since such differ-
ences are not captured by the household data, the applied thresholds may serve as reasonable
rule-of-thumb yardsticks but are certainly not sufficiently precise to capture individual needs.
Third, the household level data on food consumption do not elicit on the individual ability to
convert the consumed resources into functionings. Thus, we do not know after all whether a
certain realized diet improves the functioning of, say, being well-nourished. Fourth, there is
non-sampling measurement error in the NSS data as in any other household survey. In partic-
ular for purposes of measuring dietary diversity, it matters that rich households are less likely
to be captured by the household survey. Also, despite a relatively short recall period of seven
days, the quantity of food groups consumed are likely to suffer from measurement error, and
“[q]uite likely, there is some underestimation of consumption in the NSS data, particularly
among higher-income groups [...]”(Deaton and Drèze, 2009).
Ideally, I would employ nationally representative individual level data. These should in-
clude information on both daily individual consumption of all food groups (in grams) and
individual metabolism. However, to my knowledge such data do not exist. Thus, while the
method presented in this paper is unique and optimally suited for individual level data the
application to household level data is second best.
The paper is structured as follows. First, Section 4.2 introduces the N DI framework. Sec-
tion 4.3 presents an application using data on food consumption from India’s National Sample
Survey. It exemplifies how widely available household survey data can be applied to compute
an N DI and its various decompositions. In Section 4.4, I compare the N DI with the tradi-
tional measure of a DDI in terms of accuracy in identifying inadequately nourished house-
holds. The final Section 4.5 concludes with a discussion on further research.
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4.2 Towards a Nutritional Deprivation Index: The General
Framework
In this section, I explain the counting approach to measure nutritional deprivation in a mul-
tidimensional manner following the Alkire-Foster (AF) methodology. The AF method, as
presented in Alkire and Foster (2011) has been widely adopted to measure multidimensional
poverty. In particular, for the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) the AF method-
ology is applied to monitor multidimensional poverty of ten indicators spanning health, ed-
ucation, and living standard across more than 100 countries (Alkire and Santos, 2014). Since
2010, the global MPI has been published by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) in its annual Human Development Reports (HDR)7. Numerous governments have
applied the AF methodology to design and compute their own country-specific multidimen-
sional poverty measures, for example Colombia, Mexico, and Bhutan. Besides for purposes
of poverty measurement, the AF methodology has been applied in other fields of research as
well, so for example to measure access to modern energy in sub-Saharan Africa (Bensch, 2013)
or to measure women empowerment (Alkire et al., 2013), to name a few.8
In Subsection 4.2.1, the key features of the AF methodology are briefly presented, before
I introduce an extension to AF methodology in Subsection 4.2.2 for individual-level data. In
Subsection 4.2.3 I show that how the framework can be adjusted in such a way, that household-
level data on food consumption, too, can be applied to compute an N DI .
4.2.1 The Alkire Foster Methodology
The methodology and terminology as presented in Alkire et al. (2015) are straightforward.9
I follow both entirely. The aim of the AF methodology is to provide for a framework which
allows to measure joint (simultaneous) deprivations in various dimensions using a counting
approach. Collecting all realizations, or so called achievements, of each individual in each di-
mension a dual cut-off approach is used to first translate achievements into deprivations, and
to then determine an individual as jointly deprived or not deprived in a given number of all
dimensions. Ultimately, this yields the incidence (H ) of the jointly deprived and the intensity
(A) of experiencing joint deprivations. In the framework of poverty measurement, it yields
the incidence and intensity of multidimensional poverty. The product of H and A yields an
index score, M 0. In the following, the dual cut-off approach of the AF methodology is shown.
Based on this and an extension to the first cut-off, I build a Nutritional Deprivation Index.
According to the notation given by Alkire et al. (2015), think of an n × d dimensional
achievement matrix X with n individuals and d dimensions, with achievements xi j of indi-
7At http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports a list of all Human Development Reports can be found.
8More studies can be found at: http://www.ophi.org.uk/resources/
9Consult http://multidimensionalpoverty.org/contents/ for an online version of the book.
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vidual i in dimension j . The dual cut-off approach is applied as follows. To apply the first
cut-off entails using dimension-wise thresholds. These are collected in the d -dimensional vec-
tor z, such that
z = (z1, ..., zd ). (4.1)
Applying the thresholds to determine whether achievement xi j lies above or below z j , the
so called deprivation matrix g 0 is constructed with its elements g 0i j = 1 whenever individ-
ual i is deprived in dimension j , i.e. when xi j < z j , and g
0
i j = 0 whenever xi j ≥ z j . Given
a d -dimensional vector of weights, w = (w1, ..., wd ), each dimension is weighted accordingly.
Adding up the number of weighted deprivations w j g
0
i j for each individual i yields individ-
ual i ’s deprivation score, ci =
∑d
j=1 w j g
0
i j =
∑d
j=1 g
0
i j . Ultimately, n deprivation scores are
collected in the vector of deprivation scores ci = (c1, ..., cn).
Applying the second cut-off of the AF method entails ‘censoring’ those individuals who in-
hibit less deprivations than the minimum threshold k, and by identifying those who are jointly
deprived in at least k deprivations. Formally, an identification function ρk is applied such that
ρk(xi ; z) = 1 if ci ≥ k, and ρk(xi ; z) = 0 otherwise. Applying the identification function to all
entries, w j g
0
i j , yields the censored matrix of deprivations, g
0
i j (k), which is the product of g
0
i j
and ρk(xi ; z). Counting the censored deprivations yields the censored deprivation score vector
c(k), which includes n deprivation scores, denoted for individual i by ci (k) =
∑d
j=1 w j g
0
i j (k).
In order to calculate the multidimensional headcount ratio H (or the incidence of
the multidimensionally deprived), the number of individuals with non-zero entries in the
censored deprivation score vector c(k) sum up to q , so that H = q/n. In order to measure the
intensity of deprivations, the average deprivation share of the multidimensionally deprived,
A, is defined as A=
∑q
i=1 ci (k)/q . Multiplying these two measures, H ×A yields the adjusted
headcount ratio M0. It is also the mean of the censored deprivation score c(k) or the mean of
the censored deprivation matrix g 0i j (k). Thus, it can be formally notated as both:
M0 =µ(c(k)) =
1
n
×
n∑
i=1
ci (k) (4.2)
and
M0 = H ×A= qn ×
1
q
q∑
i=1
ci (k) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci (k) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
w j g
0
i j (k) (4.3)
Properties of the AF Methodology
The AF methodology has several attractive properties. I show the most basic and useful ones
here, as I will apply them in the empirical part. Broadly, one can think of components of the
M0, H , and A. For instance, instead of a headcount ratio for the entire country one may be
interested in H for the country’s regions. Likewise, one may be interested in the dimensions
of M0 and the question arises which dimension contributes most to M0. What is the dimension
with the highest deprivation rates? Thus, with the censored deprivation matrix in mind, one is
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interested in M0, H , and A by columns (dimensions) and rows (sub-groups). The AF method-
ology allows to undertake such “decompositions” in a coherent manner as the M 0 measure
satisfies both the properties of population subgroup decomposibility and dimensional break-
down (Alkire et al., 2015; Foster et al., 1984).
To begin with dimensional decomposition, the censored headcount ratio of dimension j
is defined as
h j =
1
n
n∑
i=1
g 0i j (k), (4.4)
which is the mean of the j t h column of the censored deprivation matrix g 0(k). The dimen-
sional contribution of each dimension j = 1, ..., d to M0 is defined as
φ0j = w j
h j (k)
M0
(4.5)
Importantly, the sum of all censored headcount ratios yields M0. Decomposing the censored
deprivation matrix by subgroups(rows) yields subgroup-specific values M0, H , and A. Mul-
tiplied with respective population shares the sum of all subgroup-specific values yields the
overall measures. Formally, given m subgroups and the population share of subgroup l given
by v l = n l/n, the overall M0 is
M0 =
m∑
l=1
v l M l0 (4.6)
Similarly, both overall incidence and overall intensity satisfy the property of subgroup decom-
posibility, so that
H =
m∑
l=1
v l H l (4.7)
A=
m∑
l=1
v l Al (4.8)
4.2.2 A Nutritional Deprivation Index: Extending the Alkire Foster
Methodology
In order to construct a Nutritional Deprivation Index (N DI ) which is sensitive to idiosyn-
cratic food requirements, the AF method as presented above needs to be adjusted. In terms
of notation and within the AF framework, one can think of the d dimensions as food groups
of interest, for example those recommended by the FAO. The n × d dimensional achieve-
ment matrix X thus contains entries of xi j which represent realizations of consumption for
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individual i in food group j (see matrix 4.9).
X =
x11 . . . x1d... . . . ...
xn1 . . . xnd
 (4.9)
In order to allow for idiosyncratic food requirements, I adjust the AF methodology by in-
troducing idiosyncratic minimum requirements for each food group j . Recall, that for the
first cut-off in the AF methodology a d -dimensional row vector z of thresholds is applied. If
the dimensions are food groups, this would imply that all individuals are treated equally in
terms of food requirements. However, it is widely known that food requirements vary from
person to person and by age, gender, health status, and occupation (Gopalan, 1992; Kakwani,
1992; Deaton and Drèze, 2009). In fact, requirements may even vary intra-individually de-
pending on health status or activity level (Srinivasan, 1992; Kakwani, 1992). Given, however,
only dimension-wise cut-offs neglects idiosyncratic requirements. For example, dimension-
wise cut-offs may be average thresholds for the entire population across age groups. This would
results in two types of errors. Either, for example, the consumption of fruits by infants could
be below the population-wise cut-off, while the infants’ consumption might just be adequate.
Or, for example, the relatively high consumption of cereals by laborers could be inadequate
to cover nutritional requirements but would be above the population-wise threshold. Hence,
in both cases dimension-wise cut-offs yield wrong estimates, which may be overestimates (in-
fants) or underestimates (laborers) of the inadequately nourished. Therefore, I account for id-
iosyncratic differences in food requirements by including person-specific thresholds, i.e. n dif-
ferent cut-offs. I thus employ an n× d -dimensional cut-off matrix Z (see matrix 4.10), instead
of just the d -dimensional row vector z, shown in equation 4.13. This adjustment is crucial and
presents the major adjustment to the classical AF method.
Z =
z11 . . . z1d... . . . ...
zn1 . . . znd
 (4.10)
I use Z to determine whether individual i consumes less in dimension j than individual i ’s
specific threshold zi j . Applying the cut-off matrix Z , I compute a deprivation matrix g
0z . This
represents the first step of the dual cut-off approach. The elements of g 0z are then: g 0zi j = 1
when xi j < zi j , and g
0z
i j = 0 whenever xi j ≥ zi j . All subsequent steps of the AF methodology
(including the second step of the dual cut-off method) remain the same, such that I ultimately
calculate a Nutritional Deprivation Index, N DI , as the product of the headcount ratio of the
nutritionally deprived, HN , and the average deprivation share of the nutritionally deprived,
AN .
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It might seem that having a matrix of vectors would fundamentally alter the properties
satisfied by the AF methodology, given that the original paper requires the cut-offs to be “fixed
and given." However, in the case of nutrition, in fact, far from generating incomparabilities
between individuals, a characteristic-specific cut-off creates comparability whereas a uniform
vector of cut-offs would not do so. Thus the cut-offs create comparable deprivations in the
space of nutritional functionings. For this reason they can be applied whilst maintaining the
same properties of the AF methodology. In the following section, I show how the N DI can
be computed when only household level data are available.
4.2.3 Adjustment to Allow for Household-level Data
Most national surveys collect data at the household level. That implies that information on, say
food consumption is not available for each individual but is aggregated at the household-level.
Thus it is not possible to apply individual food reference lines. However, if the survey provides
information on the number of individuals in a household, their gender, age and occupation,
as most household surveys do, then individual-level reference lines can be summed up at the
household level. Doing so yields household-wise minimum requirements for each food group.
The Z matrix can be written as a Z h matrix with household-level thresholds for each food
group as its entries.
The following example shall highlight the simple point. Typically, one observes for the
entire household i a row vector of food consumption (achievements), capturing food intakes
(in grams) for, say three food groups including cereals (C), vegetables (V), and pulses (P), so
that hypothetically for household i :
xi =

1360 300 450

Knowing the composition of the household yields the Z -matrix containing individual require-
ments, for example:
Z =
600 100 120480 100 90
300 100 60

Adding up these requirements by food group yields the z h vector for household i :
z hi =

1380 300 270

,
or more generally the d -dimensional z h vector for household i :
z hi = (z
h
i1, . . . , z
h
i d ). (4.11)
Repeating this for every household and collecting all rows of household-wise z h vectors yields
140
matrix Z h :
Z h =
z
h
11 . . . z
h
1d
... . . .
...
z hn1 . . . z
h
nd
 , (4.12)
the threshold matrix of household-wise food group requirements. Built on this first and ad-
justed step of the dual cut-off methodology for household-level data, a nutritional deprivation
index is constructed. Applying the elements of Z h as household-specific thresholds yields g 0z ,
g 0z (k), HN , AN , and N DI , as before in the framework for individual-level data .
To comment briefly on the household-specific thresholds: First, the adjustment of using
household specific cut-offs comes close to the idea of using equivalence scales in poverty mea-
surement. Given only household consumption expenditure, per capita expenditures are often
calculated using age and gender specific weights - equivalence scales. Second, the measure is
sensitive to household composition and needs. As the individual thresholds are summed up
at the household level, household-specific needs are captured, even though intra-household
allocations and inequalities cannot be captured.
4.3 Application: An N DI for Rural India
In this section, I present results of applying the N DI to household-level data for India. Being
one of the fastest growing countries during the last decades, it makes for an interesting exam-
ple. In particular, a nutritional index for India is of great interest since despite considerable
advances in poverty alleviation India still accounts for the highest number of malnourished
children in the world.10 In particular, compared to its South Asian neighbors, India is lagging
behind in many indicators related to health and nutrition (Drèze and Sen, 2013). Multidimen-
sional poverty in India as measured by Alkire and Seth (2015a) varies greatly by state and
sub-population. Alkire and Seth show that the progress in poverty alleviation between 1999
and 2006 has not been even. Richer states were able to reduce multidimensional poverty at
much higher rates than the relatively poorer ones. Likewise, poverty rates for Hindu families
and upper caste families reduced relatively faster than for more disadvantaged groups of Mus-
lim families and scheduled tribes. Building on the study by Alkire and Seth (2015), this paper
contributes to existing research on state and subgroup-wise differences in India. I construct an
N DI and decompose the index by states and sub-groups. This shall serve mainly illustrative
purposes of the new measure while also providing evidence on nutritional deprivation in rural
India.
10http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/07/daily-chart-0
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4.3.1 Data
I use data from India’s reputed National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) for the year
2011-12. With more than 100,000 households interviewed the sample is representative at the
national as well as at the state-level. In its 68th round, the NSSO collected consumption data
on prices and quantities using a seven as well as a 30 day recall period. In the following, I make
use of the seven day recall period assuming that it is the most accurate in terms of reflecting
quantities of food products. Since the data are collected year-round, all agricultural seasons are
equally covered. Thus, one may rule out seasonal artefacts in the data. I focus on rural India,
only, for two reasons. First, given the high prevalence rate of undernutrition in rural India
(Drèze and Sen, 2013), it is important to shed light on one of the major causes of undernu-
trition in the very same region. Second, given that a large share of India’s rural population
consumes home-cooked food and less frequently outside meal options (Deaton and Drèze,
2009), which is more difficult to measure and convert into food groups, I neglect urban areas
in this paper. For all estimations of aggregates, I apply the standard NSS survey weights.
4.3.2 Indicators, Cut-offs, and Weights
In order to measure food inadequacies in several food groups simultaneously using the
framework outlined above, it is necessary to make important judgment calls on four in-
terchangeable and “flexible” parameters. First, what indicators do best capture a diverse
diet in rural India? Second, what are the indicator and person-specific cut-offs? Third, what
dimensional weights ought to be used? And fourth, what k-value is most appropriate?
Choice of Indicators
Most measures of dietary diversity, like the DDI , use broad food groups as indicators,
instead of micro-nutrients, for example. I follow the Indian National Institute of Nutrition’s
(NIN) guidelines and focus on food groups. The NIN’s argumentation is that, since “people
consume food, it is essential to advocate nutrition in terms of foods, rather than nutrients.
Emphasis has, therefore, been shifted from a nutrient orientation to the food based approach
for attaining optimal nutrition” (National Institute of Nutrition, 2011). It has been common
practice by the NIN since 1998 to report on dietary intake in India and provide for dietary
guidelines in India. Based on that, the NIN publishes detailed statistics on food intakes for
eight broadly categorized food groups. These are Cereals, Pulses & Meat, Dairy products,
Leafy Vegetables, Other Vegetables, Fruits, Oils and Fats, Roots and Tubers. I utilize these
eight categories to measure nutritional inadequacy via the N DI framework.
Choice of Cut-offs
In order to create a Z h matrix - the threshold matrix containing household-wise food refer-
ence lines - I exploit two sources of information. First, I employ household-level information
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given in the survey data (NSS 2011-12) on the number of individuals within a household, each
member’s age, gender, and occupation. Second, I utilize information provided by the National
Institute of Nutrition (2011) on “recommendations for a healthy diet”. These recommended
daily allowances (RDAs) are age, gender, and occupation-specific based on what the NIN con-
siders as “nutrient-centred." The “guidelines promote the concept of nutritionally adequate
diets and healthy lifestyles from the time of conception to old age.” Since these RDAs are
widely used, so for example by the FAO Nutrition and Consumer Protection Division (2008),
I consider these guidelines as justifiable cut-offs. Therefore, to create the Z h matrix I sum up
the food reference lines, as given in Table 4.1, at the household-level and as per household
composition.
However, since the RDAs are meant as guidelines for a “healthy diet” for the average
Indian person, they are likely to be relatively high for households living in poverty. Thus, in
order to measure (non)access to nutrition of an “acceptable” minimum which guarantees to
avoid hunger and starvation, much lower RDAs may be considered. I do so in the subsequent
analyses by applying the RDAs of only a quarter of their value (RDA 25 %) and one half
(RDA 50 %).
Choice of Weights
In terms of choosing weights for each food groups, I apply equal weights of 1/8 for each food
group. I do so, since the NIN and FAO consider these eight food groups as equally essential
for a diverse diet. If, however, the focus is on measuring access to the most essential and
vital food groups to, for example, avoid undernutrition one could easily change the weights.
For instance, one may consider that cereals, vegetables, and proteins are the most vital food
groups of the eight. Following this logic, one could set the food group-wise weights in such
a way that the said three groups are weighted each with 1/4 and the remaining five with
each 1/20. Since such a procedure requires as much justification as choosing equal weights, I
restrict the analysis in this paper to an application of only equal weights. After all, this paper’s
application of NSS data shall mainly serve illustrative purposes of the new N DI framework
and is at no means ideal.
Choice of k-values
In the subsequent analyses, I report the various parameters of the N DI for several k values.
Recall that in this application of household-level data and eight food groups, a household is
nutritionally deprived if it is deprived in more than k food categories. Counting those house-
holds which are deprived in more than k food groups and taking the mean of the sub-sample of
interest yields the headcount ratio of nutritional deprivation, or HN k . Calculating the average
deprivation count of the nutritionally deprived (in k food groups) yields AN k . The product of
HN k and AN k yields N DIk .
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Table 4.1: Recommended Daily Allowances (RDAs)
Activity and Gender Age and Gender Age only
Sedentary Heavy 16-18 13-15 10-12 7-9 4-6 1-3 infant
Items M F M F M F M F M F
Cereals 375 270 600 480 450 330 420 330 300 240 180 120 60 15
Pulses & Meat 75 60 120 90 90 75 75 60 60 60 60 30 30 7.5
Dairy Products 300 300 300 300 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 400
Leafy Vegetables 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 50 25
Other Vegetables 200 200 200 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 25
Fruits 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Oils & Fat 25 20 40 30 50 35 45 40 35 35 30 25 25 20
Roots & Tubers 200 200 200 200 200 200 150 100 100 100 100 100 50 25
Notes: All figures are in grams and are recommendations per day.
Source: FAO Nutrition and Consumer Protection Division (2008), NIN, Hyderabad, India, 2008.
4.3.3 Findings for Rural India using 2011-12 NSS Data
The following trends emerge from the application of using Indian NSS data (2011-12) for
rural areas. Table 4.2 depicts state-wise and so called raw headcount ratios for all food groups.
These headcount ratios are ‘raw’ in the sense of showing the deprivations for the population,
irrespective of how many deprivations a household may face. According to Table 4.2 in
almost every food group I find considerable state-wise variation. For instance, the North
Eastern states of Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Assam are hardly deprived at
all in cereals, whereas states like Maharashtra and Karnataka account for incidences of about
eight per cent. While such incidences are rather small in magnitude, they appear much higher
for the food group of pulses. Here, the highest rate is above 80 per cent (Rajasthan) and the
lowest as low as four per cent (Nagaland). Average deprivations in leafy vegetables are very
high in comparison, and reach up to 100 per cent (Puducherry). Raw headcount ratios do not
inform about the joint deprivations households face in several food groups simultaneously.
They do, however, provide information on average intakes of each food group and provide
a good starting point to think about and calculate joint deprivations. These are captured
using the counting approach described above. I present the results for rural India in Table
4.3. I report all ratios of interest - HN , AN , N DI - for k-values ranging from one to eight. It
is apparent, that HN decreases with increasing k-values, while AN increases. For low k-values
HN is almost 100 per cent, implying that the entire rural population is inadequately nourished
in at least one food group. AN for a k-value of one is at about 50 per cent, implying that
those who are inadequately nourished in at least one food group are on average inadequately
nourished in four of eight food groups. At a k-value of five HN is around 30 per cent and AN
at 70 per cent, implying that a third of India’s rural population is inadequately nourished in
at least five food groups, and on average in 5.6 food groups.
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Table 4.2: N DI using Household Data: State-wise Raw Headcount Ratios
Cereals Pulses Dairy P. Leafy Veg. Other Veg. Fruits Oils Roots
Andaman and Nicobar 4.46 5.12 89.42 63.3 10.95 51.97 6.45 98.44
Andhra Pradesh 5.57 22.1 73.03 95.25 11.33 55.83 15.12 99.33
Arunachal Pradesh 2.7 14.94 91.69 43.76 28.88 67.31 60.02 77.8
Assam 1.52 15.65 96.51 68.63 19.15 74.43 38.69 77.7
Bihar 0.59 41.86 74.28 80.75 9.71 76.85 34.89 29.18
Chandigarh 9.99 27.56 24.52 95.82 9.26 54.5 9.42 76.55
Chhattisgarh 2.54 47.14 94.97 72.27 8.37 82.96 29.73 88.14
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 14.97 29.67 74.37 99.93 26.88 77.52 19.97 96.88
Daman and Diu 16.43 11.38 68.94 100 21.07 71.39 9.57 87.22
Delhi 11.81 37.79 26.86 91.51 14.97 56.96 9.76 76.23
Goa 6.23 9.76 52.49 85.37 27.09 7.67 16.86 99.38
Gujarat 8.81 55.2 46.33 94.23 12.01 70.49 4.71 88.12
Haryana 4.7 63.53 16.6 85 7.38 51.26 29.74 75.69
Himachal Pradesh 3.01 19.25 29.85 85.76 15.34 64.92 12.94 87.31
Jammu and Kashmir 1.41 31.8 24.05 41.48 17.26 66.67 8.79 91.29
Jharkhand 3.48 46.93 83.44 81.3 17.72 86.65 40.83 32.3
Karnataka 8.31 34.5 71.71 88.19 22.94 39.37 20.32 99.9
Kerala 10.5 12.96 74.21 98.74 25.67 11.23 36.9 99.35
Lakshadweep 6.55 12.39 99.29 100 36.82 2.56 25.37 98.86
Madhya Pradesh 2.82 54.23 69.89 92.66 20.92 72.14 25.98 86.22
Maharashtra 8.29 33.57 69.25 86.5 22.78 56.76 9.41 97.82
Manipur 1.09 31.75 99.89 64.87 44.54 84.39 67.73 94.68
Meghalaya 2.25 21.44 96.88 71.88 31.46 81.69 53.42 86.18
Mizoram 0.1 12.9 92.22 30.36 26.17 81.56 20.8 84.11
Nagaland 0 3.61 98.42 31.37 19.75 77.23 82.64 87.01
Orissa 2.35 41.21 91.91 79.71 13.28 79.36 49.25 62.04
Puducherry 11.34 12.65 47.44 99.95 15.99 39.57 18.62 97.73
Punjab 6.78 58.04 18.37 88.8 6.53 67.03 9.86 75.59
Rajasthan 2.34 81.84 35.03 92.6 22.39 71.82 27.59 92.03
Sikkim 5.89 45.15 39.58 48.67 14.78 90.62 14.77 81.86
Tamil Nadu 9.46 22.73 65.56 95.96 20.55 42.61 27.06 99.78
Tripura 1.06 17.47 95.45 47.52 5.2 65.71 42.43 84.23
Uttar Pradesh 2.09 46.26 63.05 92.39 18.15 74.67 25.56 35.6
Uttaranchal 1.81 31.84 32.51 77.55 9.05 66.16 8.27 73.27
West Bengal 4.78 28.43 91.07 76.64 20.5 78.15 20.45 27.34
Calculated from NSS Round 68, Consumption Module 2011-12. 50 per cent of Food Reference Value applied.
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Table 4.3: N DI using Household Data: HN , AN , M 0N , and HD over k-values
k HN AN M 0N HD
1 99.62 48.57 0.484 67.32
2 96.28 49.82 0.48 27.78
3 83.32 53.68 0.447 5.99
4 59.07 60.33 0.356 1.51
5 31.52 69.36 0.219 1.34
6 12.26 80.13 0.098 1.3
7 4.01 90.71 0.036 1.14
8 1.03 100 0.01 0.71
Calculated from NSS Round 68, Consumption Module 2011-12.
Decomposition by States
Figure 4.1 presents maps depicting state-wise headcount ratios, HN , for k-values ranging from
three to eight.11 At higher k-values, one particular region appears to be particularly exposed
to nutritional deprivation. The belt stretches from Rajasthan in the North West via Madhya
Pradesh and Jharkhand to Orissa. These regions are known to be the most disadvantaged
areas in other aspects, too, be it monetary or multidimensional poverty, health, education or
living standards (Alkire and Seth, 2015a). In the following, I stick to presenting results for a
k-value of five.
Breakdown and Contribution by Food Group
In Figure 4.2, I show Censored Headcount (CH) Ratios for every food group and for the k-
value of five. Being nutritionally deprived and deprived in, say cereals yields the CH for cereals.
The CH of cereals is the lowest in comparison to the other seven, which can reach values of
more than 25 per cent. The highest ones are found for the groups of leafy vegetables and
roots. Related to Figure 4.2 is Figure 4.3. It presents state-wise contributions of food groups to
the overall N DI score, M 0. The broad pattern reveals that food group contributions to food
inadequacy are broadly similar but still vary by state. Similarly, but not the same as the raw
headcount ratios, I find that the contribution of cereals to the overall measure is near zero, but
is about five per cent in some states (Delhi, Kerala). The highest contributions to nutritional
inadequacies can be found for pulses, leafy vegetables, and fruits.
Decomposition by Socioeconomic Subgroups
Besides large regional differences across rural India there exist large inequalities across socioe-
conomic subgroups such as caste, gender, and religion among others (Drèze and Khera, 2013;
Alkire and Seth, 2015b). In Table 4.4, I present the three measures of the N DI (HN , AN , M 0N )
along with the censored headcount ratios of each food group, given a k-value of five. It is
11I exclude maps for higher k-values here, as there is hardly any variation at such high levels of k.
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(a) k = 3
k−value 3
% Deprived
50 RDA
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(b) k = 4
k−value 4
% Deprived
50 RDA
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(c) k = 5
k−value 5
% Deprived
50 RDA
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(d) k = 6
k−value 6
% Deprived
50 RDA
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(e) k = 7
k−value 7
% Deprived
50 RDA
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(f) k = 8
k−value 8
% Deprived
50 RDA
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
Figure 4.1: State-wise HD by k-value
apparent that the traditionally most disadvantaged groups have also the least access to an ad-
equate nutrition. Therefore, households belonging to Scheduled Tribes, the landless or very
large household account for the highest HN (above 40 per cent). While AN does not vary much
across subgroups, it is around 70 per cent, HN varies substantially. For instance, among caste
groups HN for higher castes (other) (22 per cent) is less than half the value of HN for Sched-
uled Tribes. Across landholding classes, the pattern is quite clear: the more landholding the
less chances of being inadequately nourished. Also across censored headcount ratios, the large
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Figure 4.2: Censored Headcount Ratios for k=5
landowners are the least likely to be deprived in any of the eight food groups while being at the
same time nutritionally deprived in at least five of them. A similar pattern is evident for the
decomposition by household size. The larger the household the higher the chances of being
inadequately nourished. With increasing household size censored headcount ratios increase,
almost continuously.
4.4 Comparison between N DI and DDI
In this Section, I compare the N DI and the DDI in two ways. First, I compare the concep-
tional frameworks of the two approaches. For this purpose, I show how the DDI is con-
structed and how its weaknesses are overcome in the N DI framework. Second, I show empir-
ically the differences in outcomes the two approaches yield.
4.4.1 The DDI Framework
In most studies, the DDI serves as a count of food groups and yields the ratio of those not
consuming a diverse diet to the total sample population. Traditionally, neither food-specific
nor person-specific thresholds are set. Only incidences of the joint non-consumption in several
food groups are counted. For comparison with the N DI framework, I construct the DDI as
close as possible to the N DI using the dual cut-off methodology. The latter has not been
referred to as such in DDI studies; certainly so since the DDI normally does not include any
148
020
40
60
80
100
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 M
0 
(in
 %
)
An
da
ma
n a
nd
 Ni
co
ba
r
An
dh
ra 
Pra
de
sh
Aru
na
ch
al 
Pra
de
sh
As
sa
m
Bih
ar
Ch
an
dig
arh
Ch
ha
ttis
ga
rh
Da
dra
 an
d N
ag
ar 
Ha
vel
i
Da
ma
n a
nd
 Di
u
De
lhi Go
a
Gu
jara
t
Ha
rya
na
Him
ac
ha
l P
rad
es
h
Ja
mm
u a
nd
 Ka
sh
mi
r
Jh
ark
ha
nd
Ka
rna
tak
a
Ke
ral
a
La
ksh
ad
we
ep
Ma
dh
ya
 Pr
ad
es
h
Ma
ha
ras
htr
a
Ma
nip
ur
Me
gh
ala
ya
Mi
zo
ram
Na
ga
lan
d
Or
iss
a
Pu
du
ch
err
y
Pu
nja
b
Ra
jast
han
Sik
kim
Ta
mi
l N
ad
u
Tri
pu
ra
Utt
ar 
Pra
de
sh
Utt
ara
nc
ha
l
We
st 
Be
ng
al
Calculated from NSS 2011−12, Consumption Module Type 2.
CH Cereals CH Pulses CH Leafy Veg
CH Fruits Other Vegetables CH Dairy Prod.
CH Oils CH Roots&Tubers
Figure 4.3: Percentage Contribution of Food Groups to M 0 for k = 5
explicit dimensional thresholds one does not think of two cut-offs. The z-vector contains the
dimensional cut-offs and can be thought of as only containing zeros for each dimension. The
minimum threshold to determine dietary diversity in food groups is in effect a k-value, similar
to the one of the N DI framework which builds on the AF methodology. Therefore, I present
the DDI framework using the dual cut-off approach which will exemplify the differences
between the N DI and DDI .
To begin with, in the DDI framework the threshold vector zD for d food groups is
zD = (z1, ..., zd ), (4.13)
with all entries being zero. As in the N DI framework, one can think of an achievement ma-
trix, X , with xi j entries reflecting realizations in food consumption for person i in food group
j . Now, in order to count incidences of consumption and collect this information in a depriva-
tion matrix, say g 0D , the following holds: given that the threshold vector includes only zeros,
elements g 0Di j = 1 if xi j = z j , and g
0D
i j = 0 if xi j > z j . Building on this, a vector of depriva-
tion counts, c D , contains row-wise counts of deprivations. Ignoring dimensional weights, its
entries ci are ci =
∑d
j=1 g
0D
i j . Regarding the second cut-off, a person is considered as deprived
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Table 4.4: Subgroup Decomposition for k-value = 5
Subgroup HN AN M 0N CH Cereals CH Pulses CH Dairy P. CH Leafy V. CH Other V. CH Fruits CH Oils CH Roots &. T.
Caste
Scheduled Tribes 46.8 72.0 0.337 4.5 36.9 44.5 43.3 21.8 44.2 30.8 43.5
Scheduled Castes 37.2 69.1 0.257 2.6 29.8 34.4 36.0 14.2 35.0 23.7 29.6
Backward Classes 29.7 68.5 0.203 2.2 22.9 27.0 29.1 11.8 27.1 17.5 25.2
Other 22.4 69.3 0.155 2.2 17.0 19.7 21.6 11.7 20.4 12.6 18.8
Religion
Hinduism 32.5 69.5 0.226 2.7 26.0 29.7 31.4 13.6 30.1 19.5 27.8
Islam 25.5 68.1 0.173 1.3 16.5 24.0 24.7 12.0 23.8 17.5 18.8
Christianity 32.5 72.0 0.234 5.0 19.3 31.8 30.4 18.6 27.0 25.7 29.7
Other 23.6 67.3 0.159 2.4 18.9 18.7 22.8 8.1 22.2 11.0 23.0
Landholding Class
Landless 46.1 68.3 0.314 6.8 39.8 42.7 45.0 12.9 43.6 21.8 39.0
Marginal 32.1 68.7 0.220 1.6 24.8 30.0 30.8 12.8 29.9 20.2 26.1
Small 27.5 68.1 0.188 0.3 20.7 23.5 27.0 11.9 26.5 13.9 26.3
Semi-Medium 24.2 66.3 0.161 0.3 18.0 18.3 23.4 11.2 23.1 10.6 23.5
Medium 25.0 68.3 0.171 0.0 21.0 18.5 24.8 16.1 22.0 10.5 23.5
Large 18.7 65.4 0.123 0.2 15.4 9.4 18.7 12.4 14.7 8.7 18.4
Household Size
Less than 3 Members 22.4 76.9 0.172 9.7 20.9 20.3 21.6 12.8 18.3 13.2 20.9
3-4 Members 25.2 67.6 0.170 1.0 19.3 23.2 24.2 9.2 23.6 14.7 21.1
5-6 Members 38.0 68.6 0.260 1.5 28.5 34.7 36.3 15.7 35.4 24.4 31.8
More than 6 Members 42.7 69.1 0.295 1.0 33.0 38.8 41.9 19.5 40.7 25.4 35.5
Calculated from NSS Round 68, Consumption Module 2011-12. Applied RDA: 50 per cent of RDA.
Landholding classes in hectares: 0.002 < land ≤ 1 (Marginal), 1 < land ≤ 2 (Small), 2 < land ≤ 4 (Semi-Medium), 4 < land ≤ 10 (Medium), land >10 (Large)
in dietary diversity (not consuming a diverse diet) if she is deprived in at least k food groups.
Applying k to the c D -vector thus yields the c D(k)-vector with entries ci (k) = 1 if ci ≥ k and
ci (k) = 0 if ci < k. Now, traditionally the DDI framework has been used only to report the
incidence of those not consuming a diverse diet, which is HD . The latter can be written as:
HD =
∑n
i=1 ci (k)
n .
Viewing the DDI in such an Alkire-Foster-type framework the DDI resembles the N DI
in two ways. One, the joint deprivations in food groups are considered. Thus, both the N DI
and the DDI account for simultaneous deprivations in food inadequacies at the individual
level. Second, both the N DI and the DDI framework yield a headcount ratio of the inade-
quately nourished, HN and HD , respectively.
However, the DDI framework has three major shortfalls, which the N DI framework
overcomes. First, the DDI does not elicit beyond the incidence of food inadequacy. While
HD is certainly very informative as such, it does not inform about the intensity of food in-
adequacy. Therefore, inequalities in food diversity among those not consuming a diverse diet
may be stark but overlooked by focusing only on HD . In fact, HD identifies everyone as equally
deprived in dietary diversity as long as they consume less than k different food groups, even
though some may consume much less than the minimum k while others consume just below
k. Formally, HD violates the monotonicity principle, according to which, in the context of the
DDI , additional deprivations should increase food inadequacy and thus the value of HD . The
violation of the monotonicity principle is a well known problem in poverty measurement. To
overcome it, other poverty measures go beyond the headcount ratio and allow to estimate the
intensity of poverty (Foster et al., 1984; Ray, 1998; Alkire et al., 2015). The N DI framework,
too, overcomes this problem by accounting for the average intensity of food deprivation, AN .
The headcount ratio HN , similar to HD , still violates the dimensional monotonicity. But since
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both the incidence as well as the intensity of food inadequacy are calculated the N DI frame-
work provides for much richer information. Further, the ultimate N DI -figure, M 0, which is
the product of HN and AN , does not violate dimensional monotonicity.
Second, the DDI framework does usually not include dimensional thresholds. Recall, the
zDDI -vector contains only zeros. Doing so, the DDI does not control for heterogeneous food
requirements and thus ignores the extent of food deprivations within food groups. The DDI
framework could easily allow for the inclusion of food-group specific thresholds as these could
be collected in the zD -vector. However, this is rarely done. The N DI framework, on the other
hand, does account for dimensional thresholds.
Third, the DDI framework does not include any individual specific thresholds for the
various food groups. Similar to not including dimensional thresholds, not accounting for id-
iosyncratic differences in food requirements underestimates the incidence of food inadequacies
and neglects the extent of food inadequacy entirely. For instance, food requirements vary im-
mensely by age, gender, occupation and other factors (Gopalan, 1992; Kakwani, 1992), but
the DDI ignores all of these by just counting incidences of consumption irrespective of any
thresholds. The N DI overcomes this weakness by accounting for idiosyncratic thresholds.
The n× d -dimensional Z -matrix combines both idiosyncratic and dimensional thresholds.
4.4.2 Empirical Differences in N DI and DDI Applications
Given the fundamental differences in the two conceptual frameworks described above, empir-
ical outcomes can be expected to be different. To show this, I utilize the NSS household-level
data for rural India (2011-12), as before.
Headcount ratios for any given k-value will always be higher for HN than for HD , or at
least as high. This is due to the z-cut-offs which are always zero in the DDI framework and
are always greater than zero in the N DI framework. Therefore, under the DDI framework,
by counting tiny amounts of food consumption one would identify these as “no deprivation",
whereas under the N DI one would identify these tiny amounts as a food shortfall and a de-
privation, given that they are below the household-specific threshold of zh .
Table 4.3 presents both HN and HD . Clearly, HN is always higher than HD across all k-
values. In terms of levels, the two headcount ratios are very different, especially so for lower
k-values. For a k-value of 1, the HD figure is 67 per cent, implying that 67 per cent of India’s
rural population do not at all consume at least one of the eight food groups. HD then drops
sharply to 28 per cent given a k-value of 2. In contrast, for the same k-values HN is much higher
at about 100 per cent and 96 per cent, respectively. This means that almost all rural households
are inadequately nourished in at least two food groups given the zh -cut-offs. The HD figures
drop much further and faster than the HN figures, so that already at a k-value of 4 the incidence
figure is close to 1 per cent, which the HN reaches only at a k-value of 8. These differences
are also visible and even more pronounced in the state-wise decomposition of HN and HD
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(a) HN for k = 5
k−value 5
% Deprived
50 RDA
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(b) HD for k = 2
k−value 2
% HD 
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
Figure 4.4: State-wise HN for k = 5 and HD for k = 2
(Table 4.5). For example, at a k-value of one, HN is as high as 100 per cent in almost every
state, whereas HD can be as low as 42 per cent (Karnataka).
12 Similar to the national figures,
state-wise HD reduces much faster than HN with increasing k. In Karnataka, for instance, HD
decreases to 9 per cent at a k-value of two and declines further to two per cent at a k-value of
four. In contrast, HN reduces at a much smaller rates with higher k-values, so that only at a
k-value of eight it is at level of two per cent.
HN and HD are similar in magnitude at the national and state level at two specific k-values.
At a k-value of two for HD and at a k-value of five for HN , the national incidence rates are
not too far apart: HN is just above 30 per cent and HD is just below 30 per cent. While the
two ratios at the national level are not far apart given, maps for state-wise variation in HN and
HD , given the two specific k-values, reveal a different scenario (Figure 4.4). HN for a k-value
of five is particularly high in the Northern Hindi speaking belt (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh, and Orissa). HD , on the other hand, does not replicate such a pattern entirely
as there is more variation across Indian states. For example, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are
among the most deprived states, the remaining four states identified under HN as part of the
“belt” are not in this group, however. Further, while there does not appear to be much varia-
tion across states in Central and Southern India under the HN , there is a stretch identified as
much less food deprived under the HD . This stretch reaches from Maharashtra via Karnataka
to Tamil Nadu. To sum up, the two frameworks yield highly divergent results. It is apparent
that a DDI underestimates food inadequacies to a great extent by just focusing on non-zero
food intakes, which by particularly pronounced in regional estimations.
One may conjecture that household-level data are not ideal for either of the two measures.
Both measures are ideally applied to individual-level data to account for intra-household allo-
cations. I show, however, that even household-level data can be applied using the N DI frame-
work when “tweaked” for household-level data by summing up individual thresholds at the
12For completeness, Appendix Figure ?? includes maps showing the state-wise variation in levels of HD for all
k-values up to six.
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household level. Such a scenario is not feasible in the traditional DDI framework when all
thresholds are set at zero. Therefore, the N DI has some advantage in this regard. Both the
DDI and N DI are ideally suited to capture food groups for a short recall period, for exam-
ple, two days. For longer periods its values, especially those of the DDI , are certain to drop
drastically, as evident from Table 4.3.
Both frameworks depend to a great deal on the data collected. If these are based on
national household consumption surveys both frameworks will suffer from sampling error.
Any measure is bound to suffer from such drawbacks if no census data can be collected.
In addition, for the ideal N DI , individual level-data on consumption (in quantity) would
be necessary. Given the long list of food items as for example in the latest NSS round,
the collection of such data at the individual level is likely to be very time consuming, and
might stretch resources of national statistics offices beyond capacities. Certainly, in favor
of the DDI speaks that individual-level data on just the incidence of eight food groups can
be collected in much less time. If, however, the data collection is focused on just the eight
food groups of interest, resources of national statistics offices may also suffice to collect
quantity-wise information on consumption at the individual level. The latter are then ideally
suited for an N DI .
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a new tool to measure dietary diversity: the Nutritional Deprivation Index
(N DI ). Being a counting method, the N DI extends the widely used Dietary Diversity Index
(DDI ) and builds on the Alkire-Foster methodology. I show that the N DI can be applied
to both individual as well as household-level data from ordinary national sample surveys. The
N DI overcomes three major weaknesses of the DDI . First, while the DDI only considers the
incidence of the inadequately nourished, the N DI provides both the incidence and the inten-
sity of nutritional deprivation. Doing so, the N DI framework yields the headcount ratio of
the inadequately nourished and the average deprivation share of the inadequately nourished.
Second, the N DI provides for food group-specific thresholds, which are overlooked in com-
mon applications of the DDI . Third, in combination with food group-specific thresholds,
the N DI allows for individual-specific thresholds. Since consumption is shown to vary sub-
stantially by age, occupation, activity level, and gender among many other factors (Gopalan,
1992; Osmani, 1992; Behrmann, 1992; Deaton and Drèze, 2009; Tilman and Clark, 2015), the
N DI feature of allowing for both idiosyncratic and food group-specific thresholds is certainly
advantageous and makes the N DI superior to the DDI framework.
In this paper, I demonstrate how the N DI can be applied to ordinary household-level data
for rural India. I implement several advantages of the N DI framework, such as regional de-
composition and dimensional breakdowns, which provide for interesting information. My
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analyses reveal that the highest incidences of inadequately nourished households are in the
Northern states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Orissa. Going beyond an
analysis of headcount ratios, these households are deprived in at least five of eight food groups,
and primarily so in the food groups of pulses, leafy vegetables, and fruits. Further, the tradi-
tionally most disadvantaged socioeconomic subgroups are the most exposed to inadequate
nutrition. These include Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, the landless, and households
with many household members. The results exemplify that the manifold decompositions of
the N DI are ideal for targeting purposes. Using this framework, policy makers can, on the one
hand, identify inadequately nourished regions and subgroups, while on the other hand iden-
tify the most needed food groups. Such a measure can be of great use in low income countries
or regions of crises. The rich information gained from an application of the N DI could also
inform awareness campaigns designed for wealthier societies, where despite available resources
to afford a healthy and diverse diet, many households in higher income countries chose not
to do so (Tilman and Clark, 2015).
The outlined technique of an adjusted Alkire-Foster methodology has the potential of be-
ing used in other fields of research related to health, nutrition, and health economics. For
example, the technique can be easily adopted to measure child nutrition and deficiencies in
micro-nutrients in a multidimensional setting. The outlined technique can be adapted to al-
low for child nutrition-specific weighting schemes, so that nutrients or food groups important
during child feeding, e.g. milk, calcium, receive higher weights. Going beyond food groups,
one can think of converting food groups into micro-nutrients to measure a more finely tuned
measure of nutrition. This may overcome the limitation of food groups being substitutes in
the N DI framework. While research has established a link between dietary diversity - as based
on the DDI - and anthropometric outcomes (e.g. Menon et al., 2015), such a correlation still
needs to be established for the likely link between parameters of the N DI and anthropometric
outcomes.
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4.A Figures
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(a) k = 1
k−value 1
% HD 
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(b) k = 2
k−value 2
% HD 
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(c) k = 3
k−value 3
% HD 
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(d) k = 4
k−value 4
% HD 
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(e) k = 5
k−value 5
% HD 
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
(f) k = 6
k−value 6
% HD 
80.00 − 100.00
60.00 − 80.00
40.00 − 60.00
20.00 − 40.00
0.00 − 20.00
Calculated with data from: NSS 2011−12 Consumption Module, Type 2.
Figure 4.5: State-wise HD by k-value
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